

THE
METHODIST QUARTERLY REVIEW.

JULY, 1852.

ART. I.—INSTAURATIO NOVA—AUGUSTE COMTE.

By Geo. Fred. Holmes.
EVERY age has its own distinctive excellence, and boasts of the greatness of its own reformer, real or supposed. Even in the degradation and despondency of a declining civilization, the hard necessities of the times, if they fail to produce any actual relief, generate the strength to resist or the fortitude to bear the impending fate, and nurse into belief the credulous hope that some great name, on which all reliance is reposed, may prove the instrument of salvation. Nero could dream of alleviating the intolerable miseries of his subjects by the chimerical project of abolishing taxation;* and, long after the tyrant's death, the wretched populations of the Roman empire deluded themselves with the conviction that he would one day return as their deliverer.† In a more degraded age, and under an emperor almost baser than Nero, dreams of social regeneration sought for practical realization; and the pure and profound Plotinus attempted, with the sanction of Gallienus, to give effect to the visionary socialism of Plato.‡ It was in the hour of their greatest gloom and despair that Moses was sent to deliver the Israelites from the bondage under which they groaned; and every race and generation of men trusts in like manner that its Moses has appeared or will soon descend to lead it from present wretchedness to the distant and dimly apprehended land of promise. Rarely is the expectation realized; but occasionally it proves the instrument of its own fulfilment; and at times the desired renovation steals on silently, like the coming of a thief in the night, and is only recognised after its accomplishment. Most frequently, as Niebuhr truly remarks, no Moses appears, and the long agony lingers on to its close, and sinks beneath the ever-

* Muratori, *Annali d'Italia*. Ad ann. 58.

† Taciti Hist., lib. ii. c. viii.

‡ Sismondi, *Fall of the Roman Empire*, c. i.

waning hope which never ripens into fruit. Still, the belief, fluctuating but indestructible, remains—that time, and change, and circumstance, and the potency of some novel scheme, or the influence of some cherished name, will end the long sorrow, and ultimately “lead up the golden year.” The reasonableness of the anticipation, and the particular form which it assumes, vary necessarily with the condition of the age in which it is entertained, and the character of the relief or advancement which may be required; and, we may add, that seldom is the belief more sincere than when it is without adequate foundation. But the natural tendency, in its diverse manifestations, whether romantically looking for the resuscitation of King Arthur, or impelling the Mormons to the Valley of the Salt Lake, produces many false hopes, and leads to the acknowledgment of many as prophets and deliverers, who have no claim to such honour, or an inadequate one. But, with the tenacious hope of better days to come, with the anxiety for some stable faith as a refuge from perplexing difficulties and constant uncertainty in regard to things human or divine, and with the perverse attachment to error once embraced, especially if recommended by novelty—which are all so pre-eminently characteristic of the human family—the blind credulity of a hasty superstition adheres more tenaciously to its newly-discovered idol, than a well-founded belief adheres to an object of legitimate veneration. It is thus the part of prudence to dispel, if possible, the haze of an impending delusion before it has gathered into a settled atmosphere of cloud; and to challenge the mission and the revelation of an alleged prophet, whom it is proposed to recognise, before his authority becomes firmly established, and his dream is consolidated into an accepted creed.

The last half-century has been singularly prolific of new schemes of philosophy—wide-sweeping and universal in their pretensions; and in new projects of social reform, designed to remodel the whole framework of society, and to induct new and purer forms of organization over the ruins of all existing institutions. Genius, learning, ingenuity, and, we will add, self-sacrificing and sincere enthusiasm, have been displayed in the construction of these vast theories. We must lament the application of such earnest zeal and such splendid intellectual powers to the overthrow of Christianity as a necessary preliminary to the attainment of the ultimate aims. It remains for the future to disclose whether the originators of these devices have attained the highest flight to which the human intellect is destined to range in the current hundred years, or have yet “dissolved the riddle of the earth;” or whether there may not be still reserved for us a nobler, juster, and more comprehensive philosophy,

from which may spring as naturally as the fruit swells upon the tree, an adequate solution of the intellectual enigmas and social problems which now distract the times. Our own impression is that the great heresiarchs of the day are merely the first swallows of the coming spring, and are the Giordano Brunos, the Patrizzis, the Telesios, and Campanellas of an impending intellectual instauration. Certainly neither in Strauss nor Comte, neither in Schelling nor Fourier, nor in Leroux, Proudhon, nor Wronski, nor in any of the other supposed prophets of the time, are we willing to recognise the culminating intellect of the nineteenth century, until convinced by the fruitless lapse of time that we must look backward instead of forward for the great mind that is to give character to the age. But, whether this hope be a delusion or not, few of the great schemes which have been propounded in our times for the renovation of a decrepit system, whether they have belonged to the domain of politics or of metaphysics, or even of science, have failed to win for their founders the homage of a school, a sect, or a party.

But, far above all recent philosophers and reformers, in point of present prominence and prospective influence, as in point of comprehensiveness, ability, and practical skill, is the author of the system of Positive Philosophy, who has embraced within the wide scope of his contemplations, philosophy, science, politics, and practice; and who, after running through all the departments of human knowledge, except those which he had predetermined to reject, has endeavoured to augment the intellectual heritage bequeathed to us by the past, and to subserve the necessities of the present, by the construction of the new science of Sociology, which he designs to be the climax of his own labours, and the crown of all human research. The vastness of the plan, the singular ability with which it has been executed, its compact and symmetrical development, the profound results at which he has arrived, and the bold claim of universal dominion with which his system has been promulgated, have gained for Comte a party, daily increasing in numbers, and including many of the illustrious intellects of the age, who are not merely willing to follow his footsteps in particular instances, but assign to the Positive Philosophy the honour of being a new instauration, and enthusiastically hail its founder as the Bacon of the nineteenth century. The undefined hopes and the vague wants of the age are thus preparing to crystallize themselves around a recognised centre of attraction.

Having examined in former numbers of this Review the system of M. Comte as a philosophical method, and having endeavoured to determine as accurately as might be, within brief limits, its value, validity, and defects, we were naturally desirous of hasten-

ing as rapidly as possible to the consideration of its ulterior developments. We should have left nearly half our task unaccomplished, if, after pointing out what we deem to be the inherent fallacy and insufficiency of the mode, we had neglected to exhibit also the excellences and defects of the science constructed, and the practice proposed, in accordance with that mode. We were, therefore, solicitous of proceeding to the consideration of the *fruits* of the Positive Philosophy. We wished to analyze and examine M. Comte's Sociology; to review the dependant branches, which, admitting of independent treatment, have been brought within the vast sweep of that great science; to investigate, with as much sobriety and impartiality as we might be able to command, the grotesque scheme of political and social reorganization which is advocated in the *République Occidentale*; and to endeavour, from this wide, but by no means complete survey of M. Comte's labours, to estimate the merits and tendencies of the Positive Philosophy and its applications, in the symmetrical integrity of the mighty system. But, just as we were preparing for the execution of this task, our pen was arrested by the intelligence that the long-promised, long-expected *Système de Politique Positive*, wherein the new science of Sociology was to be revised, systematized, and definitely constituted, had issued from the Parisian press. Under these circumstances we have resolved to interrupt the continuity of our own criticism, until we can examine this important and anxiously desired work; and thus guard ourselves against the danger of either misapprehending or imperfectly apprehending the positions, the tendencies, the virtues, or the errors of the most original and *influential* portion of Comte's great enterprise. But, while we thus wait for the final exposition of the social science, we may not unprofitably employ the short interval with careful examination of the claims which M. Comte and his Positive doctrine possess to the high honour attributed to them by his zealous admirers, of being the Bacon of the age, and the second great instauration of the modern intellect. This investigation is by no means alien to the main tenor and purpose of our general inquiry; for these are points which, at some stage or other of the discussion, must demand a solution at our hands, and form a subject of anxious speculation or angry debate between the partisans of the new tenets and those who are not willing to renounce their settled convictions and cherished associations, and to abandon the venerated doctrines of their hallowed faith, until assured by incontrovertible evidence that they have lost all valid claim upon their allegiance, and are incapable of longer defence. If Comte be truly, as has been alleged, the great reformer of the present intellectual world, we cannot

too soon or too cordially recognise his lofty mission, and submit to his guidance; but if, on the contrary, his pretensions to this high character have been indiscreetly urged, and we must expect the desired instauration from the hands of some other prophet, we cannot too soon convince ourselves of the blighting delusion, and dispel the vague hopes which so readily cluster around a new name of promise.

The right of M. Comte to be esteemed the Bacon of the nineteenth century might be regarded as an isolated question, and treated accordingly. We might confine our attention strictly to him and his philosophy, estimate its prospective results, and from these data draw, by a summary process, a hasty conclusion as to the justice of the pretension put forward on his behalf; or we might contrast him and his labours with the Baconian philosophy and its founder: but, though this might barely suffice for a temporary and partial solution of the immediate problem before us, no such formal and imperfect parallelism would permit the inclusion of the wide and important bearings of a question which merits a much more comprehensive examination. Even if the title of Comte could be satisfactorily disproved by this brief process, the like honour might be challenged again and again by Proudhon, Lamennais, Gioberti, Wronski, and the hundred other reformers, now existing, or shortly to arise, who have invented or may propound schemes of social or intellectual regeneration, or both. If such a process should conclusively settle the pretensions of one candidate, it would excite the claims of a multitude of others; and the same question, under different aspects, would have to be moved, discussed, and decided on, whenever a bolder, more vigorous, original, or popular theory should inflame the expectations or the imaginations of enthusiastic sectaries. Thus, a mere comparison of Comte and Bacon, and of their respective philosophies, however thorough and minute it might be, would only lead to an unsatisfactory, because inadequate, decision. It would be defective, though the deficiency might not be altogether apparent, even with respect to the validity of Comte's own pretensions; for, while such a contrast would reveal the existence of many analogies and many dissimilarities, it would be difficult, if not impossible, from any such contracted field of view to determine what was purely accidental and what was essential in either the differences or the similitudes, and how far these characteristics of accident or property legitimately appertained to the analogies or the discrepancies. It is of the most urgent importance also to embrace within the scope of the same inquiry, the higher and more general, but still kindred investigation into the functions and distinctive traits of that philosophy which may

rightfully claim to be a New Instauration, and secure for its author the inestimable honour of being truly the Bacon of the nineteenth century, and the *Coryphaeus* of an intellectual renovation ampler, loftier, nobler, and even more fruitful and beneficent than its great precursor. We shall, therefore, with anxious diffidence, venture to enlarge the limits of speculations sufficiently difficult and extensive even in their most contracted form; and while estimating Comte's own claims by a higher standard and with a more comprehensive survey than would be afforded by any lower range, we shall render their consideration subordinate to the discussion of a wider question, and bring within the sweep of our horizon those collateral but more important topics, which will enable us definitely to determine the justice of Comte's and all similar pretensions, and, if not to expedite or anticipate the coming of the true reformer, at least to recognise the validity of his mission when his task has been done.

The plan, thus lightly sketched, may seem too unlimited, and is certainly difficult of suitable execution; but, perhaps, by an orderly method of procedure, we may be able to accomplish it in a manner not wholly unsatisfactory, and to compress it within briefer limits than might at first blush appear practicable. The same course, very nearly, which ought to be pursued for the adequate solution of the narrower problem, will also furnish the clue for our guidance in the treatment of the wider one. In order to maintain the due sequence and logical consistency of our investigation, it will be necessary in the first instance to determine whether the condition and characteristics of the present day are such as to require the radical and universal reform of the modern intellectual world, and the aid of a reformer like Bacon to effect it. If we should conclude this to be really the case, we may next examine whether the signs of the times justify the expectation that any such assistance will be vouchsafed to us. These questions may be more briefly embodied in the simple inquiry, whether a New Instauration is really imminent. If this important interrogatory should be found to demand an acquiescent answer, we may then balance the doubt, whether it would be possible to recognise the advent of any second Bacon, when he might appear; for, unless this were possible, any further inquiry into the characteristics by which either himself or his philosophy could be detected, would be futile. If, however, all these questions admit of satisfactory determination, and we are able to arrive at an adequate comprehension of their significance and the responses which ought to be given to them, it will be a comparatively short labour to determine whether

Comte and his Positive System possess the characteristic marks required: nor will it be either a very long or very difficult task to delineate the general type of that philosophy which the age requires, and which may deserve to be regarded as the philosophy of the nineteenth century, and the second Great Instauration of the modern intellect. It is true that no anticipation can do more than exhibit the negative aspect of such a philosophy; but if we obtain a rule or a criterion for the exclusion of the erroneous or the defective, it will unquestionably avail for the recognition of the true. In the procedure proposed, it will be readily perceived that the preliminary questions are the most arduous, and that they will furnish, in great measure, the means of replying to the concluding problems. Our investigation thus naturally divides itself into three distinguishable but mutually dependent inquiries. First, we examine the probability of a New Instauration; next, the claims of Comte to be the Bacon of the nineteenth century; and lastly, though in close connexion with the second question, the characteristics of that philosophy which may justly bear to our age the same relation that the Baconian philosophy bore to the seventeenth century. The present paper will be fully and sufficiently occupied with the discussion of the first topic.

The simple fact that Comte has been hailed as the second Bacon by a party, inconsiderable neither in numbers, nor intelligence, might by some be construed as evidence *prima facie* that the condition of the times is such as to require and to welcome the mission of such an intellectual reformer; for the maxim,

Nec deus intersit, nisi dignus vindice nodus,

is as applicable to the dramatic evolution of human progress, as it is to the construction of a tragedy; and it might be supposed that, unless the crisis were sufficient to warrant the demand, no indication of any such latent want would be afforded. It is true that this presumption might be rebutted by the simple allegation that a still more numerous party, embracing all religious persuasions, and the leading intellects in nearly all the walks of science and philosophy, have slighted the new revelation; but such a plea we reject without a pause, because it is absolutely certain that the true reformer will be rejected, scorned, reviled, and trampled upon by the supporters of ancient doctrines, in the same spirit that the prophets of old were stoned in the streets of Jerusalem by the chosen people. But, if we decline to give any weight to this objection, we are as little disposed to attach authority to the presumption which it is intended to overthrow, though we refuse to accept it for a very different reason. There is

too great a proclivity, especially in the bosom of a highly-artificial civilization, to exaggerate the difficulties of the present, to hope for sudden relief and extraordinary assistance, to behold in the objects of partial idolatry the resuscitation of former idols, and to attribute to each new prophet or favourite of the hour the names which have won the veneration of the past, for us to be satisfied with any such fallible tests. A calm and patient appreciation of the actual phenomena around us, united with a diligent comparison of the present age with similar conditions of the world in previous times, can alone justify us in venturing to claim the assent of reflecting men to the conclusions at which we may arrive.

There are three periods in the past history of civilization, which offer no slight analogies to each other, and must bear a corresponding relation to the passing century, if this be indeed predestined to witness an intellectual revolution, and a general reform of intellectual procedure. These critical eras of human progress are those which have been immortalized by the names of Socrates, or rather of Aristotle, of Abelard, and of Bacon; and it is from the phenomena which they exhibit that we must derive our principal historical illustrations of the significance and prospects of the present time. We shall, indeed, leave to a future branch of our inquiry the formal exposition of the relations which bind these periods to our own age; but as it may be necessary to make an occasional reference to the characteristics of these centuries in the earlier part of our task, and as we desire such reference to be frequently made in the tacit reflections of our readers as we proceed, we have deemed it expedient to specify them here. There are, moreover, two other eras, unequal with respect to each other, but both marked by a more potent renovation and indicating a more profound crisis, whose consideration might have lent valuable aid to our contemplated inquiries, but these were religious and moral rather than intellectual reforms; and this difference, but still more the sanctity of the subject, and Comte's entire negation of Christianity and all divine religion, compel us to exclude from the list of periods, more or less closely analogous to the present, the age which witnessed the advent of our Saviour, and that which was signalized by the great religious Reformation of the sixteenth century, both without and within the bosom of the Roman Catholic Church. We, therefore, purposely forego availing ourselves of the valuable suggestions which might be derived from a consideration of the circumstances preceding and attending the introduction of Christianity and the commencement of the Lutheran Reformation; and we do so, from reluctance to confound, or to appear to confound, direct divine agencies with the natural operation of the ordinary laws

of human progress. We shall, therefore, confine both our references and our remarks to those secular instaurations which are more directly allied to our present subject, and which offer less temptation to erroneous or dangerous speculations. But, though we have indicated the periods which we design to employ as criteria in our estimation of the current age, it is imperatively necessary, before recurring formally to them, that we should determine the actual phenomena of the times, and their relation to the main question, by a separate and almost entirely independent examination.

The great fundamental vice of the nineteenth century, from which nearly all its graver errors have sprung, and to which the origin of the multitude of social and other evils complained of may be traced, almost without exception, is undoubtedly the contemptuous rejection and negation of all valid and indisputable authority. In every walk of practice, in each of the varied departments of speculation, this same inherent vice is equally apparent. The individual will, employing the mere physical sense as its minister, but more frequently as its tyrant, has constituted itself the sole, unlicensed canon of human actions and of human doctrines; and after a struggle of more than two centuries, has succeeded in enthroning its interpreter, the Intellect, (amidst the deafening applause of myriads who drown the feeble cry of the few dissentient voices,) as the supreme arbiter of truth and error, and the autoocratic judge of right and wrong. To this has been accorded a dominion which has been fancied legitimate because conceived to be universal and exclusive, and which has been regarded as exclusive because the instinctive play of the human conscience has been checked and crushed by the domineering influence of sordid passions. Thus, it has become the highest boast of humanity, in the supposed culmination of enlightened civilization, that the Intellect is

Lord over nature, Lord of the visible earth,
Lord of the senses five.

We remember, however, the terrible castigation, which of old overtook a similar, but not equal self-idolatry, in an individual case; and, though the authority may not be altogether acceptable to the anti-scriptural reformers of the present day, we cannot refrain from recurring to the exultation and doom of the Assyrian king, and employing this prominent instance of like vanity and presumption as an illustration of our present condition. In the pride of his greatness and unquestioned dominion Nebuchadnezzar exclaimed: "Is not this great Babylon, that I have built for the house of the kingdom by the might of my power, and for the honour of my majesty?"

But, "while the word was in the king's mouth, there fell a voice from heaven," which wrested from his hands the rod of his authority, and exiled him, in the very act of pompous self-glorification, from the abodes of men, and drove him to make his dwelling with the beasts of the field, and to eat grass as the oxen. The swamps of the desert now hide from the eyes of men that great and mighty city in which the deluded monarch placed his exclusive confidence; and a few rude and shapeless mounds, filled with crumbling bricks and shattered monuments, suggest rather than attest the site of the splendid Babylon of Nebuchadnezzar. A like fate may be even now impending over the modern Babylon of the intellect, and its unsuspecting lord; and the inchoate fulfilment of a like curse may perhaps already be recognised by those whose eyes are not blinded by popular prejudice, and who have refused to look upon the Gorgon's head. For, this exclusive autocracy of the human mind, which has rendered the epithet of the Age of Intellect a term of complacent self-laudation, instead of being a source of humiliation and shame to the nineteenth century, has been the cause of that universal anarchy of thought, sentiment, and action, from which those plenteous streams of evil, and that devastating deluge of error have flowed, from which at length we would now seek redemption. The undoubting recognition of the exclusive dominion of the mere intellect, which, once admitted, necessarily overrides both the moral dictates of the human conscience and the solemn prescriptions of God, has left all forms of human development a prey to the blind passions of men, to the rabid fury of their sensual impulses, and to those latent errors, which are inevitably involved in the limited and defective premises of human speculation, and which, once received without question, must ultimately infect both the theory and the practice which they are employed to sustain.* Nothing short of omniscience could so lay down the premises for future reasoning, or could so order the general principles and conditions of thought, as

* It is scarcely necessary for us to say that we do not accept the philosophy of Kant without important modifications, nor admit the entire validity of his principles or the logical strictness of all his conclusions. But the Critique of the Pure Reason is imperatively the *primer* to all adequate philosophical speculation in this age; and the latter half of it, devoted to the Transcendental Dialectics and Methodology, is of indispensable importance in determining the necessary imperfections and limitations of the human reason, and their causes. To these we would, in the present connexion, most earnestly refer, as we have not the space to develop the grounds of our own positions in extenso. Of course, we have still less opportunity to give the points of our dissent from Kant and their reasons. These things have, indeed, been partially done by us in a previous article.

that they should be wholly unalloyed with error, or secure from the consequences of original error in their ultimate results. When, however, the whole circle of truth, as of scientific knowledge, is bounded by the narrow horizon of mere intellectual vision, and there is no ever-present recognition of wider and more authoritative, but unapprehended, or dimly-apprehended realms of truth beyond the little sphere which is measured by the radius of the human intellect, defective conclusions rarely reveal the fact of their own deficiency, and never suggest the probability of the premises themselves being fallacious, nor can these be readily suspected even of being insufficient.

The intellectual anarchy of the day, and the entire negation of all valid authority, of which we have spoken, are loudly proclaimed from all quarters around us. This important truth, first clearly detected by St. Simon, and exhibited in all its details by M. Comte, has now become a subject of familiar apprehension to every mind which has maturely reflected upon the condition of the age. Authors of all degrees of eminence and ability, writing upon subjects the most diverse, and looking from the most dissimilar points of view,—divines of all shades, from the bishop to the covenanter—professors of all science, and all practice—the poet and the philosopher, the statesman and the man of science, the archaeologist and the literary dilettante, the traveller and the novelist, the artist and the artisan, the publicist and the essayist,—all lend their testimony to the existence of these striking and deplorable phenomena. To the close observer of the private life, the social economy, and the political organization of modern communities, this wretched distemperature of the times is displayed in every phase of the subjects of his contemplation. The keen apprehension of these solemn facts has inspired the long labours of Comte, and suggested the dissimilar and grotesque reveries of Wronski. They are everywhere asserted in the *Messianisme* of the latter; and they colour with their own sombre hue nearly every page of the Positive Philosophy of the former, not expressly devoted to their exposition. The quick sense of the error and its bitter fruits, without distinct recognition of its cause, has also dictated the chimerical schemes of Proudhon, Leroux, and the multitudinous shoals of socialists and communists, which have of late years so grievously infested France.

The fatal consequences of these fundamental vices are continually and ably exhibited by Comte, and constitute the greater, but negative portion of his extensive work. He makes them manifest under all the Protean forms which they have assumed; traces them to their lurking places, and attacks them in their strongholds; unveils their

ramifications, and their mutual interdependence; points out their wholly untenable character, and the singular or pernicious fallacies to which they give rise; shows their corroding influence on the whole body of our modern science and philosophy; detects their agency in the rapidly-advancing disintegration of society, and in the social calamities which so fearfully distract Europe; discovers them sapping the foundations of political organization, paralyzing governments, and rendering them either impotent or baneful; and proposes to remedy these disasters, and eradicate the original errors from which they descend, by the application of remedies neither safe in themselves, nor adequate to effect a cure of the deep-seated and chronic disease. As we have remarked on a former occasion, we accord our almost entire assent to Comte's criticism of the speculative and practical errors of the times, differing from him chiefly in refusing his therapeutics, his postulates, and his philosophy, as an exclusive system; in tracing the main vices to other and more remote sources than those supposed by him, which are true but only proximate causes; and in desiring an intellectual and social renovation of a wider character and more ennobling tendency than that which is contemplated by his philosophy. We would neither deny nor exclude religion because our modern systems of theology may be tainted with error, or, more properly, not in harmony with the requirements of the age; but we would look forward with hope to such an intellectual renovation as would lay the firm foundations of a better philosophy, which would correct the imperfections or aberrations of our theology, while restoring to it its due efficacy, and re-establishing its harmony with human science, and would, at the same time, and principally through the influence of a genuine and operative Christianity, alleviate or remove the other disorders of the time. The philosophy that we long for, is one which may supply the moral wants of men, and satisfy the sublime appetencies of their religious nature, at the same time that it ministers effectually to the other but subordinate wants of society. It is, however, no fantastic, transcendental, or remodelled system of Christianity, but solely such an explication of the fundamental grounds of religion, and of the accordance of the plain, practical doctrines of Christianity with the legitimate demands of the human mind, as may terminate for a time, if not forever, the formidable schism which now fatally divides human reason and Christian faith. We would revise not the doctrines or prescriptions of Christianity, but the arguments employed to establish them, and the essential relations of the human reason to religious belief. We trust that this development of our views will prevent any misapprehension in regard to a point where misapprehension is easy.

To survey in detail the derivative errors which have emanated from the intellectual anarchy of the times, or from the uncontested dominion of the intellect, (terms which, if not convertible, are almost synonymous,) would be to renew the long labours of Comte, and, in great measure, to repeat the task which occupied twenty years of his life, and furnishes, in point of bulk, the main staple of his six obese volumes. Of course, we have no design of entering upon any such extended inquiry. Even a brief summary of the separate evils and fallacies, which he and others have pointed out or omitted, would be too prolix and tedious for the present occasion. All, therefore, that we can pretend to do, will be to indicate a few of the more significant and prominent phenomena of the times, which have a direct relation to the principal topic of investigation, and may aid us in arriving at a safe and intelligible solution.

It can scarcely be denied, even by those who adhere with the most unquestioning faith to the creeds of their fathers or of their choice, that the principles of religious belief and the forms of *dogmatic theology* are fluctuating and uncertain, while the direct influence of religion is almost entirely nugatory with a large portion of her professed votaries. The constant dissensions about mere shades of Christian doctrine to the exclusion of more important considerations; the general substitution of ethical for dogmatic instruction, of human morality for divine prescription; the too frequent incapacity to repel the assaults of infidel or rationalistic antagonists, the violence which is done to the principle of faith in the attempt, and the unwarrantable exaggeration of the authority of the individual reason in such efforts; the unsettled and invalid lines of argumentation adopted in the refutation of objections; the demonstration of the truth of Christianity, and the existence of God by illogical evidences; the growing claims of a ricketty and fanciful philosophy, almost in the bosom of the several Churches, to concurrent and equal authority with religious faith and established theologies, in the construction, interpretation, and determination of religious problems; the ever-enlarging circle of intelligent minds, which allege, and frequently, we believe, with a sad and sincere conviction in the justice of the charge, the inconsistency and irrationality of the Christian doctrines which are propounded to them as the reason of their revolt; the anxiety, despondency, and despair both of those without and those still within the pale of the Church; and the habitual indifference of accredited Christians, and their refusal to be governed in their daily walk and conversation by the plain commandments of the gospel:—all these things indicate the decaying efficiency of religious control in practice,

and the unsound or illogical condition of our theological systems. We have no disposition either to multiply or to amplify the charges which may be brought against the present condition of the religious world, but we think that the key-note to any adequate process of amelioration was sounded by the author of *Alton Locke*, when he said, "The only thing to regenerate the world is not more of any system, good or bad, but simply more of the Spirit of God." If we would render such regeneration possible, it is imperatively necessary that we should boldly and candidly avow the deficiencies and the inherent disease of our present religious practice and theological methods, and by the discovery and confession of our errors prepare ourselves for the task of seriously, soberly, and completely removing them. We have blinked too long the real difficulties of the case; we have denied, and endeavoured to bolster up our consciences in the denial of, charges, which, though false in their too wide expression, and productive of most fallacious consequences, are nevertheless founded upon a morbid and one-sided apprehension of valid objections. With respect to the large mass of civilized communities, there can be no doubt that the Christian Church has lost the direction and censorship of both the private life and the public conduct of men. So far then it fails to perform its legitimate mission, and in order to retrieve its steps and regain its lost authority, it must discover and acknowledge the causes of this temporary and partial failure, abandon the useless and tedious occupation of fighting the dead and buried chimaeras of former infidelity, and adapt itself to the urgent wants of the time by combatting new forms of error with other and keener weapons than of old, and by ministering to present social ailments by a profound estimation of the causes and remedies of existing social, moral, and religious disease. Nothing can be gained by either denying the strength of an adversary, or refusing to acknowledge our own weak points.

But worse, perhaps, than even those things which we have mentioned as indications of the diseased state of our modern religious systems, because the seat of the disease lies deeper, and the canker is less easily reached, is the travesty of Christianity, which moulds and modifies the doctrines of the faith into a transcendental dream, lubricating the clear, precise, practical realities of a divine revelation with the oily but poisonous slime of a spurious and seductive idealism. Yet, it is unfortunately under this form, which is the mere phantasm of religion, that modern Christianity exhibits most vitality and most aptitude for credence; and though Dr. Chalmers and other divines have boldly encountered and imperfectly refuted the weakened form of this pseudo-philosophical religionism which was offered

to the British public by Morell, the well-head of the error cannot be reached, nor the ulcer which it has produced arrested, until Strauss be completely overthrown, and the systems of German Pantheism from which he drew, and which have percolated in feeble streamlets through the French eclecticism to all countries, have been swept away before a sounder and juster philosophy. The Christian apologetics of modern times are antiquated and powerless; we burden ourselves with the cumbrous and inefficient armour of defence which served in earlier days, but is useless against the attacks with which we are now assailed. The science, the philosophy, the social organization and the social passions of modern times are for the most part adverse to Christianity, yet we refuse to avail ourselves of the advantages which are turned against us, and refuse to change our tactics and strategy, when the enemy by a skilful change of front has turned our flank, and is marching unopposed as a conqueror over our domain.

The origin of the theological difficulties we have commented on is of easy detection, if we are candid and bold enough to recognise the truth which presses itself upon our notice. We have admitted, even within the sphere of our theology,—or, without any formal admission, the all-pervading spirit of the times has introduced into it,—principles and maxims, which, in their unlimited acceptance, are fatal to the permanent recognition of any authority, human or divine. We have canonized, even in our religious contemplations, the supremacy of the intellect, and now the creature threatens to dethrone its Creator; for the intellectual Titans of the current ages, like their precursors in heathen mythology, seek to scale heaven by their own native powers, and by the superposition of the lofty mountains of terrestrial science. In the ancient legend human aid was necessary even to secure the victory of the gods; and the terrible onslaught of the modern Giants must be met with a more dexterous use of their own terrestrial weapons. But the great error of which we have been culpable is this: In the first flush of the rebellion against excessive and arbitrary hierarchical control, the absolute right of the individual mind (which soon becomes synonymous with that of the individual will) to interpret and thereby to establish its own creed, and to determine the religious complexion of its own actions, was laid down too broadly; and the ministers as the advocates of religion now find themselves estopped, without recognising the cause of the estoppel, from denouncing the usurpations and the exclusive claims of the intellect, in its most intellectual, but most purely human phase, to wit, in its strict scientific development. Of our modern theology it may be said,

"She nursed the pinion which impell'd the steel,
While the same plumage that had warm'd her nest
Drank the last life-drop of her bleeding breast."^o

Indeed, something very much like this has already been said, and in a Review published under the auspices of the Free Church of Scotland.[†] When, too, the individual judgment is warped, betrayed, excited, and blinded by the materialistic, sensual, pleasure-seeking, money-craving, debasing tendencies of the age in which we live, it is too late to express surprise at the decline or impotence of that religious faith, or the inefficacy of that theology, which itself crippled its own sinews, and broke its own wand of empire at the outset. But, if too late for wonder, it is not too late for contrition and reform; and unless some means can be discovered of reconciling the claims of reason and religion—of science and faith—without recognising the joint and equal reign of both, or unduly subordinating the latter to the former, we may prepare ourselves betimes for the certain enthronization of science or the Positive Philosophy, as the sole arbiter of human thought and practice.

To show that we have neither exaggerated nor misrepresented the deficiencies of our modern theology, and the inefficacy of our religion in modern practice, we take the liberty of citing the significant remark of Dr. Chalmers: "As things stand at present, our creeds and confessions have become effete, and the Bible a dead letter; and that orthodoxy, which was at one time our glory, by withering into the inert and lifeless, is now the shame and reproach of all our Churches."

As we do not ourselves forget that the main scope of the present essay is to determine the probability of an approaching regeneration of the modern intellect, in order to keep this aim distinctly before the minds of our readers, and to facilitate the estimation of our views, we beg them to compare the present condition of religion with the religious aspects of the times immediately preceding the career of Socrates, Abelard, and Bacon—the three periods of past history which we have specified as likely to afford analogies to the present age, if it be truly the precursor of a New Instauration.

We shall not suffer ourselves to be detained to estimate the

^o When the simile is given to us so beautifully and forcibly in our own language by Byron, we do not deem it necessary to recur to either the *Aves* of Aristophanes, v. 808, or the *Myrmidons* of *Æschylus*, fragm. 123, ed. Dindorf, for its earlier or original expression.

[†] "The Christian Church would dig her own grave, and might write over it the pathetic confession of Jacobi, that the head had prevailed over the heart, and that she lay down in darkness without hope of a resurrection." *North British Review*, Feb., 1850; No. xxiv, art. v.

sanctimonious, pharisaical, and wavering *morality*—public and private—which is necessarily incident to such a condition of the religious world as we have described. The dependence of true morality upon the Christian faith is so intimate, that the divorce of the two, or the decay of the latter, can only result in the substitution of a hollow formalism—a whitened sepulchre, cleanly and decorous without, but full of dry bones within—for the genial and ever-operative glow of conscious obedience to divine commands. We need only add that, under the impulse of prevalent errors, immutable principles and rigid rules of integrity have been in great measure supplanted by temporary expediencies and the shifting caprices of private sentiment. The reality of virtue has given place to its hypocritical semblances, with which we first delude ourselves, and then hope to deceive others. Nay, so far has this tendency been developed that we have a popular system of morals, taught in our colleges, and unchallenged in our marts, which is founded upon this miserable counterfeit of the reality; and Utilitarianism is welcomed with applause as a safe guide, and credulously believed to be a tenable philosophy. The tide is indeed turning: all the various forms of Socialism are so many emphatic protests against this wretched excuse for morality, which has been deemed the sign of an advancing, instead of the mark of a degraded civilization. Much as we admire the general criticism of Comte upon the fallacies of the day, there are few points which more closely rivet our regard than the sagacity with which he has detected, and the ability with which he has exposed, the fallacies of Utilitarianism, and the absolute want of a solid basis for our modern ethics, practical or speculative. But, indeed, the perspicacity and acumen of Comte are never at fault in unravelling the tangled webs of sophistry which have clustered around those popular fallacies, which have elsewhere met with almost unquestioning acquiescence, and too frequently with the undiscriminating admiration of the age;—

Proprii mirantur monstra furoris.^o

When we note the sobriety and skill with which M. Comte unveils such errors, it is to us a source of amazement that a mind, which winds its way so securely and unerringly through the mazes of accredited delusion, should have failed to solve completely the great enigma of the times, and should have so easily bewildered itself and wandered from the truth in the fanciful labyrinths of its own construction. Let us add, however, that he is distinctly right in recognising the necessity of an ethical reform, both in speculative and practical morals, as the indispensable accompaniment and condition

^o Claudian., in Eutrop., lib. ii, v. 519.

of either social or intellectual renovation. As in the days of Socrates so in our own, the restoration of sound morality and the re-establishment of the firm principles of morals is the *sina qua non* of either advancement or alleviation. In our estimation, indeed, the moral problem is absorbed by the religious one, and embraced by it.

To those whose attention has been arrested by the highest and consequently the most obscure manifestations of human thought, the *metaphysical philosophy* of the nineteenth century is not the least significant or suggestive of the portentous signs of the times. In this difficult and airy department of speculation we can readily detect, notwithstanding the confidence of its tone and the arrogance of its language, the same hesitancy and confusion, the same want of clearly apprehended and consistent principles, accompanied by the same erratic energy, and the same self-sufficiency, which are displayed in the other intellectual phenomena of the day. All schools have their modern representatives. From the dim mysticism of oriental philosophies, Hindoo or Gnostic, down to the most purely materialistic explication of the phenomenal laws of the universe, every old opinion has been revived and refurbished, though they now appear under disguised or fantastic forms, and contend for the mastery with each other, before they have accurately examined either the validity or the stability of the bases on which they respectively rest. The hasty assumption of primordial data, by a mistaken application of a supposed inductive process, but, in reality, in compliance with a mere vague impulse, or a wild and fanciful assurance, has been made the point of departure of all the multitudinous systems of metaphysics, which, within the last half-century, have dazzled their credulous votaries, and often hopelessly baffled those who were not acolytes of their schools. Even Kant is, in many respects, obnoxious to this censure; for his system is partially founded upon foregone conclusions, though their employment is not perceived by him, and there is an interfusion in all his reasonings of unexamined principles, which vitiate his scheme, and introduce inconsistencies and invalidities into the most beautiful and perfect specimen of profound metaphysical research. Nor does Comte escape this defect by his negation of metaphysics, for this negation is a no less unwarrantable assumption than any other presumptive tenet would have been.

But, besides the extension and development of half-forgotten systems, with a rare recognition of the actual relation of the later to the earlier forms, other schemes have been propounded, which blend in an intricate web the characteristics of different previous methods of procedure, and conceal their affinities by the wild reveries with which they are combined and gilded over. The wheels of all the

recent forms of philosophy run in the ruts which had been worn long ago; but at times they pass so rapidly from one track in the *stadium* to another, and wind about so curiously and intricately, as they follow the interlacing lines of former circles, that it is almost impossible for either their adepts or others to recognise the actual character and direction of their courses throughout their whole extent. But, while hazarding this condensed criticism of modern metaphysical speculation, we are blind neither to the pre-eminent intellectual abilities which have been devoted to this renewal of old projects, nor to the fact that the researches of the great minds which have already ennobled this century, have uncovered to the day the great fundamental problems of metaphysics and ontology, which they have been unable to solve, but which demand a partially satisfactory solution before real progress in any direction is possible, or the intellect can cease to be the cause of its own stumbling. It must be observed, too, that the result of this devious and chimerical investigation of the sublime enigmas of the human intellect has been to revive in late years, with renewed interest and with brighter hopes of some partially satisfactory solution, the great problem of the certitude of human knowledge, which both lies at the foundation of metaphysics, and must constitute the regulating principle of all intellectual development, scientific, philosophical, or practical. Gioberti and Rosmini, Franck and Javary, Véra, Mercier, and Gerbet, the greater and the lesser minds of our time, are at length addressing themselves with a clear perception of the true aims of philosophy, to the determination of this primary and all-important question. The same instinctive recognition of the great desideratum of the times has also induced M. Comte to attempt a solution of this riddle of the human mind by lopping off that portion of knowledge which is the source of difficulty and the fountain-head of those anomalies and antinomies which appear to refuse to be reduced to either uniform laws or fixed principles. The misfortune has been that hitherto philosophers, with scarcely an exception, have confined themselves to the old range and mode of procedure, and have sought by a further extension and stricter development of those very systems which have caused and at length pressed into the open day their errors and paralogisms, to escape from the fatal consequences which have been incident to the contracted stadium within which the discursions of the intellect have been restrained. The same guide, which has betrayed their floundering steps into the hopeless quicksands where no firm footing is to be found, is still employed to lead them on to a solid ground which is fancied to lie beyond. Vain hope! they have taken as their exclusive authority that very scientific intellect

which has undermined all authority, and occasioned all their embarrassments.

A re malvagio consiglier peggiore.

The great metaphysical problem of the nineteenth century, which is the present enigma of the modern sphinx, extending its influence as its doom to the permanence and vitality of all forms of human development, individual or social, is to determine the bond of conciliation by which the world of knowledge can be rescued from its purely experimental character, and the external world invested with something more than the shadowy phases of a merely phenomenal existence: * in other words,—in the language of the German schools,—to give knowledge, both in its subjective and objective aspects, the stability and reality which are now denied to it by Sensationalism as well as by Idealism; and to exhibit the intimate harmony, if not entire identity, of the fundamental principles which determine the mutual dependence and yet dissimilarity of the two. After this point has been settled, the question arises, which is concerned with the application and development of this primitive doctrine, as to the limitations within which this doctrine is to be held, and within which each of its modes of development can be safely and logically employed.

The great problem to which we have alluded has been reached, perhaps propounded by the general tenor of our modern philosophy; the necessity of a solution has been indistinctly perceived; and some blind and staggering efforts have been made to vault over, rather than to explore the difficulty. M. Comte's mode of procedure has been already alluded to; and kindred with it, though less consistent, is the attempt of Mill. The German school has rushed to the other extreme; while the French Eclectics, like the blind Polyphemus in the cave of the Cyclopes, dash their heads vainly first against one

* It is, perhaps, coaxing too far the interpretation of the mysticism and obscurity of Hoéné Wronski to recognise the dim suspicion of this fundamental problem in the following enigmatical passage of his *Messianisme*, tom. ii, pp. 459, 460:—"Pour peu que l'on approfondisse, d'une part, le scepticisme de Hume, et de l'autre surtout, la dualité de Leibnitz, que nous venons de signaler comme ayant été, tout à la fois, et les termes respectifs du sensualisme et du rationalisme philosophiques, et les motifs de la nouvelle tendance de la philosophie, on reconnaîtra que cette tendance supérieure consiste à découvrir un *Principe Absolu* qui puisse d'une part, concilier ou au moins embrasser en lui les deux principes hétérogènes de l'univers, c'est-à-dire, le savoir et l'être, et de l'autre part, fonder péremptoirement la certitude des connaissances philosophiques. Comme tel, ce principe inconditionnel de l'être et du savoir, n'est rien autre que l'*Absolu* lui-même, cette source suprême de toute réalité." This last sentence plunges us so deep into the peculiar mysticism of *Messianism*, that here we leave M. Wronski.

side and then against the other side of the cavern, which is to them hopelessly and impenetrably dark, notwithstanding the fancied spectres which float before their unperceiving eyes. The Germans are at least consistent; they have immersed themselves in the infinite abyss of Pantheism, and have identified the creation with the Creator, the objective with the subjective side of knowledge, and have suffered the object known and the subject knowing to be both simultaneously absorbed in the fountain-head of knowledge and the material of knowledge, whence both are represented as emanating and returning by an incessant pulsation of the Godhead—the continuous efflux and reflux of divinity from and to its own centre. Such an explanation may beguile the mind by the apparent perspicuity of its phraseology, and simplicity of its doctrine; or it may overwhelm it by the rigidity of its logic, as well as by the obscurity and fluidity of its substance; but no form of Pantheism can be accepted by a sober, reflecting mind, which is self-conscious of its own processes and their results at every step of its deductions, for it deprives the intellect of any fixed point of view from which to survey the universe, and denies it any stable ground on which to stand, (the postulated $\piον$ $\sigmaτῶ$ of Archimedes,) in its interpretation of the facts or phenomena of either life or nature.

But, though such be the delusive and chaotic state of metaphysical philosophy, we think that, in its secret and troubled workings, which have stirred it from its lowest deeps, it has thrown up on its shores, as the results of its tempestuous agitations, the great philosophical problem of the nineteenth century, and that it now impotently and blindly fumbles over the difficulties which it has evoked, without being competent, in consequence of the indistinctness and invalidity of its own principles, to give the urgently demanded solution.

We shall not follow the influences of erroneous metaphysics in their reaction upon all the sciences, the religious life, or the social and political action of the day, nor trace the modes in which the distemperature in these branches of intellectual development has reacted upon metaphysical philosophy itself, important as both these inquiries necessarily are to the full comprehension of the diseases of the times, their causes and their prospective issue. It suffices for our present purpose to have shown that metaphysics, like morals and theology, has its own great problem demanding adequate solution, and is unable in its present state to satisfy the demand which is made upon it. It is the magnitude of the intellectual requirements of the times, their relations, their interdependence, and their universality, which must determine whether a New Instauration is essential to further intellectual progress.

The general tenor of that criticism which we contemplate attempting hereafter, though not in the present essay, on the former periods of intellectual crisis, will sufficiently reveal the close analogies between the ethical and metaphysical, and also the logical wants of the present age, and the similar necessities of the generations preceding previous intellectual reforms.

From the tendency of our hurried observations it will be readily gathered, that the metaphysical aberrations and incapacities which we have signalized, originate almost entirely in the nebulous domain of what is termed by Kant Transcendental Logic. But dim and cloudy as is that supramundane region, even when the skies of intellect are in other respects most clear and serene, it is thence that the rains descend which fertilize and determine the expansion of all sciences, and it is through them that all the heavenly light which illumines the mind is refracted. As the lofty mountains of the terrestrial globe penetrate the mists and clouds of the upper air, so the summits of all human sciences hide themselves in the obscurity of metaphysical and logical speculation; and it is in that dusky region that we must grope for the discovery of their principles and the rules which insure their accurate and healthy development. Hence it is, that, in a period like the present, when all intellect is so profoundly agitated, we are obliged to recur to these arduous and ethereal branches, whose necessary use is hardly recognised or suspected in the ordinary periods of tranquillity. Our present difficulties are in great measure attributable to the neglect of Logic, and the looseness of metaphysical speculation, which have characterized the centuries since the Baconian Instauration. We have neglected to establish correctly the principles, conditions, and limitations of valid reasoning; we have slighted Aristotle and scorned the schoolmen; we have employed premises obtained by insufficient or unwarrantable processes, which are neither true in themselves nor co-extensive with the amplitude of the conclusions which they have been conceived to support; and we have either narrowed unduly the range of human thought, or rejected with contempt the controlling influence of well-marked lines of demarcation beyond which the human mind at any rate, in its present stage of development, cannot safely or consistently wander. Safe in the supposed universality and infallibility of our processes of observation, experience, and induction, and deluding ourselves into the belief that the whole Baconian philosophy is contained in the mutilated fragment of it of which we boast, we have forgotten that the validity of even these instruments in their most perfect form depends almost entirely upon their employment by the reason, and we have heedlessly overlooked the necessity of

analyzing and regulating our logical procedure at the same time that we were hunting for what were unduly considered the only real facts for use. But, if the data of Transcendental Logic have been imperfectly determined or habitually slighted, the doctrines of the mere science, as the prescriptions of the art, have been wholly disregarded, or contemptuously flouted, without being understood. Through a regularly *diminuendo* scale, the estimation in which Logic has been held and the use which has been made of it have rapidly descended since Peter Ramus and John Milton, or even since Raymund Lully, until, a few years back, the lowest attainable limit was reached, and this essential branch of learning was represented in popular belief by the miserable and illogical shreds of Watts and Hedge. True, the tide has at length turned, and this we regard as one of the most favourable omens of the time. The inquiries undertaken by Kant, and prosecuted by the great leaders of the derivative schools of Transcendentalism; the more recent labours of Mill, Hamilton, and De Morgan, and the daily returning reverence for Aristotle, evince a growing sense of the necessity of recalling the lost science, rather than any very great aptitude for its enlargement and reconstruction. The importance, however, of this incipient movement can scarcely be fully appreciated, until we master the lessons taught by all former intellectual renovations, and to be exhibited hereafter in some detail. It is somewhat remarkable that M. Comte, though cashiering Logic at the outset of his work, has himself noted and constantly censures in strong terms the looseness and illogical texture of modern reasoning, and has rendered signal service towards the *co-augmentation*—we cannot say constitution—of Inductive Dialectics. His labours have been employed by Whewell, and turned to profitable account by Mill: the latter has cordially acknowledged his obligations; the former has appropriated them with ungracious and suspicious silence. These indications, however, of a returning sense of the necessity of logical studies have not yet been welcomed with any corresponding change in practice; nor could this have been expected, since none of the philosophers whom we have mentioned, with the exception of Kant,* has analyzed the foundations on which the superstructure, to be either valid or adequate, must rest. If, indeed, De Morgan understands his own Formal Logic, which is put forth with much pretension, it is more than we have been able to do, though we have accorded to it a more diligent study than it apparently merits; and if Mr. Mill fails to perceive the deficiencies, fallacies, and inconse-

* Of course, we cannot stop to analyze the analysis of Kant, but can only say, without being altogether accurate, that it rather examined received doctrines than extended their range.

quences of his own valuable work, we might, perhaps, aid him in their detection. Of Sir William Hamilton we will only say that any permanent fame corresponding with his apparent capacity must be acquired by ulterior productions; for of his published works, much as they deserve approbation, we must say as was said by Cicero in regard to a different subject, "*Non res laudanda, sed spes est.*"* Thus Logic needs extension as well as renewed estimation; the leading intellects of the day are becoming sensible of this want, and also discovering that the science is imperfect both in its higher and its lower branches, and that its habitual neglect hitherto as science and as art has exercised a most deleterious influence on the forms and the conclusions of modern intellectual development.

With a defective system of Logic, or without the practical recognition of any, the expectation, credulously entertained, that the experimental sciences would be free from the risk of logical errors, has been eminently irrational, and has been grievously disappointed. It is by no means surprising, however, that there should have been a general failure, on the part of the votaries of science, to recognise the fallacies involved in their favourite pursuits, for, besides being almost uniformly the last class of cultivated men to accept or to perceive the necessity for any great intellectual mutation, the narrowness of the *intelligible* sphere to which they have confined themselves—supposing it the while to be illimitable—proves a positive bar to their discovery of its imperfections. The exclusive devotion to the experimental method, which has not been apprehended with either the sobriety or the just appreciation of its value with which it was contemplated by its great legislator, Bacon, has limited its criticism of the intellectual processes employed by it, to a mere examination of the fallacies of sense and the formal conditions of ordinary induction. We are not insensible to the beauty and profundity of Sir John Herschel's Discourse on Natural Philosophy; we are not inclined to underrate the value or the solidity of the third and fourth books of Mr. Mill's Logic; and we are still less disposed to deny the services rendered by M. Comte to the Logic of Induction; but still we must assert that science has denied itself the indispensable benefit of a vantage ground beyond its own limited sphere, whence it might securely survey its own legitimate range, and determine the conditions of its own validity, and the extent of its incompetency. This want Comte is naturally prevented from suspecting by the essential character of the Positive Philosophy. But, though neither the actual nature of the defect nor its cause has yet been clearly recognised, the consequences are already becoming sufficiently apparent.

* *Fragm. Incert. Rei Publ.*, cit. *Servius.*, *Comm. ad Virg. AEn.*, vi, 877.

The numerous efforts which have been made in recent years to review, criticise, co-ordinate, and reclassify the sciences, with the purpose of facilitating their symmetrical adunation and prospective amplification, furnish indubitable evidence of a latent and instructive sentiment that, notwithstanding our noisy boasts about the age of intellect, some new principles, or some revision of old ones, are essentially required for the accurate determination of the truth and validity of our scientific conclusions. The works of Comte, Azaïs, Ampère, Whewell, Mill, Wronski, and a host of others, indicate, with greater or less precision, the existence of such a want, and have commenced, with varying degrees of ability and success, that preliminary criticism of the sciences which is felt to be essential to their further progress, and by which alone their inherent vices and the modes of redressing them can be discovered. This retrospection of former acquisitions, and the formal registry, as it were, of present possessions—the Domesday Boke of Science—are an almost certain guarantee that current methods of procedure have displayed nearly their whole efficacy, and that a limit has been reached, beyond which it is impossible to proceed with any just confidence, without recurring to first principles, and a reconstitution or reform of the scientific methods hitherto exclusively employed. This significance of the modern attitude of the sciences is, indeed, apparently avowed in express terms, by Dr. Whewell, as the stimulus for the composition of his works on the Inductive Sciences. We may draw fresh courage from the augury: for this symptom of our existing science may be regarded both as a sign of its supervening enervation in its present form, and also as an omen of approaching renovation under ampler conditions.

The censure of the science of the nineteenth century, which we have ventured to offer, is necessarily vague and indistinct from its extreme brevity, and the exclusion of all details; but our space does not permit us to be minute, nor do we consider ourselves authorized by our inadequate acquaintance with the multitudinous sciences themselves to do anything more than present a few general reflections upon what we regard as the characteristic faults of procedure which are common to all of them, but most especially attributable to those which are esteemed the most rigid and firmly established—the Physical Sciences. Our brevity in this respect is the less to be regretted, inasmuch as the defects of modern science—its omissions, its unwarrantable assumptions, and its inconsequential reasonings—have been to no inconsiderable extent exposed with remarkable sagacity and with singular fulness of detail by M. Comte, who has dwelt, perhaps, too frequently upon the specialization of

modern intellect, whereas it is equally guilty of the opposite offence of crude and premature generalization. He has failed to recognise its erroneously exclusive character, which is the chief sin of his own philosophy; but he has justly shown the impending sterility of received scientific procedure, and its debasing subordination to purely utilitarian ends. If we had the time and the ability now for the execution of the task, which at some future day we hope to achieve, the charges which we should bring against modern science would lie beyond the domain of Comte's speculations, and would be equally applicable to his own Positive System, which is the very sublimation of the scientific tendencies of his age, and their purest and most consistent realization; for the fecundating principle of evil which we discover in the much lauded science of the times, consists in its divorce from all other knowledge, in its negation of everything not demonstrated in accordance with its own exclusive views, and in its failure to recognise its own dependence upon higher but less systematic sources of knowledge. In the mean time, however, we have no hesitation in referring to the first three volumes of the *Cours de Philosophie Positive* for the special criticism of the Physical Sciences, and for sufficient confirmation of the general tenor of our remarks, though not of our separate positions: we would also most particularly refer to the first volume of that great work for the exposure of the improper and illegitimate applications of Mathematics, and the insecurity of its foundations in its higher departments; for, though we do not agree with his profound strictures in all respects, and dissent entirely from him in our interpretation of the characteristics of mathematical truth; though we must conceive any survey of this or the other sciences imperfect, which is exclusively made from a point within their sphere, that is to say, from a purely positive point of view, and must regard this as peculiarly insufficient to satisfy the necessities of the present times; yet all the obvious objections to the actual constitution of Mathematics and the Sciences, and many which are visible only to the most acute scrutiny, are exhibited by M. Comte with masterly skill. There is, indeed, one defect of our mathematical science which his philosophy precluded him from apprehending, and which we will accordingly indicate here. The metaphysics of Mathematics is unheeded, or, if heeded, is not understood by modern mathematicians: indeed, this branch of the science has never been accurately constituted; and the consequence is, that when we leave the simpler branches of the study, and plunge into the abysses of the Calculus, under its various modifications and applications, we are hurried along by the irresistible force of our blind machinery, without adequate consciousness of the significance of the several stages

of advancement, without the means of detecting adventitious errors, and without the hope of comprehending the validity or the invalidity of the reasoning which is disguised under our algebraic symbols. To us the Calculus, in the hands of modern mathematicians, is like the Dutchman's steam leg: before the journey is commenced, the direction and even the distance may be determined; but once set in motion, it hurries on regardless of everything but the completion of its route, and drags along the unfortunate wretch attached to it, without permitting him the least control of his own progress, or the least deviation from the arbitrarily prescribed course. This is an objection which, from M. Comte's point of view, could not have been apprehended, and which we may, perhaps, have exaggerated; but though we do not regard M. Comte's criticism as complete, we refer to it as amply sufficient to demonstrate the urgent necessity of scientific reform. The mere English reader may discover a few additional censures and many repetitions of Comte's observations in Whewell's History and Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, which may be profitably consulted as his philosophy is entirely diverse from that of Comte; and inquirers of a lower grade may find some shrewd but humble speculations on this subject in the *Génie du XIX^e siècle* of M. Alletz. We are, of course, as little disposed to accept or endorse the infidel tendencies, remarks, or deductions of Comte, as we are to assent to the feeble, spurious, and blundering Kantism of Whewell. Both writers, however, indicate the consciousness of existing defects in science, and the necessity of a general renovation of its whole structure. Whewell, indeed, scarcely conceals the vain delusion that he may be destined to be the Bacon to inaugurate the new reform; and Comte has been hailed with this title by his followers, and has himself avowed his conviction that only through his philosophy can the desired regeneration be effected.

When we pass to the applications of science and philosophy to practice—or what is usually held to be practice beyond the domain of either—we enter upon the province occupied by the latter and larger moiety of M. Comte's great work; for his projected science of Sociology, which has been welcomed with very flattering acceptance, embraces both the different branches of Positive Ethics and Positive Psychology, and also attempts with very great success to reduce to a scientific form all the manifestations of the public and private life of communities. It is not the purpose of the present essay to examine, or to express any opinion on the subject of M. Comte's Sociology; as we have already said, we must examine the *Système de Politique Positive* before entering upon this inquiry. We have referred to this science at present solely to authorize our

combining under one head, for the purpose of enabling us to accomplish our proposed task with greater brevity, the very various topics which would otherwise demand to be considered under separate divisions. This course is not designed as an approval of M. Comte's procedure, but solely as a measure of expediency with respect to the attainment of our own immediate objects.

At a time when Europe is convulsed with revolution, and shock after shock vibrates through the whole family of civilized nations, as if the ancient order of things, with its hopes, its boasts, its great achievements, and its delusive splendours, were destined to be buried under the waves of a new cataclysm; when the theories of the political economists have only succeeded in multiplying wealth in the hands of the wealthy, of taking away from him that hath nothing even that which he hath, and of increasing both the bitterness and extent of pauperism; when Socialists and Communists, Positivists and Messianists, assert their claims to exclusive dominion over the regulation and re-organization of societies, which are now left without any adequate direction, and a prey to all the miseries which have sprung from fallacious and unlicensed habitudes of thought and action, for relief from the fatal consequences of which errors they vainly look to those effete and antiquated systems, which have not impeded, if they have not actually occasioned their present ruinous condition,—at a time, when the lust of gain is the sole impulse of human activity, and almost the only umpire of human life; when nations have been cut loose from their moorings, and drift about on the stormy seas of political and social agitation without rudder as without pilot; when all the bonds that of old linked man to man in harmonious intercommunion and mutual dependence have been rudely snapped asunder, and society has declined from a vital organization to a loose and fluctuating aggregation of men; when intellect has become the slave of avarice, though proclaiming its incontestable dominion over the universe, and science has descended into the mere tool of huckstering gain; when all classes are profoundly agitated and consumed with reciprocal jealousies, because steeping their daily bread in the life-blood of each other; when all authority, religious, political, social, domestic, or intellectual, meets with only a transient and hesitating obedience,—at a time like this, it were folly to dwell upon the political, the economical, the social, or the domestic aspects of the day, in order to deduce from a detailed examination of them a measured response to the inquiry, whether these are such as to suggest the necessity of a general reform of the intellectual convictions which have reduced the civilized world to such a state, or have suffered the continuance of such evils. The answer is borne to us

upon every wind that sweeps from beyond the ocean: in the Parliamentary Reports of England, in the statistical tables of the Irish population, in the memoirs of the French Academy, in the note-books of travellers, and in the essays of the poor-law doctors, as well as in the whirlwind of revolution, whose temporary lull only indicates a more violent coming out-burst, the same voice of warning is upon the blast, announcing in tones that cannot be mistaken, except by the most perverse stupidity, the alternative of an immediate regeneration of the whole circle of speculation and practice, or of imminent and overwhelming disaster.

The analogies between the social characteristics of the present times and those of the other critical ages of humanity which we have regarded as suitable aids or tests for our speculations, are singularly close and striking, as will be afterwards made apparent, and as may be detected by even a hasty examination.

In closing this part of our investigation we would remind our readers that our object on the present occasion has not been to discover the remedies to be applied to the evils which we have pointed out, nor even to determine exactly the nature or extent of those evils, but simply to show that the diseases with which the present century is infected are of such a character as to require a complete intellectual renovation for their satisfactory removal. To settle accurately the diagnosis of the malady, and to determine the therapeutics to be employed, and the modes of their application, is an ulterior and entirely distinct problem.

Summary as has been our hurried consideration of the aspect of the times—and no one can be more sensible than ourselves of either its excessive compression or of its manifold deficiencies—we think that it sufficiently indicates the need of another Bacon, or of such a universal instauration of the intellect, as would be analogous to that introduced by the sage of Verulam, only penetrating deeper than before, as befits the more advanced cultivation of the age, and comprehending a vaster scope for the exercise of its curative powers. But this investigation has also furnished a few passing indications both of the sense of this necessity, and also of an expectation, more or less faint, that the want is about to be supplied. The justice, however, of this expectation remains to be established by further evidences, which we will endeavour to furnish in a very brief form.

A strong presumptive evidence of the reasonableness of this hope may be detected in the general tenor and tone of our current literature, notwithstanding this too shows clearly the chaotic confusion in which it is weltering for want of fixed principles, and its almost entire subjection to the licentious and passionate individualism of the day.

Science and philosophy, as we have already seen, have faintly distinguished beyond the haze which surrounds them, shadows of approaching change, and have made efforts, for the most part both vain and vague, to accomplish prematurely the incumbent duty, either partially or completely, and thus "outstrip the slow result of time." With an impatience which springs from a keen instinctive perception of the urgent need, uncontrolled by any sufficient knowledge of the preliminary conditions of its healthy satisfaction, and with a rashness which argues their own audacity rather than their competency for the task, authors of all grades of eminence or insignificance, and of all shades of ability, have flooded the press with their own special propositions for a sweeping reform. Many of them certainly illustrate the truth,

Tout esprit n'est pas composé d'une étoffe,
Qui se trouve taillée à faire un philosophe.^o

But such names as Comte, Mill, and Wronski, cannot be properly included in any such category; least of all the first, for the last only proves that the most fatal union—as fatal as his own *Union-Absolute*—is the alliance of profound philosophy with extravagant folly:—*nil exitialius quam cum ratione insanire.*[†] But the instances are endless around us, in which the most chimerical dreams of fancy in its wildest moods have been gravely commended by the patronage of really acute and able minds.[‡] What has been thus crudely apprehended by science and philosophy, has been more distinctly perceived by the critical literature of the times, and still more clearly foreseen, without generating the intemperate desire for premature realization, by the divine frenzy of poetic inspiration, which scales the heaven in the early morning like the lark, hails with prophetic instinct the first rosy dawn of light on the distant mountains, and heralds forth the coming day, without pretending to hasten its advent, or determine the exact mode of its appearance. Much of our recent poetry breathes the cheerful air of hopeful anticipation—dashed, indeed, in its expression with the individual idiosyncrasies of different authors. Thus, the poet of the *Reverberations* sings:—

True the plaint,—but, if more true,
I would not deplore it:—
If an Eden fade from view,
Time may yet restore it.
○ ○ ○

^o Molière, *Les Femmes Savantes*, acte i, scène i.

[†] H. Cornelius Agrippa, *De Vanitate Scientiarum*, c. i.

[‡] "Somniorum patrocinium philosophi suscepérunt, nec ii quidem contemptissimi, sed in primis acuti, et consequentia et repugnantia videntes."—*Cic. de Div.*, lib. ii, c. lxxii, § 150.

Winter still succeeds to spring,
 But fresh springs are coming;
 Other birds are on the wing,
 Other bees are humming.

Tennyson, the Laureate of England, displays the same enthusiastic credence in the future, though still more distinctly and in a more self-conscious manner. His whole poetry is, indeed, irradiated throughout with the ever-present sentiment of the certainty and magnitude of the coming change; and this sublime instinct constitutes the loftiest merit of his genuine poetic inspiration.

Not in vain the distance beacons. Forward, forward, let us range;
 Let the great world spin forever down the ringing grooves of change.

Through the shadow of the globe we sweep into the younger day:
 Better fifty years of Europe than a cycle of Cathay.

And in that splendid and most philosophic poem, "The Palace of Art," the dim mutter of the same oracular wisdom forms the undertone of the whole allegory.

As in strange lands a traveller walking slow,
 In doubt and great perplexity,
 A little before moon-rise hears the low
 Moan of an unknown sea;

And knows not if it be thunder or a sound
 Of stones thrown down, or one deep cry
 Of great wild beasts; then thinketh, "I have found
 A new land, but I die."

And, again, in "The Poet's Song:"

And the nightingale thought, "I have sung many songs,
 But never a one so gay,
 For he sings of what the world will be,
 When the years have died away."

If we rightly comprehend the significance of that strange medley, "The Princess," it is designed to convey the prophetic anticipation of a better age, already knocking at the doors, when the supremacy of intellect, which has caused our present confusion, shall in consequence of its own restoration to health, give place to the nobler dominion of religious sentiment and moral duty. But the whole of Tennyson's poetry is coloured with the glow raised by the confident hope of a better and healthier organization of the intellectual condition of the world. The same song, which he sings with so many returns, is also re-echoed in fuller or fainter notes by a hundred minor poets, who have either caught at second-hand the inspiration, or have been touched by the magic of the approaching change.

Such examples of the cheerful and prophetic spirit of our recent poetry might be indefinitely multiplied; the difficulty is to reduce the number of our selections—not to find them. It would be equally easy to produce like evidence of the assured belief of the coming renovation from other sources, usually regarded as of greater authority. From the works of philosophers and divines, and from the essays in the English and Continental Reviews testimony which would be stronger to some minds, though improperly so, could be easily collected. Indeed, we have before us at this time, a long series of such testimonials, which we have been gathering for some years in the course of our reading, but we do not insert them here, both on account of the inordinate space which they would occupy, and because on this point we regard the higher poetry of the day as the most credible of all witnesses.

The reform thus proclaimed by poetry, and whose urgent necessity is attested by the more sober speculations of men, may be reasonably expected; for, in addition to this sort of oracular vaticination, a strong incentive to hope is afforded by the unquestionable intellectual energy and ability of the time. There is no decline of intellectual activity, but rather an excess; no sign of intellectual enervation, but rather of Herculean strength directing its forces to mistaken ends and under unfavourable conditions, because in the midst of a distempered atmosphere. In such circumstances we may legitimately regard the notes of promise as indications of its fulfilment, and the voice of hope as the prelude to the song of victory.

We have thus arrived at a satisfactory answer to the first great question in connexion with this subject; and have concluded, we think, on valid grounds, that a new Instauration is required, and may be expected at no distant time. A future essay will afford us the opportunity of determining the characteristics of "the future man,"* and of weighing the claims of Comte to be regarded as the Bacon of the nineteenth century.

* Tennyson's *Princess*, conclusion. In our citations from Tennyson, we omitted in consequence of its length, perhaps the most striking indication of his active faith, which is furnished by the series of his poems. This is the *acephalous* poem, printed vol. i, pp. 204–208 of the American edition; and especially that part of it commencing,

Even now we hear with inward strife,
A motion tolling in the gloom—

with which may be compared Jordano Bruno, *De Minimi Inv.*, lib. i, c. i, p. 97, cit. Brucker. *Hist. Crit. Phil.*, tom. v, p. 9. (Add also to our citations: Bailey, *Festus*, p. 280, Am. ed.)

ART. II.—COLONIZATION.

1. *Thirty-fourth Annual Report of the American Colonization Society.* Washington, 1851.
2. *Nineteenth Annual Report of the New-York State Colonization Society.* New-York, 1851.

AFRICAN Colonization is among the great facts of the first half of the nineteenth century. A Christian commonwealth, animated by the spirit of modern civilization, now occupies the abandoned sites of the slavers' barracoons; and, whether in the form of increasing Christian states stretching along the pestilent Guinea coast, or only in the wasting vestiges of a vigorous but shortlived civilization, the memorials of that work will long remain, and in the distant future it will appear to have been among the memorable things of the present age.

The history of European misrule in Western Africa is among the darkest chapters in the annals of human depravity and crime. The simultaneous discovery and occupation of America gave a greatly increased importance to African commerce. From an early antiquity Africa to the south of the Great Desert was known almost exclusively as an exporter of slaves. Before the age of the Caesars slaves from beyond the mountains of Nubia or the Great Desert were sold in the marts of Carthage and Cairo, and were to be seen in the rich villas of the luxurious Romans. The same trade was prosecuted to a limited extent by the Saracens; but its growth was greatly circumscribed by the genius of Islamism, by which freedom was awarded to all slaves who embraced the faith of the Prophet.

The exportation of slaves from Africa grew out of the prevalence of slavery in that country. No despotism is so intense as that of an African king, and nowhere else is there found so general and complete a system of slavery as prevails in the kingdoms of that continent. Slaves are the chief commodity; in this form wealth is chiefly embodied, and the price of things is reckoned at so many slaves. When European commerce had created new wants, slaves were freely offered in exchange for the coveted wares; and as slave-labour was the only available form of African industry, the trade in slaves naturally began to be regarded with favour by the European merchants.

Down to the middle of the fifteenth century, however, the demand for labour was too limited to create, to any considerable extent, a demand for African slaves; nor was the foreign slave-trade known till the de-

mand for labour in the American colonies called it into existence. The adaptation of the African, who had been reared in bondage, to the condition of a slave, as opposed to the unconquerable love of freedom in the American Indian, suggested to the humane, but short-sighted bishop of Chiapas the scheme of substituting negro for Indian slavery in the Spanish American colonies. A more controlling argument soon appeared in favour of the proposed substitution,—it proved to be profitable,—and impelled by such an influence the newly-created commerce advanced rapidly, though opposed by both the civil and the ecclesiastical powers. From that time forward the African coast was the scene of an ever-active traffic in the bodies and souls of men. Hundreds of thousands of unhappy victims of European cupidity were thus torn from the homes of their childhood and borne beyond the deep into hopeless exile; while the American colonies became peopled with a servile race, widely distinguished in mental and physical characteristics from the colonists. The slave-trade has long since ceased in all those parts of America that were originally occupied by British colonies, and in most of them slavery itself has been abolished by law; but the descendants of the victims of that trade are still to be found there in increasing millions.

The native Africans when separated from their national institutions and home associations were wholly without institutions, laws, or religion. They were men only so far as physical character, and moral and intellectual susceptibilities are concerned; of those mental endowments that dignify manhood they were entirely destitute. Their native tongue, no longer available as a medium of communication, was disused and soon forgotten; the rites of their conjurers, at first but imperfectly understood, soon passed from their memories; and all of the very little originally possessed above mere infantile ignorance was entirely lost. America received from Africa only unfurnished human animals, possessing, indeed, all the capacities of men, but as destitute of mental as of material endowments.

The system of African slavery, though one of the most stupendous wrongs ever inflicted by human cupidity upon defenceless innocence, has nevertheless been overruled by Providence to the good of its victims. It has removed the debased and ignorant savage from his degrading associations, and has placed him in contact with the Christian civilization of another race. Here his susceptible nature has imbibed the spirit of the institutions among which he was placed, and thus his character has been elevated and his social position improved. Other nations have advanced rapidly in civilization and refinement since first the African race was naturalized on American soil, but none has made

the same relative progress that the negro has done. To-day the three millions of that race in this country embody a mass of moral and intellectual power, that will compare advantageously with the middle classes of any European country as they were three hundred years ago. The children of unlettered Africans—slaves or princes—have in numerous instances attained a respectable rank of intelligence, even when compared with the advanced standard of the present age. The worshippers of the most worthless *gree-grees*, whose only religious emotion was slavish fear, and whose only worship was a senseless or degrading ceremony, have listened to and received the simple faith of the gospel, and by it have been elevated to the dignity of Christ's freedmen. The elements of a nation were cast upon our shores, but by reason of mental destitution they wanted the cohesive properties that change individuals into societies. These properties have since been supplied, and now we have in our midst the strange spectacle of the elements of a mighty nation, instinct with all the properties of manhood, yet wholly disintegrated and incapable of uniting with the established social mass. The difference between the African race in America and their brethren in their fatherland is an incidental result of the system of slavery; though, as it is wholly incidental, neither the institution itself nor its patrons can plead this in mitigation of the unmixed iniquity of the system.

The enslavement of one portion of society by another is not merely the result of arbitrary acts of legislation. Where there is great disparity of mental and moral elevation among the various classes of society, something approaching to the character of slavery will always exist, and without such disparity even legal slavery will be more nominal than real. It is questionable whether even the forms of slavery can be maintained beyond a certain point in the approach of the enslaved to the mental elevation of the superior order. To avoid this result, slaveholding powers have sometimes purposely placed obstructions in the way of the mental culture of the enslaved. That however until recently had not been found necessary, as the means of education were not so readily accessible as to come within the reach of those for whom they were not specially designed. If therefore we see, in this age of benevolence, and in our own Christian country, this hitherto almost unknown enormity, it obviously is not owing to any unprecedented wickedness, but rather to the peculiar difficulty of sustaining the system of slavery among surrounding influences, compelling those interested in its perpetuation to resort to stringent measures for that purpose. But the remedy is too violent to be long used. It is too late to expect to perpetuate a social organization by cutting off one portion of

the people from the means of self-culture, that they may the more certainly remain the chattels of another portion. The moral sense of American slaveholding communities will effectually frustrate any such fiendish purposes, though the throne of iniquity should frame that mischief by a law. But the fact that such insane legislation has taken place, is evidence that the slave population is already approaching that standard in mental progress at which slavery must cease. And this progress must continue, unless the standard of education among the whites shall decline also. While masters and slaves are fellow-Christians, deriving their common hopes and learning their reciprocal duties from the same Bible, the privileges most valued by the former will not be wholly denied to the latter. And as there is good ground for the presumption that at no period has the progress of the American slave population been so rapid as it is at present, it must be evident that the whole system is steadily approaching the point of its extinction—and that too under circumstances that threaten no violent or hurtful collisions of rival castes. The precise mode in which this shall result, is among the secret things of the future.

The scheme of African Colonization, in the present condition of things, is only incidentally related to slavery. The American Colonization Society professes to have nothing to do with it, and proposes only to colonize free persons of colour in Africa. But it would be neither just nor wise to pretend that the two things are not intimately related. But for the sub-incumbent slave population, the interest in behalf of the free blacks that gave rise to the cause of colonization would not have been felt; and nearly every effort in behalf of that cause has been made with a reference, more or less direct, to its influence upon slavery. That interest, too, has, in the great majority of cases, been prompted by benevolent feelings towards the enslaved, and of more or less intense hostility to the system of slavery.

The plan of restoring any portion of the exiled children of Africa to the land of their forefathers originated in England, and is one of several schemes devised for the benefit of the negro race, by that noble band of philanthropists whose names are inseparably joined to the glory of the abolition of the slave-trade and the complete overthrow of British colonial slavery. The origin of the scheme is also connected with the history of our own revolutionary struggle. At the close of the American revolution, among the provincial troops in the British army were more than a thousand negroes, who had been allured to the royal standard by the promise of emancipation. With quite as much fidelity to an unprofitable obligation as is commonly found in such cases, the British government undertook to remove these destitute and homeless ones to places of safety. A por-

tion of them were taken to London and there discharged, and the rest to Nova Scotia. The miserable condition of those in London arrested the attention of certain benevolent individuals in that city, and as it was found impracticable to render them efficient aid in England, the plan of transporting them to Africa was hit upon. Accordingly they were conveyed to that distant shore, and there, with their brethren from Nova Scotia, who joined them soon after, they laid the foundation of the colony of Sierra Leone.

In America the plan of colonization had a broader and more comprehensive design, and it was instigated by a no less genial charity. About the year 1815 two pioneers in that enterprise—Mercer of Virginia, and Finley of New Jersey, unknown to each other—were deeply engaged in studying to find out some method for benefitting the African race in America; and to both the plan of colonization appeared at once the best and the most feasible. During the next year these philanthropic men were brought together at Washington city, and there, in connexion with Messrs. Key, Caldwell, and Mills, all genuine friends of the coloured race, they laid the foundation of the American Colonization Society. That any other than benevolent purposes actuated any of them in this movement could be suspected only by those who know neither the men nor the work in which they engaged.

The American Colonization Society was organized in the city of Washington, in December, 1816. The most prominent agents in its organization were, besides those just named, certain distinguished public characters from the more northerly southern States,—Clay of Kentucky, Randolph of Virginia, Wright of Maryland, and some others. The views and expressions of these eminent men, of course, gave tone and colouring to the new society. From the first an extreme sensitiveness in reference to slavery was manifested, and great pains were taken to vindicate the society against even the suspicion of hostility to that institution. It is somewhat difficult to account for all that appears of this kind. It can hardly be thought that the antislavery sentiment of the country was not recognised and relied upon. Perhaps that was set down as so much fixed capital. The old Emancipation Societies had become inactive for want of some definite object, and it was natural to expect that the feelings that had hitherto found expression through those bodies would now be brought to operate in behalf of colonization. Accordingly the first aim of the nascent society seems to have been to conciliate the more sensitive and uncertain slave-interest. The society was strictly inhibited from any intermeddling with the subject of slavery, by having the field of its action confined to *free* coloured persons, while neither

slaves nor slavery is alluded to in its fundamental laws. But this significant silence was not deemed sufficient, and accordingly pains were taken to pledge the new organization to a course of action that should not be inimical to the cause of slavery.

Mr. Clay, the early and steady friend of the Society, who may be said to have stood sponsor at its baptism, and to have been security to the slave power for its good conduct ever since, on the occasion of its organization took the opportunity to define the relative positions of the Society and slavery, and his own position as to both. "It was proper and necessary," he remarked, "distinctly to state, that he understood it constituted no part of the object of this meeting to touch or agitate, in the slightest degree, a delicate question connected with another portion of the coloured population of our country. It was not proposed to deliberate on, or consider at all, any question of emancipation, or that was connected with the abolition of slavery. It was upon that condition alone, he was sure, that many gentlemen from the South and West, whom he saw present, had attended, or could be expected to co-operate. *It was upon that condition only that he himself attended.*"

He was followed by the celebrated John Randolph, who, notwithstanding his occasional antislavery paroxysms, was now more emphatic than Mr. Clay himself in vindicating the society from any suspicion of hostility to slavery. He said, "it appeared to him, that it had not been sufficiently insisted on, *with a view to obtain the co-operation of all the citizens of the United States*, not only that this meeting does not in any wise affect the question of negro slavery, [towards emancipation, of course,] but as far as it goes, must materially tend to secure the property of every master in the United States over his slaves. It appeared to him that this aspect of the question had not been sufficiently presented to the public view. It is a notorious fact, that the existence of this mixed and intermediate population of free negroes was viewed by every slaveholder as one of the greatest sources of the insecurity and unprofitableness of slave property; that they serve to excite in their fellow-beings a feeling of discontent, of repining at their situation; and that they act as channels of communication, not only between different slaves, but between the slaves of different districts; that they are the depositaries of stolen goods and the promoters of mischief. In a wordly point of view, then, without entering into the general question, and apart from those higher and nobler motives which had been presented to the meeting, [by Mr. Caldwell,] the owners of slaves were interested in providing a retreat for this part of our population."

Randolph was followed by Mr. Robert Wright, of Maryland, who,

in giving in his adhesion to the society, thought it necessary to accompany it with his protest also. "As I discover," said he, "the most delicate regards to the *rights of property*, I shall, with great pleasure, lend my aid to restore this unfortunate people to the enjoyment of their liberty. But while we wish to promote the happiness of these free people of colour, we ought to take care not to furnish the means of transporting out of the reach of the master *his property*."

These addresses were designed to define the position of the society before the public; and to secure the favour and co-operation of the friends of slavery, a tone of whining depreciation was adopted by its friends towards them, while those who consented half-reluctantly to be its sponsors, did so with the language of warning and menace upon their lips. Everything was done to appease the pro-slavery interest—the anti-slavery sentiment of the nation was disregarded. The society had a southern aspect from the beginning. This was seen not only in the sentiments uttered, but also in the *personnel* of its organization. The president and eight out of thirteen vice-presidents were from slave States,—probably most of them were slave-holders; and the executive-officers—as the society was located at Washington city—were all from slave territory.

The favour of the great men who officiated at the organization of the society, or were named among its officers, though purchased so dearly, was not expected to extend so far as to induce them to make any considerable personal or pecuniary sacrifice for its benefit. The burden of the details of the society's affairs was to be borne by the original projectors of the enterprise, while the national government was relied on as the source of the pecuniary means that would be required. Accordingly, among the first acts of the new organization was the presentation of a memorial to Congress in behalf of their designs. That document was the work of a very different set of men from those who spoke for the society at its constituent meeting. It portrays in vivid colours the degraded condition of the free coloured population, and feelingly deplores their wretchedness. The designs of the society for their relief are then set forth, and spoken of as affording the government a favourable opportunity "for repairing a great evil in our social and political institutions, and at the same time for elevating from a low and hopeless condition a numerous and rapidly increasing race of men, *who want nothing but a proper theatre*, to enter upon the pursuit of happiness and independence in the ordinary paths which a benign Providence has left open to the human race." A yet more expanded and elevated view of the subject is presented in another part of the same document. "It may be

reserved," say the memorialists, "for our government to become the honourable instrument, under divine Providence, of conferring a still higher blessing upon the large and interesting portion of mankind benefitted by that deed of justice, by demonstrating that a race of men, composing numerous tribes, spread over a continent of vast and unexplored extent, fertility, and riches, unknown to the enlightened nations of antiquity, and who had yet made no progress in the refinements of civilization, for whom history has preserved no monuments of arts or arms—that even this ill-fated race may cherish the hope of beholding at last the orient star revealing the best and highest aims and attributes of man. Out of such materials to rear the glorious edifice of well-ordered and polished society, upon the deep and sure foundation of equal laws and diffusive education, would give a sufficient title [to a nation or to individuals] to be enrolled among the illustrious benefactors of mankind, whilst it would afford a precious and consolatory evidence of the all-prevailing power of liberty, enlightened by knowledge and corrected by religion." That this first official document of the Society, rather than the unofficial remarks of the speakers at the organization, should have been taken as the real language and expressed sentiments of the new organization was not an unreasonable demand; though, since such papers are often passed over unread, while short and earnest speeches very generally arrest public attention, these and not that would, to the public mind, give character to the society. Such to some extent was the case, and to the same degree was the efficiency of the society destroyed.

The real strength of the cause of colonization lies in the moral convictions of the American people that they owe a long-delayed duty to the coloured race. That sentiment prevails in all sections of the country, and is shared in common by slaveholders and non-slaveholders. It is the necessary result of the common Christianity of the country, and is cherished by the benevolent spirit of the age. In the free States that spirit manifests itself in the form of the anti-slavery sentiment that almost universally pervades the enlightened and conscientious portion of the community; but which, on account of the difficulties attending the subject, and for the want of some practicable method of rendering itself available in doing good to its objects, too generally wastes its energies in inaction, or vents itself in unavailing anathemas against the institution of slavery. At the South the same spirit exists, if less generally than at the North, yet in a more practically active form. It is occupied in meliorating the condition of the enslaved, and in forming a public opinion that compels the most heartless master to award to his bondmen many of the privileges of fellow-creatures. It is teaching the whole slave-

holding community to recognise the enslaved as moral agents responsible to God, and therefore endowed by him with rights corresponding to their responsibilities. Accordingly the duty of allowing them religious privileges, and affording them the means of religious culture, is more and more recognised and practised. Their morals are cared for; they are taught to hallow the Sabbath; and though slavery necessarily discards marriage, yet in spite of this, there is a constantly increasing tendency to protect the chastity of the enslaved, and to invest their *quasi* marriages with the sanctions of religion. In many individual cases it has led to the emancipation of whole estates of slaves, and in others to liberal pecuniary contributions for the benefit of the coloured race. Had the friends of colonization relied more exclusively on the influence of this sentiment, resting their claims chiefly on high moral considerations, instead of pandering to the selfishness of heartless slave-masters, they would have gained for that cause the respect and confidence of its natural allies, and so been enabled efficiently to prosecute their benevolent enterprise. Their course in this matter has been a succession of grievous blunders; for in attempting to please all, they have not succeeded in satisfying any.

At first, indeed, the colonization cause was in danger of suffering the fate of the child of many fathers. As it had a face for everybody, so everybody was its friend. It came into being under the auspices of the great. The general government looked patronizingly upon it. It was commended to the friends of slavery as an expedient for increasing the value and security of their "property;" to the enemies of slavery it was held up as the one safe and speedy method for its extirpation. The missionary zeal of the Churches was invoked in its behalf, since it promised to open the way for preaching the gospel to the heathen, and was to be, in some sense, itself a missionary organization; while the propagandism of the politician and the scholar, and the cupidity of the merchant were to find in union with it an ample field for their peculiar enterprises. But at the same time none of these numerous and powerful friends of the cause of Colonization were responsible for its subsistence; and while each left it to the rest, not a few were alienated by reason of the bootless favour of antagonist parties.

These results, however, were only gradually developed. Northern antislaveryism was very generally, though rather languidly, enlisted in favour of colonization, notwithstanding the ungracious attitude at first given to that cause. Auxiliary associations were formed, by the spontaneous action of the people, in most of the free States, and considerable sums of money were raised. A friendly feeling to-

wards the society and its objects was also gaining ground among the more intelligent of the coloured people, and many of them, especially in the middle and more northerly southern States, began to look towards Africa as the hope and the home of the American coloured people. This was the more important, since the success of the society's operation is dependant upon their favour and confidence. This fact has been too generally overlooked, especially when, to gain the favour of the slave interest, the confidence of those without whose co-operation the society can do nothing, has been most uselessly sacrificed. Could the favour of the friends of slavery have been purchased at such a price, it would have been too dearly paid for. Here was the capital blunder. Not that the Colonization Society ever deserved to be suspected by the coloured people, but that it permitted itself to be placed in a false position by professed friends, who have proved not worth the price at which it was attempted to buy them.

For the first fifteen years of its history the Colonization Society drew out a languid existence; though during that period a settlement was fixed on the coast of Africa, whither some twelve hundred American negroes were transported, and about three hundred recaptured Africans,—the latter at the expense of the government of the United States. But this same period produced great changes at home, relative to slavery. The demand for slave labour was largely augmented, and the value of slaves increased accordingly. Men now saw their pecuniary interests involved in the institution, and casting aside the claims of justice, they began to question the prescriptive authority by which it had so long been denounced as an evil, and to look with disfavour at anything that tended, however remotely, to its removal. Then first arose a decided and avowed proslavery party in our country, to whom belongs the distinction of being the first to avow the monster dogma of the times—the moral righteousness of slaveholding. At the same time, by virtue of the steady progress of the age, the antislavery sentiments of the better portion of society were becoming more and more intense; and of course the antagonism of parties grew more decided and violent. A further, though accidental, cause of irritation was also added, which greatly complicated and rendered more intricate the existing difficulties. The antislavery cause at the North fell into the hands of parties but poorly qualified to manage its delicate and complex interests. The work that under more favourable circumstances had puzzled the shrewd and dispassionate Quakers, was now undertaken by men of directly opposite characters. Assuming a speculative and romantic theory of duty as to the relations of masters and slaves, these men laboured to propagate their opinions with all the zeal and much of

the usual intolerance of enthusiasts. Resting in the conviction that the subject admitted of no compromise, and that whatever came short of their own standard must be rejected and opposed, these newly-fledged philanthropists denounced the Colonization Society as one of the bulwarks of slavery. This assault was uncalled for and unwise; and whatever may have been the opinions and motives of the assailants, many of their imputations were unjust. But unluckily for the cause of Colonization, so much had been conceded, that it was not difficult to place the society in the aspect of an apologist for slavery.

The assault, however, would probably have proved comparatively harmless, had not the friends of the society been driven by it into a position still more fatal to the interests of their cause. Never did the strategy of an experienced campaigner succeed more perfectly in drawing his enemy into a snare, than did the movements of the Abolitionists, (the name is used in no opprobrious sense,) whether they designed it or not, in entangling the Colonizationists in a net from which it was impossible they should escape without great damage. The very worst that the Colonizationists could have done, was to take up the gauntlet thrown down by their new enemies, and so come before the public in opposition to those who were recognised as, *par excellence*, the enemies of slavery. And that very thing they did. Of course, they were worsted at every onset; for though they were cheered on by the mobs that were overriding all law to put down the Abolitionists, the sober and discerning drew away from the contest and did nothing; or, impelled by sympathy for the victims of a remorseless persecution, made common cause with them, in their follies as well as their sufferings. The position into which the Colonization Society was brought by the mistaken policy of its friends, was as unfortunate as its worst enemies could have desired; for while the North was almost wholly lost to colonization in the contest, the South entirely withdrew its confidence, and left the society and its interests to drag out a feeble existence, or to perish through neglect. There is cause to believe that the experience has not proved entirely profitless, though there is much yet for the directors of that society to learn. When its reports and other official papers shall cease to be vehicles of vituperation against abolitionists, and of apologies for slavery and slaveholders; when its orators and essayists shall cease to vilify our free coloured population, and to teach the comparative advantages of slavery over their condition; when, in short, the society shall express a friendly sympathy with the objects of its beneficence rather than with their enemies, a new and greatly improved state of things will occur in its affairs.

We will now turn our attention from the domestic affairs of the American Colonization Society to contemplate the scene of its foreign operations. Liberia in Africa lies on the western coast of that continent, extending in a south-eastern direction from the vicinity of Sierra Leone to Cape Palmas, a distance of over three hundred miles, at which point the coast turns to the eastward, and runs three hundred miles farther, along the northern border of the Gulf of Guinea, to the great Delta of the Niger. This region was for a long time the seat of European and American commerce in Africa, especially the slave-trade. That part occupied by the new republic is a beautiful and fertile region, well watered and highly productive. Situated between the equator and the northern tropic, it enjoys perpetual summer, and is richly supplied with the means of human subsistence. The climate, though fatal to white men, is eminently congenial to the constitutions of the African race, who feel the scorching rays of the vertical sun less painfully than the breeze that fails to blast the opening flower, and to whom the miasma is less deleterious than the winds that only nerve up the energies of a race adapted to another climate.

It does not fall within our design to trace the progress of the colony planted on this coast by the emigrants carried from America under the auspices of the Colonization Society; we purpose only to notice results, and from them to deduce appropriate conclusions. Down to the present year (1851) the aggregate receipts of the Society, from various sources, amount to \$913,636; to which may be added \$312,000, the amount raised and expended by independent societies in the same work; making a total of nearly one and a quarter millions of dollars, expended in the cause of colonization in thirty-four years. Out of this sum the current expenses of the society have been paid; the territory extending nearly four hundred miles along the coast has been paid for; over six thousand American coloured persons have been colonized in Africa, and many considerable public improvements made. These facts, though they proclaim the feeble-ness of the society's efforts, and the insignificance of its means, also very satisfactorily establish the fidelity and economy of its administration. But these statements very inadequately exhibit the results effected by the society. The coast for four hundred miles, once the principal seat of the horrid slave-trade, has been redeemed from its worse than heathen barbarism, and erected into a Christian state, abounding with appliances of a vigorous civilization. All along that coast, and penetrating into the interior, are found the towns and settlements of a well-regulated republic, that is now claiming its place among the sovereign nations of the earth, and launching out upon

a successful career of industrial and educational enterprises. Nearly two hundred thousands of the members of the native tribes acknowledge the authority of the new government, and rejoicing in its protection, are steadily, and in some cases even rapidly, preparing themselves for a full participation in the privileges of citizenship. Modern civilization, instinct with the spirit and life of Christianity, has become naturalized in the land of the negro.

In searching for the first-fruits of colonization, attention should be directed to Africa rather than to America. If its only results were the removal of a very small portion of our coloured people, the enterprise would be worthy of very little attention. But the persons whose removal from America caused no perceptible vacuum, have been widely and most beneficially felt in Africa. The American negro goes back to the land of his forefathers a very different kind of person from the representatives of his race that originally went out to the land of the coloured man's enslavement and emancipation. He comes back to his fatherland and to his kindred tribes a relatively educated and elevated character, and so, from the necessity of the case, becomes to them an apostle of civilization. And as the spirit of a youthful civilization is instinctively aggressive, though its standard, as compared with older communities, may be low, when acting on a mass of barbarism its success is certain. If the social elevation of our native population may suffice to raise, to their own level, the semi-enlightened masses that Europe is disgorging upon our shores, may not the American coloured emigrants in Africa in like manner elevate the native tribes to their own advancing standard? The facts now occurring in Liberia abundantly prove that this must be the case.

The native Africans regard their kindred from America as a superior race of beings, and yet as so related to themselves as to be objects of hopeful emulation. To speak the language or to wear the apparel of these strangers becomes an object of their ambition. Ideas peculiar to a state of civilization, and full of its diffusive life, are readily received and rapidly disseminated among them. The wants thus created give occasion to increased industry, and this in turn increases the appliances of civilization. Commerce brings the barbarian of the interior into contact with the civilization of the seaboard, whence he returns to his inland home with new incitements to action, and new ideas of life and manners. The schools established in and about the colonial settlements are already giving a new character to the rising generations of natives in those parts, and the more powerful influences of vital Christianity are steadily transforming those savage tribes into orderly Christian communities.

It has been asked, in reference to this work of colonization, whether

there is not danger that it may result, as have other similar schemes, in the subjection and ultimate extinction of the native tribes. The fraternal relations hitherto maintained by the colonists towards the natives are not thought to be sufficient surety that such will not be the case; for the period of colonial infancy is not the time of most imminent danger, as then a sense of weakness restrains the colonists from violence, or even from such flagrant acts of injustice as would arouse the vengeance of their barbarous neighbours. Nor is the progress of Christianity among the natives alone a sufficient safeguard against the most sanguinary conflicts between them and the colonist. Christianity, at an early date, made most encouraging progress among the American Indians, but it did not save their tribes from exterminating wars with the whites. The Hottentots and Caffres of South Africa have received the gospel; nevertheless we hear the shout of *extermination* uttered against them by their colonial neighbours. And with such examples before us it is well to ask whether like dangers do not threaten the relations of Liberian colonists and the native tribes in their vicinity.

In the cases above named, and others of like character, it must be observed that the distinction between colonists and natives did not consist exclusively in disparity of mental character arising from the accidents of education. They were of different *races*, distinguished by obvious and immutable physical characteristics, the well-known and ever-active causes of sectional prejudices and partisan divisions. And as diversity of race is made an occasion of prejudices, so unity of race has its corresponding affinities; and while the former are too stubborn to yield to the force of education, and too powerful to be overcome by the amount of Christian charity that may be reasonably calculated on in any civil community, the latter also co-operates with those influences, to unite in one body individuals very far separated in mental and moral characteristics. While therefore among us, the Caucasian race is found incapable of assimilating with either the American-Indian or the African race, and consequently living in virtual hostility to both; and while in Australia and South Africa the European colonists are steadily pushing the native tribes towards extinction, in Liberia, on account of the absence of this cause of hostility, there is no apparent tendency towards such a catastrophe. Everything there indicates another state of things. Though the colonists cannot be expected at once and entirely to forget their superiority as a class, yet so perishable are the barriers between themselves and the natives that they cannot be perpetuated. The families of colonists and of natives live in close proximity to each other; their children attend the same schools; and by thus growing

up together they imbibe the same ideas and become a common people. The institutions of the new republic all tend to efface the distinction of the two classes. Already many native Africans are enjoying the rights and privileges of citizens, and some of them are found in positions of honour and responsibility. The forming mass requires only a larger infusion of the American element to secure and hasten the assimilating and elevating process now so happily in operation.

Among the probable results of colonization, none is more noteworthy than its incidental influence towards elevating the negro character, by creating among men of that race a just self-respect, and by inspiring in others corresponding sentiments towards them. Once the language put into the mouth of the naked and kneeling African, by the British Society for the Abolition of the Slave-trade—"Am I not a man and a brother?"—was a question; but the results of colonization have changed it into an indignant demand. Oppressed by the superincumbent weight of an unapproachable superior *caste*, the African in America could never assert his claim to equality with his fellow-men, and no monuments or historical traditions remain to vindicate such claim in his behalf. But the opportunity so long withheld has been at length afforded; and well has the coloured man justified the largest expectations of his most sanguine friends. In contemplating the facts presented in the history of Liberia, all but the perversely blind must detect some of the highest attributes of the human character, among the leading men of that infant commonwealth. There the coloured man has discovered his own latent capabilities, and learned to venerate his own manhood. There the African race stand forth demonstrating their powers and susceptibilities for high intellectual and moral culture. The truths thus elicited must soon be everywhere recognised; and then the world shall be called to admire a race of men, once accounted the connecting link between rational and irrational beings, advancing with unparalleled rapidity towards a lofty eminence. Had colonization done no more, such an achievement would a thousand fold repay all its cost of labour and treasure. From this point of observation the future is full of promise to the African race; and things quite as improbable have actually occurred, as would be a rivalry in social progress during the ensuing centuries between that race and the Anglo-Saxon. Each of those races has its peculiar adaptation for success in such a contest, and both have advantages not possessed in equal measure by other portions of mankind.

In this way we may look to Liberia for an influence that must act most efficiently in favour of the final emancipation of the African race. Such an influence must necessarily arise from the very ex-

istence of a wealthy educated and powerful republic of coloured people, holding and maintaining its place among the great nations of Christendom. Hitherto the world has silently assented to the enslavement of the African race from an indefinite but effectual conviction of their mental inferiority. Take away that notion, and compel the world to confess the real manhood of the negro, and every generous soul will cry out against his enslavement. Already the infant republic of Liberia is operating toward this great end, and this tendency must increase with the growth of the republic. Its probable influence upon slavery and the condition of the coloured population of this country has been a subject of special interest among all classes who have concerned themselves in the cause of colonization. It must now, however, be apparent to all that its immediate influence towards removing that population is very inconsiderable. A few thousands have been removed in a period of thirty years, and during the same time the increase of that race among us has been by hundreds of thousands. For the last ten years the ratio of emigration to increase has scarcely equalled two to a thousand. Nor can such an increase of emigration be anticipated, for many years to come, as will sensibly affect the numerical progress of this increasing mass. It is evident, therefore, that one of the primary designs of the originators and early advocates of colonization, whether prompted by benevolence or cupidity, is not likely to be realized.

The effectual obstacle to the removal of the slave population is the profitableness of slave labour. Not that slavery is favourable to the increase of national wealth, but to immediate individual aggrandizement. As a system of practical political economy nothing can be more ruinous; yet on account of the state of things where it most flourishes, the few are enriched by it, though at the expense of the whole. This state of things depends chiefly on the greatly increased demand for cotton, by which an enhanced value has been given to slave labour. By this means the planting interest in the cotton-growing region has completely risen above all others; and so, while one class has been directly enriched, the community, as a whole, has been impoverished. Still this interested class, by virtue of their numbers and social influence, and the dependence of all others upon them, have been able to lead the public mind and to dictate the measures of government. Their plantations constitute a ready market for the domestic slave-trade, and thus the slave interests of Maryland and Virginia are united with those of Georgia and Mississippi. The cotton-trade extending from the planter to the consumer is rooted in and derives its existence from slavery; and in

return it imparts vigour and stability to that institution. While, therefore, these things continue as they now are, we cannot expect any general movement towards the removal of the slave population from the country. And here lurks the danger of the system of slavery. The glitter of gain usually effectually blinds the sight to every other object. The perpetuation of slavery is sought as a means of personal gain; and regardless of the tendency of the age to condemn the whole system as illiberal and unjust,—alike anti-American and anti-Christian,—and of the increasing moral and intellectual power of the slaves themselves, thus rendering them a most unsafe element in the body politic, the system is extended, and all thought of its annihilation, or even modification, is scouted, and proscribed as a pestilent heresy. The future as viewed from this stand-point, is dark as the prophetic writing upon the walls of Belshazzar's palace.

But if by any of the many possible changes in the affairs of the world, the value of slave labour should be greatly diminished, the same interests that now effectually forbid the removal of the slaves would as earnestly demand it. Make slavery unprofitable to the individual master, and it will very speedily become extinct. And should cotton come to be largely cultivated out of the United States,—in the East or West Indies, or in Africa,—or should some substitute for cotton, better and cheaper, be discovered and brought into extensive use, that event would occur. And should these things take place while the present social relations of the two races continue they would at once separate by their own natural repulsions. But whether in that case Liberia would become the asylum of the freed coloured people would depend upon ulterior causes. If an exodus awaits the American negro race, their land of promise is not yet certainly ascertained. It may be Africa, or the Antilles, or the wilds of Northern Mexico. It is possible, too, that the regions where they shall then be chiefly collected, would be gradually abandoned by its white population, as in Jamaica, and so the negroes at length possess the fields they once cultivated for others. The only valuable consideration connecting colonization with these contingencies, is that it is preparing an adequate asylum for that population, if at any time it shall come to be needed.

Independent of these things a few years may produce great changes in the affairs of the American Colonization Society. The institution was from the first ostensibly devoted to the free people of colour, and to them it may address itself without hindrance. Did the free coloured people know their own best interests, and had they sufficient enterprise to prosecute them at a little present sacrifice, the address

would not be unheeded. Whatever may be thought of the colonization scheme as to its ulterior purposes, its immediate fruits upon those who embrace its offers are unquestionably beneficent; and every free coloured man in America should be taught to feel that his individual welfare, as well as the best interests of his race, are pointing him to Liberia. But in order to this, the language of the Colonization Society and that of its agents and platform orators must be so modified as to conciliate the good-will and inspire the confidence of coloured men. Could they themselves be convinced that those who are inviting them to go out to find for themselves a country in a distant land, are really their friends, acting from purely benevolent motives, multitudes would speedily accept the invitation. While, however, the representatives of the Society assume the tone and port of negro-drivers, it is not wonderful that the gifts brought by their hands are regarded with suspicion. It is believed that of late there has been some improvement in this matter; and also that the character of the Colonization Society is becoming better understood by the coloured people of the free States. It is truly desirable that these good works may continue to advance.

Among the most valuable of the immediate results of colonization is the opportunity it has afforded benevolent persons to emancipate their slaves, and make adequate provision for them in a state of freedom. In many of the slave States emancipation is rendered exceedingly difficult or quite impossible; and where it is practicable, the condition of free coloured people is not such as to invite the benevolent to seek it as the portion of their freedmen. Accordingly in such cases emigration and perpetual slavery are the only alternatives presented to the slave whose master earnestly desires to do his whole duty towards him. To these, therefore, colonization is truly an angel of mercy, and Liberia a land of refuge. More than three thousand—over half the number sent out—were emancipated expressly for that purpose, nearly all of whom would have remained slaves had no such place of refuge been offered; nearly two hundred thus purchased their own freedom. It is further evident, that the legal owners of a great many slaves only need to be convinced that an asylum is there prepared for their unfortunate wards, where freedom may be enjoyed in reality, to induce them to grant the boon. Only let it be demonstrated by a proper array of well-attested facts, that the colonized negro is benefitted by the change of his condition, and many masters will hasten to send their servants thither.

The reports named at the head of this paper amply prove the assumptions we have made as to the position of the society. In

the appendix to the Report of the Parent Society is a statement of the emigration to Liberia, (exclusive of that to the Maryland Colony at Cape Palmas,) from the beginning of 1820 to the end of 1850,—a period of thirty-one years. In February of the first-named year the ship *Elizabeth* sailed from New-York for Africa, under the direction and at the expense of the government of the United States, with eighty-six emigrants, chiefly from New-York and Pennsylvania. The emigration for the next ten years amounted to thirteen hundred and thirty-six, and for the ten years following, to two thousand, four hundred and twenty-three; while that for the last decade is only twenty-three hundred, of which number nearly fourteen hundred fall to the last three years. These figures demonstrate the absence of any available favour towards the society among any considerable class of the people of the United States, and as clearly prove the bad policy of trying to please everybody. Had the same amount of efforts towards conciliation, that has been addressed to the slave-power, been used towards "the free people of colour residing in our country," without whose consent the society can do nothing, a very different state of things would have ensued. A change for the better as to that particular has taken place within a few years past, and a corresponding increase is seen in the number of emigrants.

It is equally instructive to observe from what places these emigrants have come, and from what they have not come. More than one-third of the whole (twenty-two hundred and fifty-eight) were from Virginia, nearly an equal proportion from North Carolina, and a much larger proportion from Maryland, including about eight hundred sent by the Maryland Colonization Society to Cape Palmas. Of about seven thousand persons sent out to the two colonies, over forty-four hundred have come from these three States. In these States it is well known that there is a large number of free negroes intermingled with the slave population, constituting the class of persons so often and earnestly alluded to, by a certain order of colonization advocates, as a troublesome and dangerous body. In these States, too, are to be found some of the most reliable friends of the coloured race,—persons whose views of the subject have been formed upon an intimate and extensive acquaintance with the facts of the case, and whose benevolence has not expended itself in barren expressions of sympathy. Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia have each contributed over five hundred; South Carolina about three hundred and fifty; Tennessee and Kentucky about two hundred and fifty each, and Louisiana nearly two hundred. Many of all these were liberated slaves, freed and sent out by their former masters. On the list of States from which emigrants have gone, the names of

Maine, New-Hampshire, Vermont, Wisconsin, Florida, Arkansas, and Texas, do not appear. Massachusetts, New-Jersey, and Michigan have given one each; Iowa, three; Delaware, four; Connecticut, ten: the other States range from twenty-one—the number from Illinois—to one hundred and seven—the number contributed by the Empire State. These statements very satisfactorily demonstrate that at the end of thirty-four years' labour the cause of colonization has scarcely made itself felt by the great mass of our coloured population. The great work upon which depends all its efficiency is yet to be done.

Did the reports inform us of the sources of the society's income, we should see still more clearly where lies the strength of the cause of colonization. From the Parent Society we have no information on this subject; but in the last report of the New-York State Society is given a classified list of Churches from which contributions were received during the year. The information thus given is significant and highly suggestive. Only four denominations are named as contributors,—the Old, and the New School Presbyterian, the Reformed Dutch, and the Methodist Episcopal Churches. From the other great denominations,—the Episcopalians, a body noted for the wealth and high position of its adherents, and from among whom the Colonization Societies are ambitious to choose their vice-presidents; from the Quakers, the ancient and steady friends of the coloured race; from the Baptists, among the most numerous and liberal religious bodies among us; from the Congregationalists, a denomination second to none in enlightened liberality,—from all these no account is given. Nor are the reports from the denominations named as contributors such as to impress one with the conviction that even in these bodies the cause of colonization has come to be regarded as one of the great religious and benevolent enterprises of the times. The Old School Presbyterian Church has been esteemed the strong tower of the Colonization Society; and yet of all its numerous Churches in this State, only twenty-two are heard from, and the aggregate of their contributions (\$1,591 54) falls below what many of them pay singly to other benevolent institutions. The New School Presbyterians occupy a somewhat less cordial relation to the cause. Only ten of the numerous Churches of that body have sent contributions amounting in all to six hundred dollars,—more than half of which come from our congregation. The Reformed Dutch Churches have shown a much more general and steady attachment to the cause than any other denomination. The relation of the Methodist Episcopal Church to this cause has long been anomalous and ambiguous. The society has been endorsed by our highest ecclesiastical bodies, and warmly commended to the favour of the people. Three of our bishops (North

and South) and four other distinguished clergymen of our name are among its long array of vice-presidents. A fair proportion of its travelling agents are Methodist ministers; and of the emigrants, there are more Methodists than of all other classes of Christians united. And yet it is evident that the society has but very partially enjoyed the confidence and sympathy of the great body of our people. The cause of this we have pointed out in the preceding pages; the evidence of it is found in the reports under notice. Previous to the summer of last year the contributions to that cause from our Churches had been indefinitely small. It was then determined by the State Society to employ as an agent, a regularly accredited minister of our denomination, charged expressly to visit our Churches and lay before their congregations the claims of the colonization cause, and make collections. The experiment was made, and, as a result, at least one man is thoroughly convinced that the great mass of the Methodist people in the State of New-York do not cordially sympathize with the Colonization Society, though probably nine-tenths of them are decidedly in favour of colonization. All this is patent upon the face of the report. Twenty Churches are named, giving an aggregate contribution of about two hundred dollars; and then it is added in a note—"probably forty Methodist Churches visited by the agent gave collections to the amount of one thousand dollars." It would have been nearer the truth probably had the report said eighty Churches were so visited, and that the contributions (generally public collections in small country Churches) were elicited by considerations of favour towards the agent personally rather than by any particular regard for the society he represented.

From the facts thus presented by the Report it is evident that the heart of the people of New-York has not been reached by the appeal of the Colonization Society. Now we will not charge this to any fault in the cause itself; nor will the friends of the society lay it to the heartlessness of the people. Shall we then charge it to the interference of the Abolitionists? That would not mend the matter, as it would imply a want of independent understanding among the people, leaving them to the cunning of designing men. It would also be unjust, since many Abolitionists are opposed, not to colonization, but only to certain positions and measures of the Colonization Society, and more especially to the language of its orators and agents. The fault is in the unfortunate position that that society has always occupied toward free coloured persons, and toward such white men as have especially sympathized with them.

We have written these things with only good wishes for the cause of colonization. We look upon it as an agency promising much

good to the African race, and as such we account it worthy of the confidence and support of every true philanthropist. But we cannot shut our eyes to the manifest and egregious blunders of the administration of the Colonization Society; and as we value the cause we feel constrained to protest against some of the unnatural alliances into which it has been brought by its false or mistaken friends. It is high time that good and wise men should look at this whole subject of slavery and the affairs of the coloured race with calmness and in the spirit of Christian patriotism. Too long have criminations and recriminations made up the staple of the controversy on this subject. The issue of the controversy cannot be doubtful. The point of interest is not whether a change may or may not come—as to that there can be but one opinion among men; but that when it shall come it may prove in the least possible degree disastrous to the quiet and security of our beloved country.

Let the special advocates of freedom remember that Providence is seldom or never in a hurry, and therefore learn to wait patiently the development of his purposes. There is no cause to suspect that the resources of his wisdom, even in this most difficult case, are exhausted. If with a hopeful confidence the whole affair is commended to Infinite Power and Goodness, and in the mean time present opportunities properly occupied, a happy issue may be anticipated.

ART. III.—PLUTARCH'S THEOLOGY.

PERHAPS no one moralist or philosopher of antiquity is so fit a representative and interpreter of the best elements in the religious systems of the ancient pagan world, as Plutarch. His peculiar adaptation to perform this office will appear from several considerations.

In the first place, the age in which he lived enabled him to gather up *all* the valuable results of heathen philosophy and theology, of purely human wisdom and virtue, and hand them over to those who were to enjoy the brighter light of the Christian revelation. He flourished in the latter part of the first, and the beginning of the second, century after the birth of Christ; when the religions of man had had full scope to do their utmost for the elevation of the race, and the religion of God had just entered on the work of human redemption; when the old world was ripe and ready to be dissolved, and history was to begin, as it were, anew with the reign of Immanuel, God with us. Then, if ever, was the time to gather up the fragments, that nothing might be lost. He was acquainted with all that was valuable in the history and philosophy of the past; of the truth and grace that were destined to make all things new in the time to come, he was entirely ignorant. He was, therefore, in just the situation to testify of heathenism, the whole of heathenism, and nothing but heathenism.

The pagan world, as a whole, was not then, perhaps, in its best state, either of morals or politics, literature or religion. The mass of mankind, so far from having attained to a better knowledge and a purer worship of the Deity by unaided human wisdom, had, doubtless, departed more and more from the true God, as they receded farther and farther from the light of the primitive revelation. The Greeks and Romans had degenerated from the virtue and piety of their ancestors. Grecian liberty had long been extinguished, and with it Grecian literature, science, and art had been bereft of their pristine light and life. The Roman empire had passed its meridian, and was already on its decline. Roman faith, Roman virtue, Roman piety, once proverbial, had become a by-word. The learned were to a great extent sceptical, the great were monsters of iniquity, and the masses had reached a point of corruption and degradation which, while it fully justified the dark picture that inspiration has drawn of them in the Epistle to the Romans, also demonstrated, to the painful conviction of the wisest and best of the heathen philosophers, the necessity of some new wisdom or power to deliver them

from the bondage of error and sin. Yet, at this very time, there were some of the noblest spirits that have ever lived; and the very degeneracy of the age nurtured their virtues to an unwonted greatness, and quickened their energies to search out—if perchance it could be found in all the accumulated resources of human thought and experience—an adequate remedy. These then, we repeat, were the very times, and these the very men, to collect and concentrate, as in a focus, all the scattered rays of truth and goodness that were diffused over the ages and nations of pagan antiquity.

In the second place, the school of philosophy to which Plutarch belonged, was eminently favourable to such a work as we have assigned him. The Academy, of which he was a disciple, was, in its moral and religious tendencies, the best of all the Grecian sects; insomuch that when learned men were first brought into the Church, this was, in the providence of God, the preparatory school—the connecting link between philosophy and Christianity. Moreover the Platonists of this age, the New-Platonists, were Eclectics. They were not so addicted to any master as to abjure the doctrines of every other. They loved Plato, they loved Socrates; but they loved truth more, and felt at liberty to seek it wherever it could be found, though it were in other sects and in foreign lands.

Plutarch was an Eclectic in religion as well as in philosophy. While he practically embraced the religion of his ancestors, he held that there was essential truth in all religions. And he made it his study to mediate between them, to interpret their real significance, and thus to reconcile their diversified forms with each other and with the fundamental doctrines of the religion of nature and reason. In what other way could he have been so *well schooled* for the office of an interpreter and representative of pagan antiquity to the Christian scholar and philosopher?

In the third place, the character of the man conspired with the age in which he lived, and the school to which he belonged, to fit him for this work. He was constitutionally and habitually devout. He was in principle and in practice a moral and religious man, a moral and religious philosopher. Not a trace of scepticism appears in his works. Not a stain of vice or impiety rests upon his character. A sincere and controlling faith is seen everywhere in his life and in his writings. His historical works, beyond those of any other pagan historian, are consciously and intentionally a history of divine providence. His philosophy was not, like too many philosophical systems both ancient and modern, a temple without a God. The secrets of nature were, in his view, so many sanctuaries of the Deity; still more were the good man's closet and heart. Nor was it a re-

ligion of reason alone to which he gave his assent. He accepted, not with an indiscriminate credulity, still less to the exclusion of others, but with an intelligent faith, the religion of his fathers, resting on authority and tradition, embracing positive institutions and supernatural revelations—a religion of miracles and prophecies, of prodigies and mysteries, above the powers of nature and beyond the comprehension of man.

His mental, not less than his moral, constitution and habits qualified him to be the representative of ancient theology and religion. While his faith predisposed him to believe, and his virtues prepared him to love, all that was excellent in antiquity, his extensive knowledge brought it all within his reach, his thoughtful mind subjected it to a careful examination, and his practical sagacity discerned its moral and spiritual significance. He observed, he reflected, he travelled, he read. As a historian, he knew all the facts; as a philosopher, he analyzed them; as a moralist, he contemplated them in their relation to morals and religion.

The following are those treatises of Plutarch which pertain more particularly to theology and religion. On Superstition; Of Fate; Of Fortune; Concerning the Demon of Socrates; On the Cessation of Oracles; Concerning the Oracles of the Pythian Priestess; Of the *E* over the Gate of the Temple at Delphi; Of Isis and Osiris; Consolation to Apollonius; Consolatory Letter to his Wife; The Delay of the Deity in the Punishment of the Wicked. Besides these, the Arguments against the Stoics and the Epicureans, of which there are four, have important bearings on theology, and acquaint us incidentally with the theological opinions of Plutarch. Furthermore, there are scattered passages and incidental allusions throughout his moral and even his historical works, which should be brought together in order to a full exhibition of the author's sentiments.

A brief exposition of the design and method of each of the above-mentioned treatises may not be uninteresting or unprofitable, before we proceed to a more formal and synoptical statement of the author's theological opinions.

1. On Superstition. This is not, like most of the *Moralia*, in the form of a dialogue, or an epistle addressed to some individual; but an essay, or rather an indignant declamation, setting forth, in the strongest language, the unparalleled weakness and misery of superstition. There are no bounds to the fears and sorrows of the superstitious, as there are no limits to the power and presence of the gods. They cannot flee from the dominions of the universal tyrant, like other oppressed subjects. They cannot, like other slaves, demand or expect a change of masters. Criminals fly to the altar for pro-

tection; the altar is *their* place of torment. Most men find rest and relief in sleep; their sleep is made up of frightful dreams. Indeed, their life is one perpetual dream of horror, in which their reason is always asleep, and their fears always awake. They fear everything—the land, the sea, the air, the sky, the dark, the light, a sound, a silence, a dream. Death itself, instead of the end, is, to their apprehension, the beginning of sorrows that will never end. Other fears lead to exertion, that evil may be avoided or escaped; superstition paralyzes effort and forbids the use of means, since evil comes by divine appointment—as the Jews would not fight on the Sabbath, and the Athenians under Nicias suffered themselves to be cut in pieces by their enemies, rather than engage in battle during a lunar eclipse.

The essay draws an extended comparison between superstition and atheism. Atheism is unhappy, but superstition is more so. It is a fatal calamity to be blind in a matter of such moment: but it is better to be blind, than to see tyrants and monsters in our best friends; better to be deaf to the sweetest strains of music, than, like a tiger, to be driven mad by them. It is as bad to think ill of the gods, as to speak ill of them, and far less manly. He who fears, hates the gods; and he who fears and hates the gods, is their enemy. He wishes there were no god, but is too great a coward to say there is none. Yet it is more honourable to the gods to deny their existence, than to libel their character by representing them as pleased with human sacrifices, like the Celts, or as requiring parents to cast their own offspring into the fire, like the Carthaginians. The author would rather have it said, that there is no such man as Plutarch, than that he is a monster of cruelty and wickedness. In conclusion, he exhorts his readers strenuously to avoid superstition; but not in so doing to rush into the opposite extreme of atheism, overleaping true piety, which lies between them.

There are rhetorical extravagances in this essay, which, interpreted in their full and literal sense, would hardly be consistent with other treatises of the same author, where he represents superstition as in some respects preferable to atheism.* There is also a radical defect in his apparent philosophy of atheism, (growing perhaps out of the fact, that he treats of atheism only incidentally,) in that he makes superstition a disease both of the understanding and the passions, but atheism an error of the understanding alone.† Still it is an exceedingly able and eloquent dissuasive from superstition, and, on the whole, a very sound and judicious essay.

* Cf. Pleasure not Attainable according to Epicurus.

† For the true philosophy on this point, see Rom. i, 21-28; also Xen. Mem. Soc., i, 4, 18.

2. Of Fate. This is addressed to Piso, and purports to be written at his request. But it wears less the aspect of a familiar letter, than of a theological treatise.

Considered as a substance or essence, Fate is the universal soul of the world, and exists under a threefold distribution, answering to the three sisters in the Greek mythology, and inhabiting severally the solar, the lunar, and the sublunary sphere.*

As an energy or exercise, Fate is defined (in terms collected and expanded from Plato) to be a divine principle intransgressible through a cause that cannot be hindered; or a law, consequent upon the nature of the universe, according to which all things, that are done, are transacted. Though comprehending an infinite succession of events, it is not itself infinite, but finite, since it does not go forward as in a straight line, but moves, as it were, in a circle, which returns into itself. Like the civil law, it ordains generals primarily and antecedently, particulars secondarily and consequently; and determines things not absolutely, but by hypothesis; not separately, but in mutual connexion. By all things being transacted according to fate, the author explains himself as meaning, that all actual events are contemplated by it and comprehended in it—not that all are necessitated or made imperative, not that all are, in the strictest sense, fated or according to fate; just as the civil law extends to all that is done in the state, and contemplates treason and comprehends in its scope valour, though neither valour nor treason is strictly lawful or commanded by law. Fate is consistent with the possible and the contingent, with chance, fortune, and free-will, (as he endeavours to show by a definition and analysis of each,) since (such is the substance of his argument) though all things are comprehended by fate, all things do not occur by necessity, but everything *according to the law of its being and nature*. As it regards providence, fate does not comprehend it, but is comprehended by it. Fate is always according to providence, but providence never according to fate. In providence, as in fate, he makes a threefold distinction,† first, the sovereign will of the Supreme Ordainer and Disposer of all things; secondly, the energy of the second order of deities, who are the authors of generation and preservation; and thirdly, the agency of the demons, who are the guardians and overseers of human affairs.

The subject of this treatise is one which has always awakened discussions of the liveliest interest; and, whatever we may think of

* So we learn by comparing this treatise with the Face in the Disc of the Moon.

† And like the Fates, residing severally in the starry or solar, the lunar, and the sublunary sphere.

our author's success in solving the great problem of "fixed fate, free-will, foreknowledge absolute," we must at least concede to him the merit of having handled it with much frankness and boldness, and at the same time with eminent judiciousness and reverence for practical piety.

3. The little piece on Fortune is an earnest vindication of human affairs from the dominion of blind chance and physical necessity, and a practical demonstration (based chiefly on analogy and common sense) of the supremacy of mind, the necessity of wisdom and good conduct, and the responsibility of each individual for his own character and destiny. It does not touch upon the doctrine of chance as related to the origin of the material universe; nor does it contemplate particularly the bearings of that doctrine on the divine government or the future state of the soul. It seems rather to be directed against a perversion of the doctrine of divine agency; in other words, against a species of fatalism and Antinomianism, as affecting the whole character and conduct of men, whether in the duties which they owe to themselves, to each other, or to God. Fortune, in the view of Plutarch, does not exclude the idea of God,—it is included in his universal providence. It belongs especially to the province of the demons. But it is a perversion of the doctrine of providence to expect any deity, whether higher or lower,—any demon, whether good or evil,—to do for us what we can and ought to do for ourselves. Still more absurd is it to rely on an unintelligent cause for that which must be the result of reason. *Mind* sees,* *mind* hears—the senses, in themselves, have no perceiving power—still more true is it, that only mind can *foresee* and provide, regulate the conduct, and secure a virtuous and happy life. Mind makes the man, as distinguished from the brute; and reason, not instinct; character, not fortune; free-will, not physical necessity, makes the mind.

4. Concerning the Demon of Socrates. This, like some of Plato's, is a dialogue within a dialogue, and, owing perhaps to the conscious or unconscious influence of the subject, is conducted with more Platonic art and skill than any other of Plutarch's writings; though it wants the inimitable ease and grace with which the *dramatis personæ* are introduced, and the rapid and exciting yet natural succession, in which the question and answer follow each other, in the regular Platonic dialogue.

Cephisias, the brother of Epaminondas, goes to Athens* on an embassy, and falling in with Archidamus, an Athenian, is requested by him to narrate the incidents attending the recent return of the

◦ "Light is in the soul." Milton, Sams. Agon.

Theban exiles to their country, the recovery of the citadel from the usurped possession of the Spartans, and the restoration of the Theban republic. The principal scene of the dialogue is, therefore, laid at Thebes; the time is one of the most important points in the most brilliant period of Theban history; the actors are Epaminondas, Pelopidas, Simmias, (the disciple of Socrates,) and the other principal men of the state; and the narrative of the surprise, the massacre, and the recapture awakens a thrilling interest. Our author took the more pains, perhaps, to interweave these political characters and events with the main subject of the dialogue, because they shed such lustre on his native Bœotia. They appear, indeed, as the prominent figures in the foreground of the picture. The discussion about the Socratic Demon arises incidentally, as the conspirators differ somewhat touching the significance of certain omens, which seem to portend good or evil to the conspiracy. It grows, however, very naturally into the main question in the presence of the Socratic Simmias, and also of a Pythagorean philosopher, Theanor, who, warned by dreams and visions, has come from Italy to Thebes to offer sacrifices at the tomb of a brother Pythagorean, that had been generously nursed, in his last sickness, and honourably interred by the family of Epaminondas. The answers to the main question —touching the nature of Socrates's Demon—are various. One, somewhat sceptically inclined, suggests, that it was only his own sagacity, discerning the natural significance of signs which are not understood by common minds. When pressed, however, with the objection, that he is thus justifying the charge of atheism which the accusers of Socrates brought against him, he replies, that this explanation does not exclude superhuman agency, since the sign must have an intelligent *cause*, as well as a sagacious interpreter. A soothsayer, on the other hand, maintains, that some particular demon, attached to Socrates from his birth, guided him by some mysterious vision in all the actions of his life; and he relates an instance as occurring under his own observation, when Socrates, having set out to go by a certain street to a certain destination, suddenly stopped, considered a moment, and then took another direction, urging his companions to do the same; some of them complied, but others, passing on through the same street, were met by a very annoying, though not very serious, accident. Simmias said, that having once asked Socrates about it, and received no answer, he never repeated the question. But he had often heard him declare those to be vain pretenders, who professed to have seen a divine apparition; while to those who affirmed that they had heard a supernatural voice he would gladly listen and inquire into the particulars. In his

opinion, therefore, the Demon of Socrates was not so much a vision, as a voice, addressed, not to the outward ear, but to the inward sense, just as in dreams the mind seems to apprehend unspoken words. And such voices are addressed to all, but are heard only by the eminently wise and good; the heedless multitude do not hear them. In conclusion, Simmias relates a story of an inquisitive and virtuous youth, (Timarchus, the friend and companion of Lamprocles, Socrates's son,) who, in his eagerness to ascertain what the Demon of Socrates was, went down into the cave of Trophonius, and there, on the second night, in a trance, his soul left his body and visited the unseen world, where he saw the demons, like stars, leaping about an immense cavern or hollow sphere, some rising out of it and shining brighter as they rose, others falling back into it and growing more and more dim as they sunk, but each bound by an almost invisible cord to a soul, which it endeavours with very different degrees of success to draw upward to a higher sphere; and he is informed by way of explanation, that each man's demon is the better, the rational part of his own soul, which, the vulgar think, is within them, (just as they suppose the image reflected from a mirror to be in the glass,) but the more intelligent, knowing it to be without and above them, call it a demon. Those stars, therefore, which he saw to be extinguished, were souls whose whole existence was merged in their bodies; those that rose and recovered their light, were such as retire from their bodies after death, having escaped the dominion of sense, and not being subject again to generation in a material body; and those that were carried up on high were the demons of philosophers and wise men. But you will know more of these things three months hence, concluded his invisible guide; and three months after, he died.

The Pythagorean philosopher pronounces this story credible, and confirms it by reasoning; though, in his argument, he proceeds on the supposition, that the demons are souls that have escaped from all union with flesh, and have turned guardian spirits to preside over *other* souls. The demon, however, does not go along with every one; but as in a shipwreck, those that are far from land their friends only look upon with pity, while they encourage and help those that are near, so the demons deal with mankind. While we are immersed in worldly affairs, and put off one body only to put on another, they let us alone to try our own strength and reach the haven by ourselves; but when a soul that has gone through a thousand generations and almost finished her course, struggles bravely to ascend, the Deity permits her proper demon to come to her assistance. The demon enters promptly on the work: and if the soul hearkens to his voice and obeys his instructions, she is saved; if not, the

demon leaves her, and she falls back into a miserable, hopeless state.

This dialogue presents Epaminondas in a noble and attractive light, as in choice a patriot and philosopher rather than a warrior, who thinks much, says little, and always acts in strict obedience to the dictates of his own reason and conscience, despite of friends or enemies. He refuses to take part in the conspiracy, because he would never put men to death, except in obedience to law. Yet the conspirators know, that all his sympathies are on the side of liberty and his country; and when the blow is struck, they find in his moderation a tower of impregnable strength.

5. On the Cessation of Oracles. The scene of* this extended conversation, or debate, is laid at Delphi, where our author, very appropriately, fixes the locality of several of his theological discussions. The interlocutors are a company of priests, scholars, and philosophers, who have come from, or travelled in, almost every part of the world. The main question* is, why oracles have almost ceased; for the cessation is acknowledged not to be entire. A Cynic philosopher answers, that the gods have forsaken men because of their increased and increasing wickedness; and when others scout the doctrine as imputing caprice to the gods, and undertake to explain the fact by natural causes, he leaves the company in righteous indignation. Demetrius, a grammarian from Tarsus in Cilicia,† refers the cessation of oracles in Greece to the diminished population of the country, especially in the neighbourhood of the oracles, and the consequent diminished necessity for oracular responses. Cleombrotus, the Lacedaemonian, who has just returned from a visit to the Temple of Jupiter Ammon, argues, that the demons, who preside over the oracles, have died or transmigrated and left the oracles dumb. He also expresses the belief, that evil demons, sometimes, take possession of the oracles, and return wicked responses, and demand cruel sacrifices, unworthy of the gods. Lamprias, the Delphian, thinks, that the failure of the inspiring exhalation from the earth may be a proximate cause, though the ultimate cause,

* The agitation of this question among pagan priests and philosophers is peculiarly significant at the very time when "the living oracle" of God had come down to dwell on earth.

....: "henceforth oracles are ceased,

God hath now sent his living oracle," &c.—*Milton, Pnr. Reg.*, b. 1,

It was about the same time, too, that human sacrifices ceased to be generally offered in the ancient pagan world, giving place to the one sacrifice on Calvary. Cf. Hackett's Plutarch, p. 98.

† "No mean city," the rival of Athens and Alexandria in literature, science, and the arts.

whether of the cessation or of the commencement and continuance of inspiration, as of every other finite being and event, is God.

The discussion, it will be seen, involves incidental questions of great interest, such as the relation of first and second causes, the nature and manner of inspiration, the existence and duration of demons or inferior deities, and the character and government of the Most High. A long argument is entered into to prove, that there is not one world only, nor on the other hand an infinite number, but five—the proof being drawn chiefly from the mysteries of the number five, and from the analogy of other things that exist by fives, as the five senses, the five regular solids, the five zones, &c. An effort is also made to establish and explain the fact, that the year was growing shorter and the seasons growing colder; an idea which was suggested by the declaration of the priests of Jupiter Ammon, that from year to year less and less oil was annually consumed by the lamps in the temple.

6. Concerning the Oracles of the Pythian Priestess. The scene of this dialogue is the same as that of the last. The plan is also similar, and the subject kindred. It is a dialogue within a dialogue, or rather, it is a familiar report of a rambling conversation, which arose among a mixed company of priests and philosophers, natives and strangers, as they visited in succession the apartments and inspected the offerings of the Temple at Delphi, sometimes discussing the material of the statues, as, for instance, the origin and composition of the far-famed Corinthian brass, at other times, the significance of the symbols which chanced to meet their eyes; now the appropriateness of the offerings, and the merit of the acts or actors in whose honour they were consecrated, (where, by the way, Plutarch seems to hint, that the prostituted beauty of the courtesan is quite as worthy to be canonized, as the misdirected heroism of the mere warrior,) and now again the reality of prodigies and predictions, many of which are related, and their alleged fulfilment referred to mere chance by an Epicurean philosopher, but declared by another interlocutor, who doubtless represents the opinion of our author, to be an actual and unquestionable accomplishment, as little referable to blind chance as the writings of Epicurus himself. The principal question, however, is, why the Pythian priestess, in modern times, no longer gives her responses in verse. In answer to this question, it is said, in the first place, that the *ancient* oracles were, not unfrequently, uttered in prose, and the modern are sometimes communicated in verse. In the second place, the earlier ages were in their nature more poetical than the present. Everything was then written, or rather spoken and sung, in verse. This suited the

taste of the nations in their infancy. Moreover it aided the memory at a time when books were unfrequent and unknown. Now, on the contrary, poetry was associated with fiction, and to couch the oracles in a poetical form were to bring discredit or suspicion on their truth. Prose had become the vehicle of history and philosophy; why should it not also be the language of religion and revelation? Furthermore, the questions now referred to the oracles were of minor importance and of a more prosaic character; and propriety required that the answers should correspond. Besides, in ancient times, when kings and statesmen came to the oracles with questions of great national import, the responses were given often in a poetical and even enigmatical form for the sake of obscurity, since, if communicated in more intelligible language, they might occasion offence, or otherwise injure the credit of the oracle. The form, it is further argued, is a matter of comparative indifference, subject to the demands of expediency, or the changes of times and circumstances. But the response is neither more nor less true, neither more nor less miraculous, whether it is communicated in prose or verse. If it was to be given in writing, instead of being orally pronounced, surely no one would find fault with the chirography, and say, that the response was not Apollo's, because the letters were unworthy of a divine hand. Neither the voice, nor the sound, nor the words, nor the metre proceed from the god, but from the woman. The god only presents the visions and kindles in the soul a light to discover future events. Hence, if, as some wonder and complain, the responses, when in verse, are not always in Homeric or Hesiodic perfection of metre, this is no reproach to the deity. It is befitting, that the priestess be chosen from among the illiterate, in order that she may approach Apollo with virgin soul immaculate. And the revelation, as it reaches us, must partake of the nature and the imperfections of the organ through which it is communicated; since it is the actual, if not the necessary, method of inspiration, as also of providence, to use instruments in accordance with their nature; just as in Homer, when Minerva would persuade the Greeks to any enterprise, she brings Ulysses on the stage; when she designs to break the truce, she finds out Pandarus; but when she would put the Trojans to rout, she addresses herself to Diomede—it being, in fact, impossible to move a cylinder like a sphere, or make a trumpet sound like a harp, or an illiterate person speak like a man of letters.

The author, it will be seen, proceeds on the assumption of a general conformity of the supernatural to the natural. The laws of nature are never *contravened*. The course of nature is *interrupted* no further than is necessary. The great law of proportion and adapta-

tion of means to ends governs the special intervention, as well as the ordinary succession of events.

7. Of the Εἰ over the Gate of the Temple at Delphi. This is addressed to Serapion, an Athenian poet, who is one of the interlocutors in the foregoing dialogue, and to whom Plutarch gives an account of a discussion, in which he himself took part with Ammonius the philosopher, Lamprias the Delphian, and several others, (two of whom were also among the *dramatis personæ* of the last dialogue,) at the Temple of Delphi, about the time when Nero visited Greece. The subject of discussion is one—the significance of the mysterious inscription (Εἰ) over the gate of the temple. All agreed that it was symbolic or enigmatical, in accordance with the well-known character of Apollo, whose very surnames (Pythian, Delian, &c.) indicated a fondness for such curious and recondite questions. But they put widely different interpretations upon it. The first said, the current report was, that the original *five* of the seven sages inscribed the letter E on wood because it was the *fifth* letter in the alphabet, and dedicated it to the temple of Apollo, as a perpetual protest against reckoning the other two (Cleobulus and Periander, both tyrants) among their sacred number. The second believed, that it was the contingent particle Εἰ, meaning *if*, and significant of the *questions* and *prayers* which inquirers brought to the oracle, and in both which the particle Εἰ held a prominent place, as, for example, in the question, *If* I shall marry? or the petition, *If* (would that) it might please the god! The third agreed with the preceding in considering it equivalent to *if*, but preferred to interpret the *if* as expressive of the logical relation of the antecedent and consequent, (*if* such a thing is *given*,* such a result will follow,) and so symbolical of the consecration of the logical faculty, or reason, to the god. The fourth, deeming mathematics a more worthy offering than logic, pronounces the number five (expressed by E) to be an emblem fit of that sacred science. Or the same sacred number may be taken as the representation of the five senses, the five musical chords, the five regular solids, or the five orders of living beings from the brutes to the supreme God. The last, (Ammonius, Plutarch's teacher in philosophy,) while he speaks respectfully of the traditional, the grammatical, the logical, and the mathematical interpretations, sets them all aside, and propounds a solution more strictly theological. He takes the Εἰ to be the second person singular of the verb of existence, and by addressing the deity thus, (THOU ART,) he supposes the worshipper to ascribe to him what belongs to him, and him only—necessary, eternal, and

* *If* is well known to be but a shorter form of *give*, and *εἰ* is probably a kindred imperative of an old Greek verb.

immutable existence.* Thus interpreted, it stands in beautiful relation to that other famous inscription at Delphi, *γνῶθι σεαυτόν*. The god admonishes the worshipper, *Know thyself*: and the worshipper responds, *Thou art*, and none besides thee *is*; myself and all creatures have but a derived and dependent existence, which scarcely deserves the name of *being*.

8. Of Isis and Osiris. Of the Religion and Philosophy of the Egyptians, would be a title more fully and exactly descriptive of this piece, which is accordingly addressed to a priestess of Isis, who was also priestess of Apollo at Delphi. The doctrine of the discourse is, that the religious rites of the Egyptians, so far from being the mass of folly and superstition which it was then customary to consider them, concealed beneath appropriate symbols, truths in religion or philosophy that were fraught with practical utility and moral excellence. It was not strange that a people who not only placed sphinxes before their temples, but concealed their written language and literature, history and philosophy under a veil of hieroglyphics, should set forth their religion in the disguise of symbolical rites and enigmatical tales, which, literally interpreted, were indeed absurd and monstrous enough, but which yet contain obscure hints and shadowy resemblances of the most important truths. The dress of the priests, the form of the temples, the sacrifices and modes of worship, and all the romantic tales of the birth and death, the wanderings and wars of Isis, Osiris, and Typhon, are so many dispersions and refractions of the logical and philosophical truth, as the rainbow is of the sun. Accordingly Egypt has been visited by Grecian sages in every age, all of whom have brought away more or less of their mysterious wisdom, and some, especially Pythagoras, have borrowed not a few of their religious symbols. Plutarch not only identifies the Egyptian gods with those of Greece, (Osiris, or what is another name for the same deity Serapis, with Pluto, Isis with Proserpine or Minerva, &c.,) but, though not altogether unconscious of the absurdity he is perpetrating, suggests many contradictory Greek etymologies for their Egyptian names. He relates at considerable length the story of the three principal personages of the Egyptian mythology, and then, with exemplary patience, details several of the allegorizing constructions that have been put upon it—such as the physical, which identifies Isis with the land, Osiris with the Nile, and Typhon with the sea; or, perhaps, Osiris with moisture, and Typhon with drought—the astronomical, which refers Isis to the earth, Osiris to the moon, and Typhon to the sun; or, as others will have it, for there is no agreement in this matter, Osiris to the sun,

* So Jehovah in Hebrew. Cf. Exod. iii, 14.

Isis to the moon, and Typhon to the chaotic tendency of matter—and the metaphysical, which makes Osiris the First Cause, or Intelligent Principle, of the universe, Isis the faculty of reception, Orus the effect, and Typhon the principle of disorder. He speaks, with manifest partiality, of the dualistic system of the Persians, and seems to recognise the necessity of a distinct and intelligent author of evil, who must himself be evil or malevolent, but who will at length be overcome by the benevolent author of all good. The adoration of animals by the Egyptians our author condemns, but he puts the most charitable construction upon it as of a piece with other forms of idolatry, which always stops with the form, and fails to penetrate to the thing signified; and though it were better, like the Greeks, to speak of the several animals as sacred severally to the several gods, than to worship them like the Egyptians, yet to worship them is quite as excusable as to worship images of wood and stone, or gold and silver, since the meanest creature that is endowed with life and sense and motion, belongs to a higher order of being, and therefore is a more fit symbol of the deity, than any image of however costly material or however exquisite form and finish.

With all its doubtful allegorizing and fanciful etymologies, this treatise is a valuable contribution, not only to the history and philosophy of the religion of Egypt, but to the hermeneutics of idolatry and mythology in all the heathen world, excessively charitable doubtless in its interpretation of heathen rites and traditions, yet distinctly recognising their degeneracy and corruption in the understanding of the mass of mankind, and that as the result of their own degeneracy and corruption.

9. *Consolation to Apollonius.* This is a consolatory letter addressed to a friend on the death of a son who bore the same name with his father. The usual precepts and considerations which philosophy suggests for the solace of the afflicted are here urged, such as the fruitlessness of grief, the weakness of excessive sorrow or extreme joy, the mutability of all things earthly, the liability of the race to afflictions, some of which are heavier than ours, the miseries of life and the desirableness of escaping the evils that may be in reserve, and the necessity of death, sooner or later, since it is the lot of mortals and the debt of nature. History also is searched for examples of fortitude under affliction, and poetry is laid under contribution for the choicest gems of consolation. But our author seems to have been aware that religion is the most efficient comforter in the hour of sorrow; and it is with the religious considerations which he presents that we are chiefly concerned. As Socrates well said,*

◦ Cf. Plat. *Apol.* Socr. 32.

death is either like a deep sleep, or it resembles a journey into a far country and for a long time, or it is the utter extinction of the soul as well as the body; and in neither of these views can it be considered an evil. For if death is annihilation, it is the end of existence, and therefore of all the ills to which existence is subject. If it is a profound sleep, (poets have always been fond of representing sleep and death as twin-brothers, and sleep as the image of death,) what is more refreshing, what more grateful and welcome to weary mortals than sound sleep? Or if it is rather a journey to a distant country, a removal from the body into the land of spirits, what more desirable, than to escape the prison in which we are here confined and go where alone liberty, truth and wisdom can be found? Hence to the question, What is the greatest good? the oracle has often responded, death; and the gods have bestowed death on those whom they love, as a reward for their piety. If then we mourn our own loss, when our children die in early life, it is criminal selfishness; and if we mourn for their sake, we ought rather to rejoice and thank the gods, that they have been delivered from the ills of humanity and made to participate in the divine nature. As compared with eternity, there is no difference between a long and a short life; and to mourn that our friends die in childhood or early manhood, is more absurd than it would be for the ephemerae of Pontus, whose whole existence is but for a day, to sorrow immoderately, if some of their number should perish at midday or even in the morning instead of living till evening. At all events, call away whom they will, and when they may, the gods take only what is their own, since they have an absolute property in us and ours; and if, according to a tradition so ancient that Aristotle says it may well be called eternal, they, at the same time, exalt us to a more refined nature and a more blessed life, they justly claim our thanksgivings, instead of our complaints. Like music, poetry, and painting, life should be estimated, not by its duration, but by its excellence. Not the longest life, therefore, is the best, but the most virtuous. And Apollonius was an eminently virtuous youth, dutiful to his parents, dear to his friends, benevolent to all mankind, and devout towards the gods. His father should, therefore, be comforted with the belief, that he had been withdrawn from this low earthly entertainment, before he was surfeited with drunkenness, and been admitted to a high seat of honour and blessedness in the abode of the pious, where, as Pindar says,

The sun shines with an unclouded light,
When all the world above is thick with night.

10. Consolatory Letter to his Wife. Plutarch having lost a daughter, two years old, who was born after four sons, and who died

and was buried in his absence, writes a letter full of tender sympathy, yet manly fortitude, to the bereaved mother, whose name the daughter bore. He draws a beautiful picture of the bright, playful, innocent, and affectionate child, the life and joy of a family brought up under parental care at home; and he deeply laments her early death. But a daughter for two years was better than none, was a gift to which they had no claim, and for which they should therefore be grateful; and the very charms which delighted their eyes, while she lived, might and should still live in their memories and in their hearts. He commends his wife for her decorum, not only on this, but other occasions of the same nature, (for they had lost two children before,) in that she had not put on mourning apparel, nor disfigured herself or her maid-servants, nor filled the house with mourning and lamentation; but, as in times of prosperity and festal rejoicing she had ever been marked for her frugality, so in the hour of sorrow she had shown herself a pattern of moderation. He maintains here, without any alternative hypothesis, a full persuasion of the immortality of the soul; and the shorter the time during which it has sojourned in the body, the less does it become contaminated and fettered by fleshly appetites and passions, the less likely is it again to sink back into a bodily form, and the more sure it will be to rise at once pure and unconstrained to the realm of purity and light—just as a bird, soon let loose from a cage, forthwith exults in its recovered freedom, whereas, if it remain too long in the cage, it becomes attached to its prison, and, when set free, spontaneously returns to its captivity. The soul of the aged man, like his body, stoops and bows down to the earth, while that of the youth looks upward. “Hence by the laws and traditions of our ancestors, when children die, no libations nor sacrifices are offered for them; for infants have no part of earth or earthly affections. Nor do they tarry and hover about the sepulchres and monuments where their bodies are buried. The religion of our country teaches us otherwise; and it is an impious thing not to believe, what our laws and traditions assert, that the souls of infants pass immediately into a purer, better, and more divine state. Let us, therefore, conform to the laws in outward deportment, and endeavour still more earnestly to have our hearts chastened, pure, and undefiled.”

In these consolatory letters of Plutarch, we see the utmost that philosophy and natural religion can suggest for the consolation of the afflicted. And it is not a little—with gratitude to God, as well as in honour to our author, do we say it—it is not a little comfort and hope which this thoughtful and devout spirit was able to derive from natural religion for his own solace and that of his bereaved

friends. Yet how far was he from having attained to that full assurance of a resurrection and a reunion in a better world, and that tender, affectionate, filial confidence in a heavenly Father's love as manifested and proved by his severest discipline, which Christianity inspires, which even the Old Testament inculcates, and which Job and David, Paul and John breathed so spontaneously from their lips and lives! The Bible was made for a sorrowful, because a sinful, world.

11. The Dialogue on the Delay of the Deity in the Punishment of the Wicked purports to have taken place at Delphi, between Plutarch, Patrocleas his son-in-law, Timon his brother, and Olympicus, and to have been occasioned by the wild ravings of a follower of Epicurus against the justice and the providence of the gods. As becomes the mutual relation of the interlocutors, Plutarch undertakes the office of answering questions and solving difficulties, while the others appear in the character of inquirers and objectors; and the piece is, for the most part, a monologue in which the author discourses at considerable length on the great subject of punishment as related to the government of God. The principal objections against the delay of divine justice are first brought forward, in that tardy vengeance affords no satisfaction to the injured, and imposes no restraint on the evil-doers, and that it destroys all belief in the reality of divine providence in the minds of the wicked, who impute the punishment, when it does come, to chance, and call it, not a penalty, but a misfortune. Plutarch begins his reply by disclaiming, with the diffidence characteristic of the Academy, all *knowledge* on a subject which *lies beyond the scope of human wisdom*. Even music, war, and medicine are beyond the comprehension of those who are strangers to the arts. How much less shall mortals comprehend immortality! The laws and customs of men often appear absurd to those who do not understand the reason for them. What wonder, then, if there are difficulties and, to our apprehension, even absurdities in the government of God!

With these prefatory remarks, not intended, however, to evade the question or its difficulties, but to secure a retreat should he be found unable to cope with them, the author proceeds to assign some of the *probable* reasons, why the Deity may delay for a season the infliction of deserved punishment on the wicked.

1. He thereby sets us an example of forbearance and long-suffering. Human virtue is but an imitation of divine excellence—a participation of the divine image. God made the world so as to teach us wisdom and moderation; it was worthy of him to govern it so as to teach us patience and long-suffering, which is not the least divine of his attributes.

2. He thereby affords the wicked an opportunity for repentance and reformation. Character is eminently susceptible of change, as the very words $\tauροπός$ (turn of mind) and $\etaθος$ (custom, habit) intimate. History records the names of many who were dissolute, licentious, or tyrannical in early life, but who afterwards reformed and rendered illustrious services to their country and mankind. "If Miltiades had been put to death when playing the tyrant in the Chersonesus, or Cimon when living in incest with his sister, or Themistocles when rioting and revelling in the agora, where then would have been Marathon, Eurymedon, or glorious Artemisium, where the Greeks laid the foundation of their liberties!" The very excesses of such men in their youth show the depth and richness of the soil from which they spring.

3. He preserves the wicked in order to use them as instruments of punishing and restraining other wicked men, or, perhaps, that they may give birth to a virtuous and noble posterity, as the Athenian law, after the example of the Egyptian, deferred the execution of a pregnant woman, who was convicted of a capital crime, till she had brought forth her child. Thus Pericles and Pompey sprung from a despised and accursed parentage, and Ulysses and \mathbb{A} esculapius descended from such tyrants and monsters as Sisyphus, Autolyceus and Phlegyas. Even the inhuman Phalaris was, as it were, a medicine to the Agrigentines; and so was Marius to the Romans.

4. By delay, punishment sometimes overtakes the wicked under more appropriate and striking circumstances, than if it came upon them immediately. They suffer or die by the same means, perhaps by the very same instruments, which they used in wronging and destroying others. Or their ill-gotten gains prove the occasion of their ruin. Or their own consciences betray the guilt which had escaped detection, and bring on the punishment which they might otherwise have avoided. Pertinent examples of each of these suppositions are cited from history. Among the rest is the case of a youth who had murdered his own father, and long passed without suspicion. But at length, as if in a fit of frenzy, he suddenly rose from his seat at a banquet, struck down a nest of swallows with his spear, and crushed the young under his feet. When asked what could have possessed him to do so barbarous an act, he replied, Do you not hear, how they have this long while been crying out against me, that I murdered my father? The remark excited surprise, led to examination, and issued in the conviction and punishment of the unnatural son.

5. All this on the supposition, that punishment is actually delayed in those instances in which it appears to be. But it is not so.

Crime is always more or less its own punishment, just as the criminal bears his own cross to the place of execution. Children in the Roman amphitheatres admire and almost envy the poor creatures who, dressed in gay attire, dance for the entertainment of the populace, till they see the flames bursting from that very attire (inlaid with combustibles for that purpose) and hastening to consume them;* then they perceive that their punishment had begun at the very time when they were the objects of their foolish admiration: so the wicked begin to be punished as soon as they begin to do wrong, and pay the penalty of their crimes (when it seems to be deferred) not later but longer; nor are they punished only when they have grown old, but they grow old, all the while suffering punishment. And this long time, it should be remembered, has reference merely to human apprehension, not at all to the gods; for in their view the whole duration of human life is nothing, and to hang the criminal or stretch him on the rack now instead of thirty years ago, is the same thing as to do it in the evening instead of the morning. Meanwhile they run no risk of his escape by any possibility out of the prison of life in which they confine him till the day of execution. And what though, during his imprisonment, he eat and drink, and dance and play with the halter over his head! Shall we say, that he is not punished, till we see him hanging by the neck, or already stiff and cold after having drunk the hemlock? Shall we say, that the fish, that has already swallowed the hook, is not caught, till we see it roasted by the cook or served on the table? If, then, the soul has no existence after death, the Deity may be said to deal severely rather than too mildly with those whose days are prolonged.

But, 6. The soul is immortal. This is implied in the providential care which the gods take of men, since it is absurd to suppose, that they would lavish so much expense and pains-taking on so short-lived a creature as man is, if the present is his only state of existence.† Moreover, the immortality of the soul is implied in the sacrifices which men offer, and the gods accept, for the souls of the departed;‡ and in the evocation of departed spirits from the unseen world, as it is practised by necromancers, and sometimes enjoined by oracular responses.§ And if the soul exists after death, it is reasonable to

* It will be observed, that the allusion is to such punishments as Nero is said, in Ecclesiastical History, to have inflicted on the Christians. The illustration in the previous sentence is also a *locus classicus* in relation to our Saviour's having his own cross laid on him, till he was no longer able to bear it.

† Compare Matt. xxii, 32: "God is not the God of the *dead*, but of the *living*."

‡ So the author of the Second Book of Maccabees proves, that Judas believed in a resurrection from his offering sacrifices for the souls of the slain.

§ In like manner, (as Prof. Hackett justly remarks, in his excent edition of

suppose, that it will be rewarded or punished. For, during life, it contends like an athlete at the games; and when the contest is ended, it receives its reward. By way of illustrating and confirming this truth, Plutarch relates, with some hesitation lest it should be deemed a fable,* a singular story of a young man, named Thespesius, who, after having been for several days apparently dead, was said to have returned to life, and communicated to his friends an account of what befell him in the interval.

Thespesius, before this occurrence, had been a most unprincipled, profligate man; but the disclosures thus made to him, respecting the tendencies of the life he was pursuing, had such an effect on his mind, that he immediately reformed and became henceforth a pattern of every virtue.

In order to give a consecutive analysis of Plutarch's argument on the main question, we passed over, in its place, a kindred subject of no small importance, which comes up incidentally and occupies no inconsiderable space. It is the imputation or visitation of the sins of parents upon their children—sometimes, according to the current belief, many generations after the guilty individuals have passed away from the earth. Plutarch pronounces many of the popular stories of this kind to be sheer fictions; but he acknowledges the truth of the doctrine, and proceeds to justify the providence of God therein—from analogy, from the natural bond of connexion between parents and children, and from the salutary influence of such a procedure, as a means of moral discipline and correction. Men instinctively honour even the remote posterity of the great and good. On the same principle, whether of justice or of expediency, they may, and sometimes do, entail disfranchisement and other penalties on the descendants of the atrociously wicked. Time, no more than space, has a necessary power to sever the chain of cause and effect. If a plague which originated in Ethiopia infected Athens, why may not justice—penal evil—pass over from one generation to another. A family, like a state, and even more than a state, is a unit so long as it continues to subsist, and must possess a collective responsibility commensurate with its identity. Besides, nothing has a more powerful tendency to deter men from a vicious life, than the fear of entailing the consequences of their follies and vices upon their offspring.

this treatise,) such instances as that of the witch of Endor in the Scriptures, demonstrate a belief in the doctrine of an existence after death among the Hebrews, Warburton and his disciples to the contrary notwithstanding.

* Plutarch, like Plato, usually couches his views of the unseen world under the guise of a myth, for whose truth he will not vouch; and in Plutarch, this myth usually takes the form of a trance, or dream, or vision.

The punishment of the wicked after death is unseen and disbelieved; but the pains and penalties which they bring upon themselves and their posterity in this life are open to observation, and cannot fail to impress deeply all who are not quite destitute of natural affection. And as in medicine, so in punishment, the great question is, What will cure the disease? whether the remedy is applied directly to the diseased part, or reaches it, indirectly, or sympathetically, through some other organ, is of minor importance. In all cases, however, where moral medicine is applied to the children of the wicked, the children are also wicked; in other words, they inherit the disease of their parents, or a predisposition to it, and punishment is a remedy or a preventive for the children's malady, while, at the same time, it impresses a salutary lesson on all vicious parents.* Accordingly Providence does not always visit the iniquities of the fathers upon the children, but only when the children resemble them in character. If the children of vicious parents are themselves virtuous, the penalty will not fall upon them, though it may reappear with the vice in some future generation; as warts, moles, black spots, a dark complexion, or other family marks, sometimes sink out of sight for a time, and emerge again perhaps after the lapse of a century.

Such is the substance of this remarkable treatise. We feel that we have not done it justice in the process of abridgment, especially in sacrificing the numerous historical examples which, while they embellish the style and illustrate the meaning, never seem to interrupt the course of the argument, but superadd the light of facts and the conviction of reality to the force of demonstration. A quick and accurate moral sense—a sort of moral and religious intuition—conspires with a fertile memory and a prolific imagination, to lift this treatise, not only to a high pre-eminence above any other on the same subject that has come down to us from pagan antiquity, but to elevate it to the rank of a standard work on the subject for all coming time.

Having extended our analysis of these works of Plutarch to such an unforeseen length, our space will allow us to furnish only the most condensed summary of his theology, as it is found in these and other writings.†

* "Sin begets sin, and nothing can stay the plague but the direct interposition of Heaven,"—this lesson is written wide and deep in the poetry as well as the philosophy of the Greeks, in the literature as well as the history of nations, in the hearts and consciences of men as well as in the sacred Scriptures.

† Every article in this summary might have been accompanied with a voucher: but these references would have occupied much space, and we deem them unnecessary; by far the greater part will be readily found in the treatises here analyzed.

1. The Relation of the various National Religions to each other and to the Religion of Nature. All nations worship the same gods under different names, ascribe to them the same attributes under different representations, honour them with rites diverse indeed in outward appearance, but alike in their essential meaning; in short, hold a religious faith in modes and forms manifold and various, but in spirit one and the same. The modes and forms distinguish the national religions, the spirit and essence constitute the religion of nature and reason. Even so the heavens and the earth are common to all nations, though each gives them a different name. The sun is intrinsically one and the same for all countries; but his light wears a very different aspect, as reflected from different objects, refracted by different atmospheres, and seen by different eyes. Plutarch's position is a medium between the vulgar heathen notion, that every nation has its own deity or deities, and the uncompromising doctrine of the Bible and the early Christians, that there is but one true God, while the gods of the heathen are vanity and a lie.

2. The Proper Interpretation of Religious Rites and Myths. This is a great secret, which men have always been studying, but with imperfect success. Some take the myths in their literal sense, and the rites merely in their outward forms, and fall into the grossest superstitions. Others explain them all away, and leave nothing but blank atheism. If there is essential truth and unity in the mythologies of different nations, they must, of course, receive a figurative interpretation. The theogonies and theomachies, the marvellous stories of the gods, are allegories. The rites and sacrifices, the temples and altars and sacred vestments are all so many symbols of religious truth. And in the interpretation of them, two extremes are to be avoided—an excessive allegorizing, which virtually annihilates all mysteries, all religions, all gods, and a mere literalism, which sets them at variance with each other and with the reason and common sense of men. Especially are they chargeable with absurdity, who resolve the deities into mere powers of nature, making Bacchus a mere personification of wine, Vulcan of fire, &c. As well might we take the sails and rudder of the ship for the pilot, or the loom and the web for the weaver. Nor is the method of Euhemerus any better, who reduces all divine things to the level of *human* affairs, and degrades the gods to the form and state of kings and commanders of the earliest ages, thus doing violence to the intuitive convictions of the human race.

3. Nature and Origin of Idolatry. Plutarch's doctrine of symbols leads to his explanation of the nature and origin of idolatry. All

those creatures and things which have become objects of worship in different nations, were originally contemplated as symbols of the Deity, who is the only proper object of adoration. Thus the Greeks esteem certain animals as sacred to certain divinities, whom, in certain respects, they represent or resemble. But the Egyptians worship the animals themselves as divine. The sun is a striking image of God; and thus the Persians came to worship it, as itself God. Sometimes we see a nation or sect stopping at an intermediate stage and regarding the animal as an incarnation, the sun as an embodiment of the Deity, &c. The undiscriminating multitude are ever prone to confound gifts with their givers, words with things, signs with the things signified. The men of an early, believing, and poetical age very naturally called the gifts and creatures of the gods by the name of the gods themselves, not really believing them to be divine, but honouring them as manifestations of divine power, wisdom, and goodness. But those who came after them, having degenerated alike from their poetry and their piety, not only called such things by divine names, but believed them to be divine. So we call the works of Plato by his own name. But a man must be very stupid and vulgar, when he hears his neighbour say, he has bought Plato, to suppose that he has purchased the philosopher himself. The use of any appropriate symbols is not to be forbidden; though some are far preferable to others, and the use is always liable to abuse. The symbols themselves are worthy of homage, but only as, and in proportion as, they are seen and felt to be fit representatives of the Deity, or of the worship that is his due.*

4. The Sources and Standard of Authority in Religious Faith and Practice. These are tradition, and the laws and customs of nations. To demand a reason or demonstration for the opinions which we entertain of the gods, is to raise questions which ought not to be agitated, and, indeed, to subvert the very foundation of all piety and religion. It is sufficient to believe and worship according to the faith of our forefathers and the instructions of the country where we have been born and bred.† The office of reason in religion is that of an interpreter and mediator. It is the business of the priest to receive from the laws the representations that pertain to the gods, and then apply his reason to the investigation and discovery of the truth contained in them. In like manner, it is the work of the philosopher to classify, reconcile, and interpret the common con-

* It will be observed, that the most intelligent Catholics have borrowed or reproduced Plutarch's doctrine in justification of their image worship.

† So Socrates, Xen. Mem. i, 3, 1; Porphyry, Ep. ad Marcellum 18; and so the general voice of antiquity.

ceptions and intuitions of men concerning God and their relations to him: for these universal ideas or instincts are the teaching, the handwriting of God himself; and the religious traditions and institutions of men go back to a period so far beyond the memory of man, that they may well be deemed eternal, and therefore divine—go back at least to that earlier and better age of the world, when man, in his pristine purity and piety, held more frequent and intimate converse with God. Great deference is due to the earliest *poets*, particularly Homer and Hesiod, as competent witnesses to the truth, as it was believed in that early age. The opinions of philosophers so wise and good, so virtuous and pious, as Socrates and Plato, are also entitled to much respect. Homer and Hesiod, Socrates and Plato are cited by Plutarch almost as frequently as Moses and David, Paul and John are quoted by Christian theologians. Still they are cited rather as witnesses, than authorities; their testimony is to be received no further than it accords with the laws and religious institutions, the sacred traditions and intuitive convictions of mankind, or with that system of doctrines and duties, which reason, by a fair and consistent interpretation, derives from these sources.

5. Existence of the Deity. Plutarch seldom enters into an extended process of reasoning for the express purpose of proving the existence of the Deity. He assumes it as an admitted and unquestionable fact; or he contents himself with the moral argument drawn from the evil tendency and manifest fruits of atheism. Still it is sufficiently evident, on what kind of proof his own convictions rested. He relied chiefly, as we should presume from the statements under the last head, on the universal and intuitive belief in the Divine Existence which has prevailed in every age and nation. A government without a religion, a nation without a god, never existed, and never will exist. As well might there be a state without magistrates, or a city without foundations. The argument from the relation of cause and effect must have had great weight with him, since he not only felt the necessity of a First Cause prior to all second causes, but he could not conceive of any efficiency in any material cause aside from divine agency—as well might the rudder supersede the pilot, or the lancet dispense with the physician. Indeed a glance at the fluctuating and temporary nature of all earthly existence convinced him on broader and more metaphysical grounds, that there must be some Being, back of all this, before all this, to whom belongs necessary, unchanging, eternal self-existence. Moreover the Deity is constantly revealing himself to the understanding and almost to the senses of all classes of men by oracles and prodigies, and to the reason and conscience of eminently holy men by

more direct, spiritual communications.* So conclusive and so palpable to the mind of Plutarch was the evidence from these and the like sources, that he had no patience to argue the point at length with those who would not see it; and with all his devoutness, he never took the pains to write a treatise directly on the subject.

6. **Revelation.** God reveals himself to men, directly and indirectly: directly to the eminently wise and good, just as the favourites of kings receive their communications from their own lips; indirectly to most men, as the multitude learn the will of kings and commanders by proclamation, or the sound of the trumpet, or some other intervening, external sign. In direct revelation, the divine Spirit may be supposed to touch and move the human spirit, without the intervention of any bodily sense or material medium, as incident light is in contact with the reflected ray at the reflecting surface. Indirect revelations are communicated through the medium of signs, which constitute the basis of divination. These are referable chiefly to two classes, oracles and prodigies, kindred severally to the prophecies and miracles which constitute the external evidences of Christianity. Plutarch seems to entertain no doubt of the reality and trustworthiness of both these sources of revelation, as they existed among heathen nations.† Fraud has indeed fabricated false and wicked oracles, (and their cruelty and wickedness demonstrate their falsehood,) and superstition has multiplied pretended prodigies by misconstruing ordinary events. But the counterfeits do not disprove the genuine coin; they rather confirm it. The tests of a genuine prophecy are the definiteness of the prediction and the exactness of the fulfilment. There is no event so prodigious or unlooked for, but it may naturally come to pass at some time or other in the course of ages; and so a chance prediction might, perchance, meet an accidental accomplishment. But when a person not only foretells the event, but defines, how and when, through what means and by what person it shall come to pass, it is beyond the power of chance or human skill to conjure up such a prophecy and its fulfilment.‡ We might as soon believe that the writings of Epicurus were composed by a fortuitous combination of the letters of the

* In like manner Socrates appeals to revelation in proof of the Divine Existence. Xen. Mem., i, 4, 18. All the arguments in proof of a revelation, of course, go to substantiate the Divine Existence.

† The early Christian Apologists differed from each other on this question, some denying and others acknowledging an *inferior*, a sort of *natural* prophetic element in heathenism preparatory to Christianity, as Paul, perhaps, did. Tit. i, 12; Acts xvii, 23, 28.

‡ It is in just this particularity, and also in perspicuity, that the authenticated pagan oracles, that have come down to us, are deficient.

alphabet. As to his philosophy of inspiration, Plutarch supposes the deity to be its source, and, sometimes at least, an exhaling vapour its medium or occasion; and the inspiring exhalation ceasing, the inspiration may cease also—for none of the gifts of the gods are like the gods themselves, in their nature immortal. Again: the substance of the revelation proceeds from the deity, but the style and manner depends on the genius, character, and will of the priestess; nay, an evil demon may, sometimes, thrust himself in and utterly pervert the oracle,—so corruptible is all created good.

In his treatment of prodigies, Plutarch is less explicit and less satisfactory,* and we shall pass the subject with a bare allusion to a theory which he casually suggests, viz., that there is a mysterious sympathy between providence and those images and offerings which are consecrated in the temples, whereby they move conjointly to signify future events—in other words, that these sacred donatives are a sort of organs of the Deity, pervaded by his spirit, and instinct, as it were, with his life.

7. Divine Nature and Attributes. Starting from the idea of self-existence, or, which is the same thing, *real* existence, (for only that really *is*, which exists necessarily in and by itself,) Plutarch deduces from it unity, eternity, immutability, independence, entire purity, and the highest conceivable excellence. These attributes are implied, not only in the inscription (*Ετ*) over the gate of the temple, but in the very names of the god at Delphi; for Apollo (not many) denies plurality, Jeios affirms unity, and Phoebus was the name given by the ancients to everything that is bright and pure. In like manner, in the names of Isis and Osiris, he finds shadowed forth knowledge and holiness, as divine attributes. After the example of Plato, he often calls God the Reason (*ὁ νοῦς*) and the Good Being (*τὸ ἀγαθόν*). Goodness or love to mankind (*φιλανθρωπία*) and justice unlimited by time or place, he is especially fond of predicating of the Deity. Of the natural attributes, he speaks less frequently. Still there can be no doubt, that he attributed to the Deity omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence. Or rather, he more accurately conceived of the Most High as existing independently of time and space, there being no past or future, nothing near or remote to him, since all things are alike present with, and exist in himself. A god subject to the same accidents and limitations from time and place as men—a god confined to a human form, a material body or any other outward circumstances—most of all a god without a soul, and dependent on

* Let the sceptic, or the believer, who would see and feel the difference between pagan prodigies and the Christian miracles, read Plutarch along with Paley's Evidences.

the caprice of men, like the idols of the besotted multitude, were no god at all. Self-sufficiency and self-perfection belong to the very idea of the Supreme Being. And from these result, or to these belong, the conception of unlimited power, infinite knowledge, absolute perfection, and entire blessedness.

8. Inferior Deities, or Superhuman Beings. Plutarch's doctrine in regard to the nature and rank or ranks of such beings, does not seem to be consistent with itself, and probably was not settled in his own mind. But he appears to have entertained no doubt, as to their real existence. Nor can we explain his language on this subject, as a condescension or accommodation to the popular belief. It is a part of his philosophy, that there must be, or may well be, intermediate beings between the supreme God and men, as a bond of union and a medium of communication between them; and they were alike erroneous in his view, who would have God to be the cause of nothing, and they who would have him directly concerned in everything. Whether they are immortal, like God, or die, like men, though after a longer existence; whether they are a permanently distinct class of beings, or may rise or sink into a participation of the divine or human nature according to their character and tendency; whether they are all good or some of them evil demons*—these are questions on which he is at variance with himself. When and where this doctrine of intermediate beings originated, whether in Persia or Egypt, Phrygia or Thrace, he does not know. In Greece, Homer used the names gods and demons interchangeably. Hesiod was the first to distinguish and define between them. Plato considered demons as a necessary link between God and man. Plutarch regards them as the agents of the divine government, whether in nature or providence, whether in special revelations and interpositions, or in the ordinary care and discipline of men; and he often uses language which reminds us strongly of that which the Scriptures employ in setting forth the ministry of angels.

9. Divine Agency. First and Second Causes. In nature, as in works of art, there are two kinds of causes which conspire to produce the effect—the efficient or final cause, and the physical or material cause. The latter may be wholly void of intelligence; the former must be an intelligent, rational being. Strictly speaking, the former alone is the cause, while the latter is only the instrument which the

* In the use of *δαιμόνες* for *evil* demons, it will be seen how the way was prepared for the New-Testament sense of that word; while the old association of the *same name* with the *gods* of the heathen gave the early Christians a verbal advantage in their assaults on the old mythology: "The things which they sacrifice, they sacrifice to *δαιμόνια*, and not to God." 1 Cor. x, 20.

intelligent cause uses for the accomplishment of his ends. The artist is the proper cause or author of the painting or sculpture; the colours and brushes, the marble and chisel are only the instruments with which he works. So Reason or God is the proper cause of the universe, and matter, with its properties, is only the means which he uses. Still both may properly be called causes, since both are essential to the effect. Both are proper subjects of philosophical inquiry; and the freest investigation or the strongest affirmation of the one involves no denial or superseding of the other. In their tendency to partial and one-sided views, however, men are always prone to exalt one to the neglect or exclusion of the other. The ancient poets and divines confined their view to the first and most excellent cause, having on all occasions these well-known words in their mouths: "Jove the beginning, middle, source of all," but giving themselves no concern about physical causes. Their successors, on the other hand, who, for that reason, were called *φυσικοί*, or natural philosophers, stopped with the physical causes, and did not deem it necessary to ascend to the Divine Reason, as the efficient cause and proper author of all existence. The same mistakes are perpetually repeated in the explanation of omens and prodigies, oracles and prophecies, some deeming them wholly natural, others making them wholly supernatural, whereas the true philosopher will avoid both these extremes, and labour to assign to the natural and the supernatural each its several province. So far from believing fate to be the cause of all things, Plutarch does not allow that it is properly the cause of anything, since, like the laws of nature, it is only an established rule or mode of the divine agency. Evil, especially moral evil, does not proceed from fate, still less from God. If fate were its cause, it would be necessary; if God were its author, it would not be reprehensible. He seems to regard sin as the result of man's free agency, and inclines to consider it as connected in its ultimate source with an evil principle or power in the universe, according to the dualistic philosophy of the East. "For if nothing can come without a cause," he argues, "and good cannot be the cause of evil, then there must be an original source of evil as well as of good in the universe. And this is the opinion of the wisest and greatest part of mankind."

10. Providence. Moral Government. Providence is threefold, and may be thus defined:—The first and supreme providence is the intelligence or the will of the Supreme God, doing good to all beings and things, according to which primarily all divine things throughout the universe have been arranged in the best possible manner. The second is that of the secondary gods, who range through the heavens,

producing mortal existences in due order, and regulating all that pertains to the safety and preservation of the several species. The third is the providence and forethought of those demons who on earth are appointed the guardians and overseers of human affairs. The supreme providence is prior to nature, antecedent to fate, and, indeed, the most ancient of all things, except him whose will or intelligence it is, who is the Maker and Father of all. In the interpretation of God's providence and moral government over men, two extremes are to be avoided. The one is that of the superstitious, who turn all natural occurrences into prodigies, and construe every evil, that befalls, as a special punishment for some particular sin—who are paralyzed with fear, for example, at sight of an eclipse, as if God had withdrawn his favour, when, in fact, it is only themselves have lost their reason; and with correspondent weakness, they find the cause, perhaps, in something that they have eaten or drunk, or in the non-performance or misperformance of some outward ceremony. The other extreme is that of the atheist or mere philosopher, who, when he has found a natural cause for an event, forthwith jumps to the conclusion, that it has no final cause, no moral intention, no possible relation to punishment or discipline. The truly wise and pious man will recognise the perfect harmony of physical and final causes, will expect to see them co-operating in the divine government as they do in human affairs, will study to discern their mutual relation; and though he will meet, as he might expect, with many incomprehensible mysteries in providence, yet if he exercise sufficient candour and patience, he will find satisfactory evidence that God does deal with men in this world more or less according to their character; that he does, sooner or later, directly or indirectly, reward virtue and punish vice; that justice is often administered only with more manifest perfection because of its seeming imperfection and delay; and that moral discipline is, after all, the grand design, as it is also the great secret, of our checkered earthly existence. Evil, though not the necessary means of good, is overruled by all-seeing wisdom and all-controlling power. It calls forth the forbearance and compassion of God, and thus is the occasion of a new development of the divine perfections for the imitation of men, whose excellence consists in the knowledge and participation of the divine image. Moreover Providence uses the wicked as his executioners in the punishment or the restraint of other wicked men, or as his instruments in the accomplishment of a good which they do not intend, and when he has accomplished the end, then he cuts them off from the world.

Fortune is a part of providence, and is said to happen, because it falls in with our plans or wishes, and yet is not the result of

human purpose, knowledge, or agency.* Chance also, which Plutarch uses as a more comprehensive term than fortune, is comprehended in providence, and is called fortuitous, merely because its occurrence is unforeseen and its cause unknown to us.

As God's providence and man's agency conspire, so prayer and exertion should always go hand in hand; for God is the brave man's hope, and not the coward's excuse. Pray, and yet hold to the rudder; pray with your hand on the plough; pray, while you gird on your armour—these are precepts which are justified by sound philosophy not less than true piety, having received the sanction of the heroes and sages not less than the priests of antiquity.

With Plutarch, providence was no idle speculation. It was a deep conviction of his moral nature, which was ever present with him; and is not less manifest in the whole series of his biographies than in the most strictly religious of his moral essays. He was the Puritan historian and philosopher of his age. He saw the hand of God in nature and in history, and he wrote "the *Magnalia*" of Greece and Rome.

11. Worship. Piety. The Nature of Religion. So far as external service goes, Plutarch, as we might have presumed from his general doctrine touching the authority of law and custom in matters of religion, deemed it sufficient, and not only sufficient, but right and duty, to obey the same precept which Socrates inculcated and referred to the oracle as its original source, viz., honour the gods according to the laws of the state. For these, so far as they pertain to religion, he regarded, in the first place, as going back to a divine origin; and, in the second place, though they had been much perverted and grossly misunderstood, still the traditional rites and institutions of all countries, in all their diversities, were more or less appropriate symbols of the pure and spiritual worship that should be rendered to the Deity. But all external services are little worth in comparison with the homage of the heart and life. The gods are most honoured by right views of their character, and best pleased with obedience to their will. The desire of truth, especially in what relates to the gods, is a sort of grasping after divinity, and a mark of more piety than any ritual purgation or temple service whatever. And though thank-offerings, especially for the blessings of knowledge and peace, (*war* trophies in the temples are of questionable propriety,) are acceptable when they proceed from a grateful heart, yet it is more becoming, especially for kings and princes, to con-

* The ancients, very generally, by the use of the words fortune or chance, meant to deny simply human forecast, not divine agency, e. g., *forte quadam divinitus*. Liv. i, 4.

secrete to the god the lasting monuments of justice, temperance, and magnanimity. Wise men should go to the gods for all the good things which they would enjoy; and, most of all, when we aspire after such knowledge of *them* as human nature can attain to, we ought to pray, that they themselves will bestow it upon us—truth being the greatest blessing that man can receive or God can give. In a word, virtue, holiness, true piety is likeness to the divine image, which consists chiefly in wisdom and goodness. Fasting and austere observances are to be encouraged, so far as they conduce to this end, to which they, doubtless, have a natural tendency. But to make religion consist in abstinence from meats and drinks, and mortification of the body; to wrap one's self in sackcloth and roll in the mire and groan because he has eaten this and drunk that, is a folly and absurdity which Plutarch is never weary of ridiculing—sometimes he sternly denounces it as the fruitful source of atheism. For men were not first made atheists by any defect in nature or providence. No; it was the uncouth actions and senseless passions of superstition—her canting words, her foolish gestures, her magic incantations, her fantastic processions, her foul expiations, her barbarous and inhuman penances—it was these, that gave occasion to many to say, It would be far better that there were no gods, than such as are pleased with these toys and trifles.

12. The Natural Character of Man. Means of Recovery. Touching the native character of man, our author is not consistent with himself. Sometimes he seems to teach, that souls at birth proceed directly from their Maker, and so partake of innate goodness. More frequently, however, and in better keeping with his whole creed, he holds, that souls are born into this life in punishment for the sins of a former existence, and in consequence of an earthly and sensual tendency, which sinks them down into a body of flesh and blood in spite of all the discipline to which they have hitherto been subjected. From the fallen and sinful state in which men are thus born, there is no recovery, but by a prolonged process of discipline and personal expiation carried on through a succession of transmigrations or earthly generations, with intervening seasons of purgation in another world. Of free forgiveness or vicarious atonement, he seems to have no conception. This world is thus turned into a sort of purgatory, as well as probation for the next. And the next, or invisible world, is much the same (only more severe) to all who have not already finished their probation but must undergo another metamorphosis, that is to all who have not reached a state of entire purification on the one hand, or, on the other, been proved hopelessly incorrigible.

13. **A Future State.** The immortality of the soul is demonstrated by the universal belief of it in all ages and nations, by inspired law-givers and oracular responses, by offerings for the dead and evocations of departed spirits, by the testimony of those who have visited the unseen world in trances or visions, and most of all, by the providential care which the gods exercise over men, and which is altogether disproportioned to the value of their brief earthly existence. When the soul has passed through its season of trial, and completed its series of earthly generations, it enters upon a state of rewards and punishments which are everlasting. The good rise to the region of the sun and stars,* to a life with and like God, where God is their leader and king, where they hang on him wholly, behold him without weariness, and passionately admire and affect that divine beauty which cannot be uttered or conceived by men. The wicked sink into an abyss of woe, where he sometimes represents them as subjected to the extremest bodily tortures which justice can inflict or ingenuity invent, while, at other times, he eschews the idea of bodily inflictions, and describes them as plunged in utter mental darkness, sorrow, and despair.

Our readers are capable of reflecting for themselves upon this outline, and drawing their own inferences from it. Perhaps, however, we may be indulged in the remark, that it administers reproof to the advocates of both the extreme views which are so often and indiscriminately taken of pagan antiquity—to those who argue the sufficiency of the light of nature for all practical religious purposes, and those who decry natural theology as utterly devoid of truth or excellence, and thus unwittingly subvert the foundations of all religion. In the name of antiquity, in the name of humanity unenlightened and unbiased by the Scriptures, Plutarch bears witness to the truth of those fundamental doctrines which belong in common to natural and revealed religion, and are assumed as the basis of the evidences of Christianity. But he sheds not a ray of light on that darkest, deepest problem in theology, which has ever awakened the most profound solicitude in thoughtful, serious minds, viz., How shall a man be just with God? and the satisfactory solution of which is the characteristic glory of the Christian revelation. And on the subjects of the divine existence, providence, probation, and a future state, he testifies with much doubt and hesitation, and not unfrequently minglest hurtful error with uncertain truth. The false notion that matter is necessarily contaminating and the prime source of evil, mars the moral tendency of his ethical system. The gloomy

* The intermediate abode, to and from which the soul passes in its successive metempsychoses, Plutarch suggests, may be the moon.

doctrine of transmigration of souls, with its associated misapprehension of the doctrines of punishment and expiation, converts the universe into a dark and dismal purgatory, earth into a vast prison, and the bodies, not only of men, but of the lower animals, into so many dungeons for the incarceration and discipline of fallen spirits. When true, his disclosures of a future world want authority. The whole system is deficient in motive power. It wants especially the animating, inspiring, renovating power of hope and love for the elevation of the masses, whom it leaves sunk in almost helpless and hopeless degradation. On the whole, there is, perhaps, no lesson which Plutarch teaches us more effectually than this, (and what can teach this lesson more impressively than the doubts and errors of the wisest and best of pagan philosophers?) How unspeakably great are our obligations to the authoritative testimony of Him who came forth from the unseen world, and so could speak what he knew, and testify what he had seen of God and eternity!—who was not only in the beginning with God, but who was God, and therefore had the right, as well as the power, to promulgate the precise and only terms of reconciliation to rebellious men—who became flesh, and dwelt among us, full of *grace* as well as truth, and thus enabled men to *hear and see and handle the Word of Eternal Life.*

ART. IV.—BIRDS AND AUDUBON.

Ornithological Biography; or, an Account of the Habits of the Birds of the United States. By J. J. AUDUBON. Philadelphia and Edinburgh. 1835—1839.

A PECULIAR charm invests the lives of naturalists. The path of the military conqueror is blood-stained, that of the statesman involved and tortuous, while the pale legions of avarice usually beset the goal of maritime discovery, and associate the names of its heroes with scenes of anarchy and oppression; but the lover of nature, who goes forth to examine her wonders or copy her graces, is impelled by a noble enthusiasm, and works in the spirit both of love and wisdom. We cannot read of the brave wanderings of Michaux in search of his sylvan idols; of Hugh Miller, while at his mason's work, reverently deducing the grandest theories of creation from a fossil of the "old red sand-stone;" or of Wilson, made an ornithologist, in feeling at least, by the sight of a red-headed woodpecker that greeted his eyes on landing in America,—without a warm sympathy with the simple, pure, and earnest natures of men thus drawn into a life-devotion to nature, by admiration of her laws and sensibility to her

beauty. If we thoughtfully follow the steps, and analyze the characters of such men, we usually find in them a most attractive combination of the child, the hero, and the poet—with, too often, a shade of the martyr. An inkling of the naturalist is indeed characteristic of poets. Cowper loved hares; Gray, goldfish; Alfieri, horses; and Sir Walter Scott, dogs: but, when pursued as a special vocation, Ornithology seems the most interesting department of natural history.

Birds constitute the poetry of the animal creation: they seem, like flowers, the gratuitous offspring of nature; and although their utility, as the destroyers of baneful insects, is well known, we habitually associate them with the sense of beauty. Indeed, familiarity alone blinds us to the suggestive charm attached to winged creatures; and we can scarcely imagine the hopelessness that would brood over woods and fields, if deprived of the tuneful voices and graceful movements of the feathered tribe. The gift of aerial locomotion they enjoy, is a distinction which robes them with an attractive mystery, and leads us to regard them as creatures of less restrained volition than any other species; freedom of action is thus one of their less obvious charms, but one to which we instinctively refer a certain exemption from ordinary trials, and capacity of high pleasures: the chartered libertines of the air, ranging its vast expanse as inclination or necessity dictates, they seem to belong to a more highly-endowed order of animal life, and to spiritualize the principle of motion by grace, alacrity, and a power to counteract natural forces. The flight of a bird, attentively watched, is one of the most inspiring revelations of nature. The ease, rapidity, and grace with which it ranges the "upper deep," and the apparent caprice or unerring instinct that regulates its course, appeal at once to science and poetry, and the minstrel as well as the naturalist is warmed into observant admiration. Delicacy of organization and exquisite plumage add to the interest thus excited; and when we combine with these attractions that of a versatile musical endowment, it is not surprising that birds have created such enthusiasm in the explorers of nature, and such affection in untaught but susceptible minds. Animal spirits seem embodied in the swift, volatile, and gay tribe; and while they approach human nature in this regard, its holier sympathies are illustrated by the domestic habits, the attachments, and individuality of birds; and thus they become naturally linked with the most grateful associations of human life: so that in conversation, literature, and art, they occupy a more distinctive and significant relation than we award to any other order of creatures.

To the natural theologian there are few illustrations more pleasing

and available than those derived from the structure of birds: its adaptation to their habits yields the most useful hints towards the invention of a flying machine; the perforated membrane which encloses the lungs, through which air passes into the cavities of the breast, abdomen, and even into the hollows of the bones; the powerful muscles of the wings, the lightness and delicacy of the plumage,—increasing their buoyancy while protecting them from the weather,—the cleaving shape of the head and bill, and the rudder-tail, mark them for inhabitants of the air, of which they consume a larger portion in the ratio of their size than any other creatures; the magnitude of the brain, too, is proportionally greater; and the complexity and perfection of their vocal organs is a problem for science; while instinct asserts itself in their migratory and domestic habits, in a manner so remarkable that the history of birds has furnished more inspiration to story-tellers and poets than all the rest of the animal creation. In special adaptation the various modifications of beak and talons is wonderful; how different a feeding-apparatus, for instance, belongs to the woodpecker and the California fruit-eater. In the perfection of the senses, also, birds excel, and share the pleasures of sight and sound with man, indicating their enjoyment with an almost human expression. The minute and exquisite beauties of insects, visible to us only through the microscope, have given rise to the belief that the richest provision exists for the gratification of their sight. The act of singing, and the innumerable cadences and versatility of note they exhibit, suggest that the world of sound has for them an infinite range of significance. In variety of aptitude and vocation they also assimilate with the human species—some being, as it were, minstrels by profession, and others architects or hunters; and not until we enter into the labours of the ornithologist, can we imagine what numerous and modified species exist of birds of prey, and of passage—the climbers, the gallinaceous, the waders, and the web-footed. The wonderful process of ovation is yet another natural mystery revealed by birds, and Audubon used to speak of the rapture with which, when a boy, he hung over the newly-discovered nest, and looked upon the little, shining eggs, so carefully and snugly disposed. Independent of the sense of beauty and the kindness of feeling to which birds minister, they seem to embody and express pleasure more directly than any other offspring of nature; her benign influence is singularly associated with them; the spontaneous and, as it were, vital joy that seems to animate their song and motions, brings the idea of enjoyment vividly to the heart—they seem to prophesy and proclaim happiness; and, accordingly, the misanthropes repudiate, while the cheerful welcome them. It would require a

degree of introspective attention rarely exercised to realize how much the familiar notes of birds act upon our moods; in the balmy stillness of a summer noon, the vernal air of a spring morning, or amid the gorgeous drapery of an autumn wood, the chirp, carol, or cry of birds breaks upon our solitude with an impression or a winsome effect kindling to the imagination and eloquent to the heart. "Lord," exclaims old Walton, "what music hast thou provided for thy saints in heaven, when thou affordest bad men such music on earth?" There appears to be a meaning in the sound beyond what reaches the ear; it links itself with the aspects of nature, with the spirit of the hour, or blends with the sad reminiscence or the hopeful reverie, like its echo or response.

There is, too, a metaphysical reason for the superior interest birds excite; they have great variety and individuality of character, and we instinctively apply their names to our acquaintances as the best and most available synonyms. Who has not encountered human beings selfish as the cormorant, loquacious and unoriginal as the parrot, vain as the peacock, gentle as the dove, chattering as the jay, volatile as the swallow, solemn as the owl, rapacious as the hawk, noble as the eagle, and so on through all the modifications of character? There are, indeed, two human attributes which birds possess in a striking degree—affection and vanity. There is a bird in Mexico with a most beautiful tail, that builds its nest with two openings, in order to go in and out without ruffling its feathers. The brilliant and varied costume of birds has suggested fabrics and patterns innumerable to more rational beings; and many of them, apparently, take as conscious delight in their array, and the display of it, and in their vocal accomplishments, to win admiration or sympathy, as the most accomplished coquette or gallant. In fact, although they seek prey and build nests, their ways are quite social, and they seem born to leisure like people of fortune; and it is this apparent immunity from care, this life of vagrant enjoyment—as if mere flying about and singing were their destiny—that renders birds, like flowers, so grateful to the mind and senses. The blue jay is a practical joker; the snow-bunting delights in a storm, and the white owl in moonlight, quite as much as any poet; the tailor-bird sews leaves together to make itself a nest with the skill of a modiste; the cuckoo is an adept in small imposture—the Yankee pedler of birds; the maternal instinct of the quail induces her to pretend lameness, and lead off urchins in search of her nest on a false track. There is an Indian bird of luxurious tastes, whose domicile is divided into several compartments, each of which it lights up at night with fire-flies. We cannot see the kingfisher intently gazing down upon the waters from a lofty tree, without

realizing the wonderful visual adaptation of its optics. It is attested by many travellers, that when a mule falls dead on the plains of South America, although not a bird is visible to the human eye, in a few moments flocks of vultures appear, having either scented or seen their prey from so vast a distance as to indicate an incalculable power of the visual or olfactory nerves. We cannot see a flight of crows without thinking of the ancient time, when their course was so anxiously watched by the augurs; or hear the first welcome-note of the robin, as he hops about the field before our dwelling, as if on a congratulatory visit at the advent of spring, without having the associations of childhood revived with the thought of that memorable English ballad which consecrates this bird to youthful affections.

Of the rude sculptured figures on Egyptian tombs, the most correctly designed are those of birds; and in that land of sunshine and mystery, the ibis was held sacred; while as effective accessories to the grand and monotonous landscape, most appropriately stands a solitary heron, apparently carved in bold relief against the twilight sky; or floating high above the traveller's head, is seen a symmetrical phalanx of flamingoes, their black wings and snowy bodies gracefully parting the ambient firmament. The hue of a Java sparrow's beak is inexpressibly cheery; the habit of the ostrich of burying her eggs in the sand and leaving them to be hatched by the sun, and the fidelity of the carrier-pigeon, are facts in natural history prolific of comparisons. The antique design of the doves at a fountain, is constantly repeated by mosaic and cameo workers; and on sword, banner, and signet, the king of birds remains the universal emblem of freedom and power, equally significant of American liberty and Roman dominion.

One of the most celebrated jurists in America was missed at dinner by his family, one day in the country; but, after diligent search, he was found in the hayloft, absorbed in watching a pair of swallows, and acknowledged that, accustomed as he was to technical and abstract investigations, the observation of animated nature proved a refreshment he could not have imagined. Few of us, indeed, can fail to have acquired a personal interest in birds, however we may have neglected their biography. A family with which we were domesticated abroad, had a pair of turtle-doves in the house, who flew about at pleasure, and exhibited no fear, except in the presence of strangers; one of them died, and we were surprised at witnessing no indications of the despairing grief ascribed to this bird when thus bereft. The anomaly was explained, however, when we noticed what an attachment the dove manifested towards a beautiful boy of six years; her favourite resting-place was in the profuse golden hair of the child;

here she would sit brooding, while the boy was at his sports or his book, swaying to and fro with his movements, or quietly nestling when he assumed a fixed position. Sometimes, when the sunshine fell upon the pair, in a picturesque attitude, the idea of a cupid with one of his mother's doves, or of an infant St. John with this living emblem of beatitude, irresistibly suggested itself. The child was seized with a brain fever, and, after a brief illness, died; and then the dove's plaintive cooing was incessant; she refused sustenance for a long time, and adopted a monastic life, in the high and dark folds of a window-curtain—abjuring her previous habits of sociability, and apparently consecrating her life to sorrow. Who that has watched the yellow birds swinging on the lithe sprays of an elm in a New-England village, the flight of blackbirds, in the autumn, round the shores of Lake Champlain, or the graceful sweep of the curlews on the Atlantic coast, and not thenceforth found them indissolubly associated with these localities? As I crossed the piazza of St. Mark, at Venice, for the first time, I noticed with surprise that the pigeons did not fly at my approach, and recalled the fact that they had been sacredly protected by the ancient government, and enjoyed prescriptive rights, which they obviously considered inviolable. It is a striking thought, when we contemplate it, that the eider down that pillows the head of beauty, or trembles at the breath of her whose fair bosom it covers, was torn from the wild sea-bird; that the graceful plume that waves over the warrior's crest once sustained the poised eagle among the clouds, or winged the ostrich on his desert path. With how many evening reveries and reminiscences of sentiment is the note of the whip-poor-will associated, and what an appropriate sound for the desolate marsh is the cry of the bittern! It is not surprising that tradition and poetry embalm the names of so many birds; from the superstition of the ignorant mariner to the appreciative love of the educated bard, they, though so often sacrificed, are yet endeared to man. The fables of the roc and the phenix are among their most remote memorials; mythology has wedded them to her deities; on tavern-signs they betoken good cheer, and on banners are national emblems. Burns uttered a natural human sentiment when he asks, in the song, the little birds o' bonnie Doon, how they can chant, and he sae fu o' care! One of the most exquisite metaphors in English poetry is that of Goldsmith, when he compares the good pastor's efforts to lure his charge to the skies to those of a bird tempting its offspring to fly; and next to it is that of Byron, in allusion to Kirke White's early death, comparing him to the dying eagle who sees that his own feather winged the fatal shaft. And another more tender and graphic image still is that of Dante in the episode of Francesca de Rimini:—

Quali colombe, dal disio chiamate,
 Con l'ali aperte e ferme al dolce nido
 Volan per l'aer dal voler portate:
 Cotal uscir della schiera ov'e Dido,
 A noi venendo per l'aer maligno,
 Si forte fu l'affettuoso grido.

Boccaccio's falcon and Sterne's starling, and the raven in Barnaby Rudge, are classic birds, since rendered by genius the expositors of noble and humorous sentiment. But in this, as in all other departments of nature, the most characteristic and feeling tributes emanate from the poets.

The graceful flight and instinct of the waterfowl—the very sentiment of the bird, and the impression it makes upon a contemplative mind, have been embodied by Bryant: the very rhythm of that favourite poem seems to coincide with its lonely and sustained motion when sweeping in majestic curves the gray twilight of an autumn day. The superstition attached to birds has been used with consummate art in two poems, the popularity of which indicates how successfully the natural and supernatural may be wrought and blended in verse; we need scarcely allude to Coleridge's Ancient Mariner and Poe's Raven.

The metre, images, and even the diction of Shelley's ode to a skylark echo the aspiring, joyous flight and melody of that favourite bird of the poets. Hans Andersen's juvenile story of the "Ugly Duck" touches felicitously a comic vein, that observers are well aware may be amply suggested in this field; witness the graphic humour of Irving's description of a rookery and a barn-yard fowl on a rainy day, in "The Stout Gentleman." For the peculiar sentiment that imaginative minds elicit from the song or appearance of birds, and the associations they awaken, we may refer to Milton's beautiful allusion to the nightingale, who "all night long her amorous descent sang," and the fine ode to the same melodious bird by Keats; to Wordsworth's ballad of "Poor Susan," Dana's "Beach-bird," and Sprague's "Swallows that flew in at the Church Window." These instances of poems suggested by "wanderers of the upper deep," are not, perhaps, so illustrative of the peculiar influence they exert upon human sympathies, as the casual allusions and incidental metaphors which continually present themselves in the standard poets. As ornithology is more generally studied, and the peculiar habits of these "aërial companions" of Audubon become more familiar, poetry will more definitely consecrate the subject; others of the species, besides the self-sacrificing pelican and the harmonious bulbul, will figure in story; and the bards will follow the sagacious example of

one of our own poets,* and by exact observation, render the characteristic advents of birds a means of effectively describing nature, as thus, in spring:—

"Then bursts the song from every leafy glade,
The yielding season's bridal serenade;
Then flash the wings, returning summer calls,
Through the deep arches of her forest halls;
The bluebird breathing from his azure plumes
The fragrance borrow'd where the myrtle blooms;
The thrush, poor wanderer, dropping meekly down,
Clad in his remnant of autumnal brown;
The oriole drifting like a flake of fire
Rent by the whirlwind from a blazing spire;
The robin jerking his spasmodic throat,
Repeats staccato his peremptory note;
The crack-brain'd bobolink courts his crazy mate,
Poised on a bulwark tipsy with his weight;
Merry in his cage the lone canary sings,
Feels the soft air and spreads his idle wings."

AUDUBON'S career as an ornithologist began and was prosecuted with an artistic rather than a scientific enthusiasm. His father appears to have been an intelligent lover of nature, and took pleasure in walking abroad with his son to observe her wonders. These colloquies and promenades made a lasting impression upon his plastic mind; it is evident that the habits and appearance of animated nature at once enlisted his sympathies; the accidental view of a book of illustrations in natural history excited the desire of imitation, and he began in a rude way to delineate the forms, colours, attitudes and, as far as possible, the expression of the creatures he so admired. Chagrined, but never wholly discouraged, at the ill-success of his early attempts, he annually executed and destroyed hundreds of pictures and drawings, until long practice had given him the extraordinary skill which renders his mature efforts unequalled, both for authenticity and beauty. He artlessly confesses that finding it impossible to possess or to live with the birds and animals that inspired his youthful love, he became ardently desirous to make perfect representations of them, and in this feeling we trace the germ of his subsequent greatness. Thus the origin of Audubon's world-renowned achievements was disinterested. His love of nature was not philosophic, like that of Wordsworth; nor scientific, like that of Humboldt; nor adventurous, like that of Boone; but special and artistic,—circumstances rather than native idiosyncrasy made him a naturalist; and his knowledge was by no means so extensive in

° Holmes.

this regard as that of others less known to fame: but few men have indulged so genuine a love of nature for her own sake, and found such enjoyment in delineating one of the most poetical and least explored departments of her boundless kingdom. To the last his special ability, as an artistic naturalist, was unapproached; and while one of his sons drew the outline, and another painted the landscape or the foreground, it was his faithful hand that, with a steel pen, made the hairy coat of the deer, or, with a fine pencil, added the exquisite plumage to the sea-fowl's breast. For years he fondly explored woods, prairies, and the Atlantic shores, and drew and coloured birds and beasts, without an idea of any benefit other than the immediate gratification thus derived. It was not until his interview with Lucien Bonaparte in 1824, and the latter's unexpected offer to purchase his drawings, that he conceived the project of giving the results of his explorations to the world. Although, in pursuance of this intention, he embarked soon after for Europe with characteristic promptitude and eager hopes, the loneliness of his position and the want of means and influence depressed him on landing; but the instant and cordial recognition he met with from the active literary and scientific men abroad, soon confirmed his original resolution. Roscoe, Wilson, Jeffrey, Brewster, Herschel, and Humboldt successfully advocated his claims, and cheered him with their personal friendship; and, under such favourable auspices, his first contributions to ornithology appeared in Edinburgh. Indeed, notwithstanding the privations and difficulties he encountered, an unusual amount of sympathy and encouragement fell to the lot of Audubon. Compared with other votaries of a special object purely tasteful and scientific in its nature, he had little reason to complain. Of the one hundred and seventy subscribers of a thousand dollars each to his great work, eighty were his own countrymen; and his declining years were passed in independence and comfort in the midst of an affectionate and thriving family—the participants of his taste. His elasticity of temperament also was not less a distinction than a blessing; it supported his wearisome and lonely wanderings both in search of birds in the forest and in search of encouragement among men; and when the labour of years was destroyed, after a brief interval of mental anguish, it nerved him to renewed labour, so that in three years his portfolio was again filled.

Born the same year that independence was declared by the Americans, his father an admiral in the French navy, and his birthplace Louisiana, he was early sent to France for his education, where he received lessons in drawing from David, but pined, the while, for the free life and the wild forests of his country. On

his return, his father gave him a beautiful plantation on the banks of the Schuylkill, and he married; but neither agricultural interests nor domestic ties could quell the love of nature in his breast; and for months he wandered in search of objects for his pencil, unsustained by any human being except his wife, who seems to have realized from the first the tendency and promise of his mind. At length, in order to enjoy the opportunities he craved, and at the same time have the society of his family, Audubon determined to emigrate, and selected the village of Henderson, in Kentucky, for his new home. In the autumn of 1810 he floated down the Ohio, in an open skiff, with his wife, child, and two negroes, his mattress, viands and rifle, happy in the prospect of nearer and more undisturbed intercourse with nature, and intensely enjoying the pomp of the autumnal woods, the haze of the Indian summer, and the wildness and solitude around him. The locality chosen proved adequate to his aims; day after day, with his dog, gun, and box of pencils and colours, he made excursions, now shooting down a fresh subject, now delineating its hues and form; one moment peering into a nest, and at another scaling a cliff, for hours watching the conduct of a pair of birds as, unconscious that their doings were to be set in a note-book, they constructed a graceful nest, fed their young, or trilled a spontaneous melody; over streams, through tangled bushwood, amid swamps and in stony ravines, beneath tempest, sunshine, and starlight—the indefatigable wanderer thus lived; the wild-beast, the treacherous Indian, the gentle moon, and the lowly wild flower sole witnesses of his curious labours.

Audubon returned from Europe to prosecute his ornithological researches with fresh zest and assiduity; and his first expedition was to the coast of Florida, where he made rich additions to his portfolio among the seafowl of that region: he afterwards successfully explored Maine, the British Provinces, and the ice-clad and desolate shores of Labrador. The most remarkable and happiest era of his life was, doubtless, that employed in collecting the materials, executing the pictures, and obtaining the subscribers to his *Birds of America*; his wanderings previously have the interest of adventure, and the charm derived from the indulgence of a passionate love of nature; and his subsequent excursions and artistic labours, in behalf of the work on the *Quadrupeds of America*, begun in 1842, afford pleasing evidence of his taste and perseverance. But the period included by his ornithological enterprise, is more characteristic and satisfactory. He had a great end in view, and the wildest forest and most unfrequented shores, the highest and most cultured sphere of society, and the most patient and delicate limning were the means

of its realization; and it is when contemplating him in this three-fold relation that we learn to appreciate the mingled hardihood, enthusiasm, firmness, and dignity so remarkably united in his character. In the woods, a genial companion, a single-hearted, kind, and generous friend, as well as a childlike enthusiast and manly sportsman; he stood before the council of an institution with his first delineation—the bald-headed eagle—or opened his portfolio to the inspection of an English nobleman in his lordly castle, with quiet self-possession, an independent air, and without exhibiting the least solicitude either for patronage or approbation. Arriving at a frontier village, after a tramp of months in the wilderness, his long beard, tattered leather dress, and keen eye made him an object of idle wonder or impertinent gossip; but none imagined that this grotesque hunter-artist enjoyed the honours of all the learned societies of Europe. His exultation at the discovery of a new species, and his satisfaction at the correct finish and elegant verisimilitude of a specimen, amply recompensed him for days of exposure or ill-success. On his journey from the South, he kept pace with the migration of the birds; and he proclaimed the Washington sea-eagle to his country and to the scientific world with the pride and delight of a conqueror.

His passion for rambling caused Audubon to fail in several business enterprises he undertook; and at one period he applied to Sully for instruction in portrait painting, but soon abandoned the idea. So faulty did Dawson, the engraver originally employed by the Prince of Musignano to illustrate ornithology, consider the early specimens of Audubon's skill as a draftsman, that he refused to execute them, and appeared to consider the pigments invented by the wood-and artist as the most remarkable feature they presented. Although thus discouraged on every hand, we can readily believe his declaration, that he left America with profound regret, although his career abroad affords yet another striking evidence of that memorable and holy saying—"that a prophet is not without honour save in his own country." It is natural that a man who succeeded by virtue of toil and fortitude should repudiate the commonly received faith in mere genius; and we are not surprised that his settled view of the philosophy of life was patient self-reliance, and meditation on facts derived from personal observation, with unremitting habits of labour. To these resources he owed his own renown and achievements; and his high arched brow, dark-gray eye, and vivacious temperament marked him as fitted by nature to excel in action as well as thought; a destiny which his pursuits singularly realized. There was something bird-like in the very physiognomy of Audubon, in the shape and keenness of his eye, the aquiline form of the nose, and a certain

piercing and vivid expression when animated. He was thoroughly himself only amid the freedom and exuberance of nature; the breath of the woods exhilarated and inspired him; he was more at ease under a canopy of boughs than beneath gilded cornices, and felt a necessity to be within sight either of the horizon or the sea. Indeed, so prevailing was this appetite for nature, if we may so call it, that from the moment the idea of his last projected expedition was abandoned—in accordance with the urgent remonstrances of his family, mindful of his advanced age—he began to droop, and the force and concentration of his intellect visibly declined. Both his success and his misfortunes, therefore, proved the wisdom of Richter's advice to steadfastly and confidently follow the permanent instincts of character, however they may seem opposed to immediate interest.

The style of Audubon reflects his character with unusual emphasis and truth. He was one of that class of men who unite intellectual and physical activity in their natures so equally, that while their very temperament forbids them to be exclusively students, their intelligence demands a constant accession of new ideas. Professor Wilson and Baron Humboldt belong to the same species. No one can glance over Audubon's Biography of Birds, without being struck with the unusual animation and reality of the style. He writes with an ease and enthusiasm that makes portions of his work quite as entertaining and far more suggestive than a felicitous novel. Instead of a formal nomenclature or pedantic description, he digresses continually from the technical details which are requisite to the scientific value of his treatise, to charming episodes of personal adventure, sketches of local scenery and habits, and curious anecdotes illustrative of natural history or human character. The titles of these incidental chapters adequately suggest their aim and interest, such as "Hospitality in the Woods," "Force of the Waters," "the Squatters of Labrador," "Wreckers of Florida," "a Maple-Sugar Camp," "a Ball in Newfoundland," "Breaking up of the Sea," "Pitting of Wolves," "Long Calm at Sea," "A Kentucky Barbecue," &c. We are thus genially admitted to the knowledge of much that is characteristic and interesting, by spirited and graceful narratives. His artist's eye and his sportsman's zest give liveliness and a picturesque grace to the best of these interludes; they relieve the monotony of mere description, and also impart an individuality to the entire work, by associating the positive information it conveys with the fortunes and feelings of the author. His habit of naming newly-discovered birds for his friends is another pleasing feature. Thus genially is our view of nature enlarged, the attractiveness of romance given to a department of natural history, and one part of the world

made perfectly acquainted with the feathered tribes of another. We need not enlarge upon the amenities resulting from pursuits of this kind, and their encouragement by individuals of taste and wealth,—of the innocent and available gratification thus extensively yielded, or of the more liberal and pleasing views resulting therefrom. In a literary point of view, the style of Audubon, notwithstanding an almost unavoidable vein of egotism, in its clearness, colloquial facility, and infectious enthusiasm, proves how much more effectively intimacy with nature develops even the power of expression than conformity to rules; and vindicates completeness of life, animal and mental, as essential to true manhood even in literature.

This, in our view, is one of the most important lessons derived from such a career as that of Audubon philosophically considered. There is a cant of spiritualism, at the present day, which repudiates the vital relation of genius to material laws. In the view of this shallow philosophy to trace intellectual results in any degree to physical causes, is derogating from the essential beauty of mind. The class of persons who affect this extreme devotion to ethereal systems, aim to sever body and soul while mutually alive, contemn physiology in their analysis of character, and recognise only the abstract in mental phenomena. This mode of reasoning is founded not less in irreverence than error. The most truly beautiful and significant phases of intellect, fancy, moral sentiment, and all that we deem spiritual in man, is born of its combination with the human. Indeed, the grand characteristic of life, considered in a metaphysical light, is that it is a condition which brings together and gives scope for the action and reaction of material influences on spiritual genius. The end is development, growth, and modification. As the rarest fruit owes its flavour and hues to qualities imbibed from earth and air, from rain and sunshine; so what we call the soul is the product of the thinking and sensitive principle in our nature, warmed, enriched and quickened by the agency of an animal organism,—the channel of nature,—by sensation, physical development, appetites, and sensations as well as ideas.

An author differs from other men only by the gift and habit of expression. This faculty, for which, in the ordinary purposes of convenience and pleasure, speech only is requisite, through genial cultivation redoubles its force, meaning, and beauty, and is capable of affording a kind of permanent utterance to what is most dear and important to man. It is obvious, therefore, that the more thoroughly an author's nature embraces the traits peculiar to manhood, the more efficient and satisfactory will his vocation be fulfilled. Hence the universal recognition of Shakspeare's supremacy in authorship;

it is because his range of expression included more of what is within and around life—more, in a word, of humanity—than any other single expositor. In general, authorship is partial, temporary, and its force lies in a special form. Writers devoted to abstract truth, like Kant and Jonathan Edwards, are not to be included in the proposition, as their appeal is not to the sympathies, but to the pure intelligence of the race. But the authors who really affect the mass, and represent vividly the spirit of their age, are not less eminent for genuine human qualities—for prevailing traits of temperament, appetite, and sensibility—than for superior reflective and imaginative gifts. It is, indeed, essential that they should possess the former in a high degree in order effectively to exhibit the latter. This is constantly illustrated in literature and art. With a fancy that scarcely approached the idealism of Shelley, Burns thrilled the hearts of his kind by virtue of an organization that humanized his genius. Landor is equipped with the lore of antiquity, and all the graces of classical diction to advocate his liberal opinions, yet while his elegant volumes adorn the libraries of scholars and men of taste, Dickens, comparatively ignorant and unrefined, by virtue of what may be called a more genial instinct, pleads for the oppressed in a million hearts. Jenny Lind sings many cavatinas with more precision and artistic power than Grisi, but her voice, uncharged with the sensuous life whose vibration is inevitably sympathetic, does not so seize upon the nerves or quicken the blood. The element of sensation as related to sound, form, and ideas is essential to popular literature. It is the peculiar characteristic of this department of art that it depends upon sympathy, which can only be awakened in large circles by addressing the whole nature, by winning the senses as well as the mind, stirring the heart not less than eliciting the judgment, and, in a word, making itself felt in that universal human consciousness which, to distinguish it alike from mere intellect or mere feeling, we call the soul.

The author who expects reception there, must write not only with his intelligence, his imagination, and his will, but with his temperament and his sensitive organism; he must, in a degree, fuse perception and sensation, nervous energy and moral feeling, physical emotion and aerial fancy; and then, at some point, he will be sure to touch the sympathy of others—not the scholar only, but the peasant. Accordingly we always find in the habits and idiosyncrasies of popular authors a clue to their success. There is an analogy between their constitution and their writing. The tone of the latter is born of the man, and forms his personal distinction as an author. Reasoning, rhetoric, and descriptive limning, considered as processes, do not differ according to the writer, they only vary in a certain spirit,

manner, or, more properly, tone; and when we analyze this, we shall find it given out by the individual character, by the particular union of moral and physical qualities that make up the identity of the author, and not originating in a pure abstract and spiritual emanation. Far from diminishing, this but enhances the interest of authorship; it renders it a great social fact, and a legitimate branch of human economy. It teaches us to regard authors as we regard men, by the light of character; and from their human to deduce their literary peculiarities instead of the reverse, which is the method of superficial criticism.

The popular basis of Audubon's renown, as well as the individuality of his taste as a naturalist, rests upon artistic merit. We have alluded to the instinctive desire he so early manifested not only to observe, but to possess the beautiful denizens of the forest and the meadow; and he candidly acknowledges that he was induced to take their portraits to console himself for not possessing the originals. Rude as were his first attempts to delineate birds, few portrait painters work in a more disinterested spirit: the motive was neither gain, nor hope of distinction, nor even scientific enthusiasm; for when Wilson called at his place of business, these primitive sketches were produced as the results of leisure, and the work of an unskilled amateur. It is evident, therefore, that a genuine love of the occupation, and a desire to have authentic memorials of these objects of his enthusiastic admiration, was the original cause of his labours with crayon and pigments; circumstances, an ardent temperament, and an earnest will gradually developed this spontaneous tendency into a masterly artistic faculty; he sketched, painted, and destroyed, copied, retouched, and improved, until he succeeded in representing perfectly the forms, colours, attitudes, and expression of the feathered tribe. The life-size of these delineations, their wonderful accuracy, the beauty of their hues, and the animation of their aspect instantly secured for the backwoodsman artist universal praise; but a minute inspection revealed yet higher claims: each plate, in fact, is an epitome of the natural history of the species depicted,—male and female, young and adult are grouped together, their plumage at different seasons, the vegetation they prefer, the soil, the food, sometimes the habits, and often the prey of each bird are thus indicated; and we take in at a glance not only the figure, but the peculiarities of the genus. This completeness of illustration—the result of vast study—united, as it is, with grace and brilliancy of execution, led the great naturalist of France to declare that our country had achieved a work unequalled in Europe. No lover of nature, whether poet or savan, can contemplate these exquisite and vivid pictures in a foreign

country, without delight and gratitude; for, without any exertion on his part, they introduce him to an intimate acquaintance with the varied and numerous birds that haunt the woods, sky, and waters between Labrador and Florida, in hue, outline, and action as vivid and true as those of nature; and their intrinsic value as memorials is enhanced by the consideration that a rapid disappearance of whole species of birds has been observed to attend the progress of civilization on this continent.

ART. V.—METHODIST PREACHING.

CHARACTERISTIC SKETCHES OF SUMMERFIELD, COOKMAN, BASCOM, FISK, AND OLIN.

WE are not yet through with the subject of Methodist preaching. Our two preceding papers, though hazardously frank in their disregard of some favourite prejudices, have met with a reception, the cordiality of which has been the more refreshing because little expected. It is quite natural that we should feel the flattery, and infer from it a license to encroach still farther on the good nature of our readers. If so, they must blame themselves as well as us.

After affirming, in our last article, that there were scattered all through our ranks able representatives of the great modern interests of Christianity, as well as of its ordinary pulpit instructions, we remarked that "our ministry has not been without a class of men pre-eminent even above these, for reputation at least—'men of renown' in the Church." Summerfield, Bascom, Fisk, and Olin, were named as examples.

The peculiar unity of our Church, resulting from its itinerant episcopacy, and the interchange of its pastors, has been highly favourable to the reputation of such men. They have been recognised as the common representatives and common favourites of the denomination. They moved extensively through its territory, not as foreign visitors, but as honoured members of the one great family, leaders in the common pastorate. In no other denomination of the land has this sentiment of fraternity been so prevalent and so characteristic. Besides its moral beauty, it has been of no little practical value; a great idea, a great deed, or a great man, has always had a wider sway among us than among other Churches. While the reputation of eminent preachers in more localized or more districted

communions has been analogous to that of leaders in the State legislatures, the fame of our distinguished preachers, and its moral power, has been analogous to the national fame and influence of our great Congressional leaders. With the increase and consolidation of the Church this advantage is disappearing—perhaps inevitably. It gave to the class of men referred to a standing among us, similar to that which the great preachers of the age of Louis XIV. occupied among the clergy of France. We may have hereafter as great men intrinsically, but they can hardly wield as extended a sway over the general mind of the Church.

We propose to attempt, in this article, characteristic sketches of some of our most notable preachers,—not elaborate estimates or finished portraits, but rapid drawings—“sketches,” as our title says,—and not for the purpose of presenting them as pulpit models, but as pulpit studies, affording examples of both excellencies and defects, and at the same time not without interest as specimens of personal character.

SUMMERFIELD was the first of general fame, and, unquestionably, one of the very best. Fragrant still are the associations of that endeared name. A chaste style; fertility of good but not extraordinary thought, adorned frequently, however, by apposite figures; the facility of a remarkably colloquial manner, which made his hearers feel as if they had a sort of interlocutory participation in the discourse; and, above all, an indescribably sweet spirit of piety—the very personality of the speaker sanctified, and revealing itself in his tones, looks, and gestures—were the traits of this extraordinary man.

This manifestation of his personal characteristics had nothing, however, of egotism about it. It was not preaching himself instead of Christ, but Christ in himself, as well as in his subject; so that Christ was presented at once both “objectively” and “subjectively,” as the Germans would say, and thus became “all in all.” The fame of few men has depended less upon original talent, and more on personal dispositions, than that of Summerfield. Though the most transcendent in his reputation, he was, at the same time, the most imitable of our eminent preachers. Simplicity, placidity, meekness, and a colloquial manner, combined with good but not great ideas, certainly would seem to be of easy acquisition. Still the imitation of the excellencies of a model, however desirable, is often found exceedingly difficult. To copy a model entire is impracticable, and always results in absurd defects, for the moral idiosyncrasies of men give an individuality to their character and manner which must remain

inxorably distinct from all resemblances, as the differences of faces show themselves notwithstanding any similarity of features. Only such as are similar in these idiosyncrasies should think of imitating each other's excellencies. Henry B. Bascom would have become ridiculous with the pulpit manner of John Summerfield. Men, however, of tranquil dispositions, of neat style and ready flow of thought, ranking now only at mediocrity, might place his example before them with peculiar advantage. A deep consecration like his, a simple and direct aim to reach the heart rather than inflame the imagination of the hearer, the melting and outflowing of one's whole individuality in the discourse—these are not difficult to such men, and a better example of what success they can attain, is not on record than that of Summerfield.

The best judges, who were familiar with Summerfield's preaching, find it impossible to tell precisely in what its interest consisted.

We venture to repeat that the solution of the problem is to be found mostly, if not wholly, in what the French would call the *naturel* of the man—the beautiful compatibility between the preacher and his preaching—a harmony that revealed itself in his looks, his tones, his gestures, and all the subtler indications of verbal style, mental aptitudes, and moral dispositions. You have only to suppose him strongly characterized by other traits than those mentioned, to perceive at once that he must have been an entirely different preacher. Had he possessed the same intellectual capacities, but been *brusque*, or denunciatory, or satirical—had he been tinged strongly with moroseness, misanthropy, or self-conceit, his pulpit characteristics would have been different; he never could have won the peculiar fame which attaches to his memory; he would probably have gone down to the grave without public distinction. With a mind susceptible of all graceful impressions, a heart whose sensibility was feminine—yet with such feminineness as we ascribe to angels, and think of as consistent with mighty though serene strength—he united the very sanctity of religion and a simplicity of purpose which saved him utterly from the affectations or artifices that might have marred his character, and quite changed the effect of his preaching.

Montgomery, the poet, expressed a just critical estimate of him when he said:—

“Summerfield had intense animal feeling, and much of morbid imagination; but of poetic feeling, and poetic imagination, very little—at least there is very little trace of either in anything that he has left, beyond a few vivid but momentary flashes in his sermons.”

This “animal feeling,” however, must be understood to have been

refined and intensified by divine grace, into the holiest moral affections; so that the sympathetic instincts of the natural heart became in him pure religious passions, and seemed such as might befit the bosom of a seraph.

His appearance in the pulpit was expressive of his character, and contributed much to the effect of his discourse. Though his face possessed nothing at first and near view remarkably striking or agreeable, yet when irradiated with the fervour of his feelings, it was angelically beautiful. The portrait which accompanied Holland's memoir is considered a good one, but it fails to represent the glowing life that played over his features and radiated from his eyes. The languor of disease could not mar this moral beauty; it rather enhanced it, by adding a delicacy which could not fail to associate with the hearer's admiration a sentiment of tender and even loving sympathy. His voice was not strong, but exceedingly flexible and sweet, and harmonized always with the vibrations of his feelings. His gestures did not violate the rules of the art, but seemed not the result of it. They were unexceptionably natural, and yet naturally conformed to the art. He was, in fine, so exempt from artifice, he so entirely surrendered himself to the occasion and its concomitants, whatever they might be, that he spontaneously fell into unison with them, and seemed naturally and immediately to acquire that mastery over them which the highest art cannot always command. This is the truest genius; genius is not independent of art, but it is its prerogative often to assume it intuitively, reaching its results without its labours. Labour is an important aid to genius, unquestionably; and the latter is seldom notably successful without the former; and yet the great characteristic of genius is its facility, the indolent ease, even, with which it accomplishes what art, without genius, reaches only through elaborate assiduity. Genius suffers more than it labours, but it suffers not so much in action as in reaction. Its sensibility is what gives it success, mainly, but often inflicts misery also.

Though in the delivery of his sermons there was this facility—felicity we may call it—in their preparation he was a laborious student. He was a hearty advocate of extempore preaching, and would have been deprived of most of his popular power in the pulpit by being confined to a manuscript; yet he knew the importance of study, and particularly of the habitual use of the pen in order to success in extemporaneous speaking. His own rule was to prepare a skeleton of his sermon, and after preaching it, write it out in fuller detail, filling up the original sketch with the principal thoughts which had occurred to him in the process of the dis-

course. The first outline was, however, in accordance with the rule we have given for extempore speaking, in a former article, viz., that the perspective of the entire discourse—the leading ideas from the exordium to the peroration—should be noted on the manuscript, so that the speaker shall have the assurance that he is supplied with a consecutive series of good ideas, good enough to command the respect of his audience, though he should fail of any very important impromptu thoughts. This rule we deem the most essential condition of success in extemporaneous preaching. It is the best guarantee of that confidence and self-possession upon which depends the command of both thought and language. Summerfield followed it even in his platform speeches. Montgomery noticed the minuteness of his preparations in nearly two hundred manuscript sketches.

He exemplified his own views respecting the use of the pen, as an aid to extempore style. Besides the large number of sermons and sketches just mentioned, filling seven post-octavo volumes, he left two considerable volumes, one "a counting-house ledger," filled with exegetical notes on the Scriptures, in such minute penmanship, and with so many abbreviations, that it is said they can scarcely be "deciphered without a glass."

A volume of his sermons and sketches of sermons has been published. They afford no criterion of the transcendent power of the preacher. The "skeletons" contained in this volume illustrate, however, his pulpit style; to such as heard him often they must recall the image and indescribable manner of the preacher, his facility of thought, his colloquial and abrupt style, the fervent variability of his feelings. They may be taken also as specimens of his outline preparations. Not only are the leading thoughts noted, but abundance of illustrative details also. The pithy Scripture allusions with which they abound are characteristic of his discourses; his own diction was sententiously Saxon, but its terseness and simple beauty were continually enhanced by remarkably apt Biblical phrases. His style was a mosaic of pertinent and beautiful texts. The quotation of a single word would sometimes terminate a climax with brilliant effect, or conclude an illustration with epigrammatic significance.

There was one respect in which Summerfield was a model for all public speakers, viz., in the ease, as we have described it, with which he undertook his pulpit tasks. Doubtless he felt the usual anxieties of preparation, in the study; but having made his preparations, and committed them and himself to God in prayer, he seemed to enter upon his public duties disburdened of all care. There was no elaborate effort of thought or language—no fluttering after lofty flights. If, as we have said, preparation is the most essential con-

dition of success in extempore discourse, this facility, this self-possession, the result of preparation and of the absence of all egotistical aims, is assuredly the second. It may be affirmed that failure is next to impossible to him who acquires it as a habit. Who that has a suitable supply of thoughts, on a given subject, would expect to fail of an easy communication of them in his family circle, at the fire-side? The right language will come to him "of itself," and the right modulation, and, if the subject demands it, pathos, solemnity, or denunciation. How naturally does he assume the appropriate expression both of voice and gesture! Why can we not have equal facility in the pulpit? Mostly because of the restraints which our powers suffer from our egotistical anxieties, our attempts to do something great. Simplicity is an element of all true greatness. He that would be successful, especially in public speaking, should study his subject till, as we have above said, he feels that he has provided lessons which his hearers will respect, and then, unanxious about himself, simply intent on the task before him, enter directly and calmly into it. He will soon lose himself in his subject; language better than he could ever have elaborated in the study, will flow from his lips; his sincere and self-possessed spirit will be susceptible to the pathos, the severity, or the dignity which the different phases of his theme inspire; a natural and therefore beautiful compatibility will usually exist between his subject and his own mood, and not unfrequently the latter will be exalted by the former to the loftiest elevations of thought. This we again affirm was Summerfield's great pulpit characteristic.

What would have been the effect of years on the eloquence of Summerfield? The question occurs to us very naturally, and is a curious one at least. We so spontaneously associate his juvenile delicacy and beauty with the impression of his preaching, that we can hardly conceive of him as the same man, in middle life or old age. He was but about twenty years old when he began to preach, but twenty-three when he arrived in America, and only twenty-seven when he died. His personal appearance first excited the anxiety of the hearer, next won his sympathy, until he discovered in it at last, by the contrast of his mature and resplendent ability, only an additional reason for wonder and admiration. The circumstances under which his second appearance in public, after his arrival in this country, took place, very happily concurred to enhance this advantage. It was on the anniversary platform of the American Bible Society. A masterly address had just been pronounced by an eminent clergyman; murmurs of applause were audible in the assembly. Dr. Bethune, who was present, says:—

"The chair announced the Rev. Mr. Summerfield, from England.—'What presumption!' said my clerical neighbour; 'a boy like that to be set up, after a giant!' But the stripling came in the name of the God of Israel, armed with 'a few smooth stones from the brook' that flows 'hard by the oracles of God.' His motion was one of thanks to the officers of the society for their labours during the year; and of course he had to allude to the president, then reposing in another part of the house; and thus he did it:—'When I saw that venerable man, too aged to warrant the hope of being with you at another anniversary, he reminded me of Jacob leaning upon the top of his staff, blessing his children before he departed.' He then passed on to encourage the society by the example of the British Institution. 'When we first launched our untried vessel upon the deep, the storms of opposition roared, and the waves dashed angrily around us, and we had hard work to keep her head to the wind. We were faint with rowing, and our strength would soon have been gone, but we cried, "Lord, save us, or we perish!" When a light shone upon the waters, and we saw a form walking upon the troubled sea, like unto that of the Son of God, and he drew near the ship, and we knew that it was Jesus; and he stepped upon the deck, and laid his hand on the helm, and he said unto the winds and the waves, Peace, be still, and there was a great calm. Let not the friends of the Bible fear; God is in the midst of us. God shall help us, and that right early.' In such a strain he went on to the close. 'Wonderful! wonderful!' said my neighbour the critic; 'he talks like an angel from heaven.'

"He talked like an angel," not merely because his thoughts were excellent, but because the visible man, clothed with physical delicacy and youthfulness, and glowing with moral beauty, seemed an embodiment of your ideal of an angelic apparition. Riper years would doubtless have modified this peculiar charm of his youthfulness; but we doubt that they could have marred the effect of his eloquence; we doubt it, for the good reason that his oratory was perfectly natural. Being natural it would have been permanent as his nature, taking new hues from the changes of life, but only such as being congenial with those changes would render it congruous with them—would sustain his beautiful naturalness. We suppose, therefore, that if Summerfield's eloquence had lost some of its juvenile traits in maturer years, it would have gained in riper and richer qualities, as good wine gains in zest, though it loses in sweetness by age. Emanating as it did from the very nature of the man, we can imagine it to have retained its essential charm uninjured though varied even in old age; and if John Summerfield had lived to hoary years, we can conceive of him only as the St. John of his day—the beloved disciple, who still saw the visions of God, and upon whose lips, as was said of Plato, bees from the flowers had shed their honey.

In private life Summerfield was, if possible, still more interesting than in the pulpit. He was fertile in conversation. He had a flowing but delicate humour, quite Addisonian in its character, always appropriate but never sarcastic. His extraordinary memory rendered him familiar with the names of all who were introduced to him, even children and servants—he seldom or never forgot them. Above all,

he had the happy faculty of introducing into all circles appropriate subjects of religious conversation. There was no cant about him, no overweening endeavour to impress the eager groups around him with a sense of his clerical scrupulousness, but an unaffected respectfulness, a confiding courtesy, which conciliated the listener and compelled him to look upon any devout remark as happily congruous to the occasion, and even felicitously befitting to the man.

An incurable malady reminded him that he must work while the day lasteth, for the night cometh. He was incessant in his labours, preaching often from five to ten discourses a week. Besides frequent addresses in which he was remarkably happy, he delivered about four hundred sermons in the first year and a half of his ministry. Throughout his brief but laborious career he bore about with him that "morbid feeling," of which Montgomery speaks, and which seems indeed a usual pathological accompaniment of genius.* His conversion was clear and decided, yet in his subsequent religious experience he was subject to severe inward conflicts, and Holland has justly remarked that "the light of spiritual illumination in *him* (whatever may have been the case in *others*) did not *uninterruptedly* shine 'brighter and brighter unto the perfect day,' but clouds and darkness frequently intercepted the rays of that Sun of righteousness which had so evidently arisen on his soul. Indeed, the Lord seems to have led his servant, not with the shadow by day, and the glory by night, of the pillar of cloud and fire, but *alternately*, amidst perpetual natural gloom, presenting to him the light of the flame that cheered the Israelites on the verge of the Red Sea, and the darkness behind that frowned upon the Egyptians their pursuers. But God who is 'love,' was equally present to him in the splendour and the terror—in the hidings as in the revealings of his face—and by that mysterious dispensation, we cannot doubt, led him, as the best mode of guidance, through the sea and the wilderness, over Jordan to Canaan and Jerusalem which is above."

This was his discipline—he needed it amidst the perilous flatteries of his success. It was probably one of the most effectual causes of that profound humility which was at once the protection and the charm of his saintly character. Could we read the inmost history of most of the mighty men of God in the earth, we should find that they have been summoned by him, to confront, like Moses, the fiery terrors of Sinai, or like Daniel, to call upon him from the lions' den, or like Paul, to bear with them to the grave the thorn in the flesh.

The youthful hero, wounded in the well-sustained conflict, retired at last to his tent to die. "Well—yes—well—all is well." "I

* "Genius," says Heyne, the German, "is a disease, as the pearl is in the oyster."

want a *change*—a *change of form*—a *change of every thing*,” he said feebly as the last struggle approached. “All—though—sin—has—entered;” but his utterance failed in the quotation. Night came on; with increased energy he exclaimed, “All’s perfection!” “*Good-night!*” were his *last words*.

GEORGE G. COOKMAN disappeared from our midst by a terrible disaster in the prime of his manhood, and at a period in his ministerial career when the star of his fame seemed about to culminate, and attract the gaze not only of the Church but of the nation. If he had not a reputation co-extensive with that of the other characters sketched in this article, none who knew him can doubt that it would have sooner or later ranked him with some of them, and beyond others, had it not been for the premature termination of his course.

He was born in 1800, at Hull, England, and came of a good old Wesleyan stock. His father, a man of wealth and of high respectability, was a Methodist local preacher, and his early domestic education tended to form the son for the work of his life. While yet very young he gave evidence of his peculiar capabilities for public speaking, on the platform of Sunday-school and juvenile missionary anniversaries. Some of these efforts of his childhood are said to have excited extraordinary interest.

In his eighteenth year the death of a young friend left a profound religious impression upon his mind, which resulted in his conversion. When about twenty-one years old he visited this country, on business for his father, and while at Schenectady, N. Y., received the impression that it was his duty to devote his life to the Christian ministry. He began there, we believe, his labours as a local preacher. In 1821 he returned to Hull, and entered into business with his father, exercising his talents meanwhile zealously in the Wesleyan local ministry. He continued in his father’s firm during four years, but with a restless spirit; his ardent heart panted for entire devotion to Christian labours. So profound was his conviction of duty in this respect that it visibly affected him; and his father, prizing him with an Englishman’s regard, as his eldest son, and the representative of his family, but perceiving that he “*must go*,” gave him up, and bade him depart with God’s blessing. Having witnessed the heroic labours and triumphs of the Methodist preachers on this continent, he resolved to join them, and forthwith took passage for Philadelphia. After labouring a few months in that city, as a local preacher, he was received into the Philadelphia Conference in 1826. He continued in the itinerant ranks, without intermission, the remainder of his life, labouring with indomitable energy, and

constantly increasing ability and success, in various parts of Pennsylvania, New-Jersey, Maryland, and the District of Columbia.

Mr. Cookman was slight, but sinewy in person, and capable of great endurance. His arms were long, and gave a striking peculiarity to his gestures. His eye was keen and brilliant, his craniological development good, but not remarkable, and his lean features were galvanic with an energy which, Englishman though he was, never allowed any obese accumulations to form beneath them. He had too much soul to admit of fatness; frown not, ye Falstaff captains in the armies of Israel! "Would he were fatter," said Cæsar of Cassius,—but Cæsar himself was lean, and he feared the leanness of Cassius, because it had meaning in it,—"he thinks too much." Cookman's agile movements scouted with defiance the morbid monster, and kept it ever in distant abeyance. Every nerve and muscle of his lithe frame seemed instinct with the excitement of his subject; even the foot often had its energetic gesture, and he took no little perambulatory range when the limits of the desk or platform allowed it. The latter was his favourite place; never did popular orator revel more in the licensed liberties of the platform. All his powers were brought out there, and lavished upon the occasion with absolute prodigality,—strong argumentation, dazzling imagery, satire, pathos, wit,—holding his hearers in a spell of close, clear thought, shaking them with resistless strokes of humour, melting them instanter into tears, or, by some energetic or heroic thought, throwing the whole assembly into tumultuous agitation, and provoking from it irrepressible responses. If at such times his manner tended to boisterousness it seemed compatible with the scene: it is not the zephyr but the mighty rushing wind that shakes and bends the forest.

There was in his voice a strenuous, silvery distinctness, and even music, which enhanced much the effect of his more powerful passages. In a large house, or at a camp-meeting, where he was usually the hero of the field, he could send its pealing notes, with thrilling effect, to the remotest hearer. The hall of representatives at Washington never echoed more eloquent tones, or more eloquent thoughts, than when he occupied its rostrum during his chaplaincy to Congress. He was peculiarly successful in these congressional ministrations. Notwithstanding the vast variety of character and prejudice concentrated at the national metropolis, during the legislative sessions, he was a universal favourite. All men about him felt that whether in the humble Methodist pulpit, or amidst the magnificence of the national capitol, he was *himself*; and men will generally, if not always, wave their personal prejudices in the pre-

sence of talent which stands forth before them in its simple genuineness, while few things can more effectually defeat real ability than attempts to exaggerate it by dissembling artifices. The trickery is not only morally ugly by its disingenuousness; but the popular sagacity, much keener than is commonly supposed, quickly perceives it, and takes an egotistical but honest pride in defying it. Mr. Cookman's sermons before Congress were thoroughly prepared; they were often truly great, but directly to the purpose, and stamped throughout with the honest, earnest individuality of the man. There was much of special adaptation in them. He was always apt in seizing on casual events for the illustration or enforcement of his subjects; but his congressional discourses were peculiarly distinguished by the success with which he availed himself of the exciting incidents of the place and season. These discourses had also a deep moral effect as well as oratorical interest. Several of his distinguished hearers, both in Congress and the executive department of the government, were awakened to a personal interest in religion by his powerful appeals.

He was characterized by a sort of chivalry, a martial predilection, which gave him real bravery, and combative promptness and energy. This was one of the strongest elements of his nature. The military events which stirred all Europe during his youth, doubtless had an influence on his forming character. It was affected by even an earlier influence, probably. "Mind is from the mother," says Isaac Taylor, and the characters of great men, especially, begin to form under the impressions of the maternal mind (let her that readeth understand) before their birth. The martial clangour that resounded among the continental States, and filled all the homes of England with loyal heroism, at the end of the last century, had possibly an effect on the *morale* of Cookman. Be this as it may, there was a military fire in him which nothing could extinguish, and which, sanctified by religion, gave an heroic and invincible power to his ministrations. It influenced his imagery and his very language. It revealed itself in his sermons, in his exhortations, his very prayers, and most especially in his platform addresses. The first of the latter that we open upon in his published "Speeches" * is an example. It marshals the different evangelical sects of the country into a general missionary conflict, and is full of chivalric spirit. His martial temper rendered his assaults on error formidably vigorous. He liked right well a manful encounter, and relished, with epicurean

* Speeches delivered on various occasions by Rev. George G. Cookman, of the Baltimore Annual Conference, and Chaplain of the Senate of the United States. New-York: Carlton & Phillips, 200 Mulberry-street.

zest, a pungent sarcasm, or a humorous thrust, that scattered in dismay sophistry or sceptical conceit.

He had good sense, and a good amount of it; but his imagination was his dominant faculty. It furnished him incessantly with brilliant illustrations. Besides the minute beauties with which it interspersed his ordinary discourses, it sometimes led him into allegories which might have entertained the dreams of old John Bunyan. The martial Bible-Society address at New-Brunswick, in 1828, to which we have referred; the mission ship, in his famous Baltimore-Conference speech of 1829; the widow and her daughters, in his American Sunday-School Union speech of 1831; and the personification of liberalism, (the prodigal son of the "Spy Bigotry,") in his New-York Sunday-school address of 1832, are examples. It can hardly be doubted that had he devoted himself to the production of some work in this rare and difficult department of literature, he might have become a worthy disciple of the glorious old dreamer of Bedford jail. This allegorizing mood, however, befits the poet better than the orator.

In his private life Mr. Cookman had many attractions. His piety was deep, and he was always ready for any good word or work; but his religion never interfered with his enjoyment of life. He relished good fellowship, enlivening conversation, and the entertainment of books. He adhered through life, we believe, to the primitive Methodist costume; it was not the most graceful for his lank person, but under this Quaker-like external primness he carried a large and generous heart—a heart which seemed ever juvenile in the freshness of its sentiments and the ardour of its aspirations.

On the 11th of March, 1841, he embarked in the ill-fated steamer, *President*, and was never heard of more.

HENRY B. BASCOM maintained an extraordinary reputation, as a preacher, down to the last year of his life. He entered the itinerant ministry in 1814, when yet in his teens. During fourteen years he pursued its laborious duties in various parts of the West, and through the next twenty years occupied honourable positions in our literary institutions, either as President or Professor. He was at last elevated to the Episcopal office in the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, but presided in only one annual conference, on his return from which he was stricken down by death, in the very maturity of his life and his promotion.

In person he was one of the noblest of men—substantially built, well proportioned, with full and manly features, a complexion of English ruddiness, and a highly intellectual cerebral development.

His medallion likeness, in plaster, by Messrs. Fowler, New-York, accurately as well as elegantly executed, is one of the finest examples of manly beauty extant. His voice was commanding, remarkably orotund, and even melodious, till affected by habitual snuff-taking.

The candid critic must find it difficult to delineate well his pulpit character. His *manner* in the desk was conformed to the rules of the oratorical art—strictly so. This fact secured him from the irregular violence of voice and gesture to which his impetuous feelings naturally tended, but at the same time rendered his manner factitious and elaborate, especially in passages of studied beauty, where the attempt at effect, however laudable, became too manifest. This was in fine a characteristic of Dr. Bascom's eloquence throughout; devoted as he was to the art, he did not attain that perfection in it by which its labour is concealed or rather superseded. "Nature," some one has said, "is the highest art," and to get clear of our factitious habits and become aesthetically true to nature, in anything, is perfection. Powerful as were some of Dr. Bascom's efforts, the intelligent hearer could hardly divest himself of the consciousness that he was listening to a proposed example of declamation, and he found his mind spontaneously holding his heart in abeyance, that the former might sit in critical judgment upon the performance, admiring or condemning it. While this was the case with severer minds, the multitude hung upon his discourse usually with more of wonder than of any other emotion. We say *usually*, for there were occasions in which his own excited emotions bore down all criticism, and swept along in a tumultuous current the feelings of high and low. At these times, in spite of his hyperbolic imagery and language, his noble voice assumed its fullest music, and fell into a slight *recitative*, which seemed no fault, but actually enhanced its effect. Some of the ancient writers on oratory speak of this manner as an excellence not uncommon in the classic eloquence. If we are not mistaken, Cicero somewhere alludes to it favourably. It may be founded in nature, in a tendency of the sensibilities, when intensely excited, to express themselves in ecstatic and musical tones, analogous to their tendency under such excitement to poetic measures in language. We find it still extant among the Quakers, and other sects, though in great exaggeration.

Dr. Bascom's intellect presented a singular combination of excellencies and defects. The poet and the dialectician were so mixed in him as not to allow of a distinct development of either, but produced, in his mental operations, such an habitual interplay of the logical and poetical powers as often to confound each other. A severe

critic would, we think, usually retire from his preaching, puzzled to discriminate the intrinsic thought and the overlaying imagery of the discourse, and yet compelled to acknowledge that there was a marvellous exhibition of both. He had little or no fancy, but an august imagination. Contrary to the wont of imaginative minds, he seemed always inclined to discuss subjects which admitted of elaborate argumentation; yet in conducting his argument he could not proceed with the measured pace of the logician, but must move with the flight of an archangel. Should the hearer divest himself entirely of the propensities of the critic, and give himself up to the poetry of the discourse, he would find himself more satisfied than if, on the contrary, he should sit in judgment on the process of thought alone, or attempt to comprehend both.

The poetic element was, we think, his chief distinction. The strict art with which he studied oratory was not, however, equally applied here; his imagination was often excessive. It lingered not among Hervey's "Reflections in a Flower Garden," but aspiring to a loftier flight, plumed itself among his "Starry Heavens." Many of these flights showed a Miltonian grandeur, but they were oftener exaggerated, and habitually too frequent. Some of his discourses seemed almost, from beginning to end, a series of elaborated figures, "chained lightning," and sometimes, perhaps, owed, like the latter, much of their apparent splendour to the surrounding obscurity. Jupiter, at the request of Semele, came to her arrayed in the thunders and lightnings of the god, but she was consumed at his approach; the plain good sense of popular assemblies is often baffled and confounded by displays of oratorical poetry, and, let us confess it, more so in the sanctuary than anywhere else.

Dr. Bascom was self-educated—a means of peculiar advantage to some minds, but to an exuberantly fertile one, like his, the occasion of a lax discipline and distorted growth. He emigrated early to the West; among its vast rivers, prairies, and mountain ranges, he studied the revelations of nature, and his mental character revealed the impression which those grand scenes made upon him. Whatever other defects he had he showed no effeminacy, no dilution of thought. His ideas were robust, his imagery rugged though luxuriant—all his conceptions seemed naturally to take a character of magnitude, if not magnificence, like that of the scenery with which he was conversant. His literary studies, pursued alone, and in his ministerial travels, could not compete with the influence of the grand associations which surrounded him. The latter formed his intellectual character; the former, though pursued assiduously, failed of

their usual chastening effect, so far at least as his pulpit efforts were concerned; and to the last year of his life his preaching retained its original characteristics, though its delivery was somewhat moderated by the use of manuscripts in the desk—an expedient very unwisely recommended by his medical advisers as a relief to a chronic inflammation of the throat.*

He had little of the ease and self-possession which we have recommended. He evidently entered the pulpit bowed under the burden of his task, and his discourse throughout was apparently an extreme effort. It was not unusual for him to spend most of Saturday night in walking his chamber floor, anxiously conning the next day's sermon. Such elaborate attempts often defeat themselves, and Mr. Bascom's failures were not unfrequent. His sermons seemed invariably delivered memoriter, though usually long enough to occupy two hours; if he did not purposely commit them to memory, yet their frequent repetition fixed in his mind their language as well as their train of thought. They were evidently prepared with the utmost labour. The paragraphs seemed often to be separate but resplendent masses of thought, written at intervals, and without very close relations. This defect added to the obscurity of the discourse as a whole, breaking up its continuity in the mind of the hearer. The elaborateness of his mental processes extended even to his language; it had something of the Latin pomp of Johnson, with the *bizarre* complexity of Carlyle, and often, as a consequence, presented sentences of striking peculiarity and force, notwithstanding its general defectiveness. He frequently coined words, or gave them new applications; the latter, however, were usually traceable to some subtle etymological authority, and sometimes were marked by beauty and pertinence. His published sermons will not endure; they have not come under the attention of the higher class of critics, and would not, we think, be passable at their bar. Some of his other productions, in which his poetical propensities had no room to play, show that if his education had been such as to effectually discipline his imagination, his real ability would have been greatly enhanced. His most important writings, besides those prepared for the pulpit, are his "Bill of Rights," written on behalf of the "reform" movement of 1828; the "Protest of the Minority," in the memorable General Conference of 1844; the "Report on Organization," at the formation of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South; and a subsequent elaborate volume in defence of the Southern Church, entitled "Methodism and Slavery."

* We believe that extemporizers suffer much less than sermon-readers from this ailment—and there are obvious reasons why this should be the case.

In social life Dr. Bascom was not readily appreciated, except by his familiar friends. To others he was taciturn or abrupt, and apparently frigid. There was about him that uneasiness which so often accompanies men of rare powers and marked individuality—the morbid effect usually, the honourable but not often honoured wounds of hard-fought inward conflicts. He suffered no little misconstruction in this respect, in addition to the suffering which the conscious defect itself inflicted. When Sir Humphrey Davy, by the special permission of Napoleon, visited Paris, at a time when the country was closed to Englishmen, he was conducted by the French savans with great courtesy and eclat to the principal scientific resorts of the city; but no sooner had he left it than a torrent of abuse overtook him for his "English hauteur"—the stolid pride with which he appeared to receive the attentions of the learned Parisians. His biographer explains the case. It was not pride but its direct opposite that affected the great English philosopher. His constitutional diffidence—not an uncommon trait of the highest and purest style of mind—embarrassed him so much that he knew not how to receive the polite attentions showered upon him; and while he was publicly condemned for his pride, he was secretly agonized by his self-depreciation. Dr. Bascom was an example of the same weakness, or virtue, as some would call it. To those who enjoyed his intimate acquaintance he revealed a nature full of generous frankness and cordiality. "To such," says one of his Southern brethren, "he was as simple as a child, open to suggestion and counsel, amiable and lovely as a friend."* "A warmer heart, and more noble feelings," says Bishop Andrew, "beat not in the bosom of mortal; there was a spring of kindest affection there which never run dry."

He died at Louisville, Kentucky, surrounded by old and endeared friends, on the 8th of September, 1850. When asked if his spirit was sustained in the final conflict by the grace which he had preached to others, his reply was, "Yes, yes, yes!"

Notwithstanding any critical detractions from the popular estimate of his intellectual character, those who have heard him in his successful efforts will remember the occasion as a privilege, an exhibition of magnificent mind—magnificent, though, like the grandeur of the mountain, made up of broken outlines, rough cliffs, dark ravines below and sunlit effulgence above.

We pass to another name which has become a synonyme among us for almost every trait of mental symmetry and moral beauty—WILBUR FISK. He also, like Cookman, came of a primitive Methodist stock,

* Dr. Wightman, *Southern Christian Advocate*.

and a strong ingredient of New-England Puritanism did not mar the composition of his noble nature. He began his ministry in 1818, when about twenty-six years of age. His pastoral labours extended through eight years; the remainder of his life, including some fourteen years, was spent in literary institutions of the Church. He may be pronounced the founder of the educational provisions of New-England Methodism—provisions which we believe are now more complete than in any other section of the Church, comprising a well-related series of one or more independent academies for each conference, and a university and theological school for them jointly. Dr. Fisk saw the absolute necessity of such institutions for Methodism, especially in the Eastern States, where the whole people were educated, and where education could not well be divested of sectarian influences, except in its most elementary forms. His successful plans have rescued the youth of the Church from the proselytism of other sects. They have already made a visible, an almost universal, impression on the character of New-England Methodism, especially of its ministers, a very large proportion of whom have spent more or less time in preparatory studies in its seminaries.

Wilbur Fisk's person bespoke his character. It was of good size, and remarkable for its symmetry. His features were beautifully harmonious, the contour strongly resembling the better Roman outline, though lacking its most peculiar distinction, the *nasus aquilinus*. His eye was nicely defined, and when excited beamed with a peculiarly benign and conciliatory expression. His complexion was bilious, and added to the diseased indication of his somewhat attenuated features. His head was a model not of great but of well-proportioned development. It had the height of the Roman brow, though none of the breadth of the Greek. The two portraits of him which have been given in this work recall his appearance well enough to those who were familiar with it, but can hardly afford an accurate impression to such as never saw him. The first of them, presenting him in the primitive ministerial costume of the Church, (which he doffed, we believe, in later years,) has too much of the languor of disease: there is an aspect of debility, if not decay, about it which did not belong to the original, notwithstanding his habitual ill-health. It is preferred, however, by many of his friends, to the second engraving—an English production, marked by ideal and somewhat pompous exaggerations, and not a little of that exquisite and unnatural nicety with which our English brethren are flattered in their published portraits. There is a bust of him extant; but it is not to be looked at by any who would not mar in their memories the beautiful and benign image of his earlier manhood by the dis-

figurations of disease and suffering. His voice was peculiarly flexible and sonorous: a catarrhal disease affected it; but just enough, during most of his life, to improve its tone to a soft orotund, without a trace of nasal defect. It rendered him a charming singer, and was an instrument of music to him in the pulpit. Without appearing to use it designedly for vocal effect, it was nevertheless an important means of impression to his sermons. Few men could indicate the moral emotions more effectually by mere tones. It was especially expressive in pathetic passages.

His pulpit manner was marked in the introduction of the sermon by dignity, but dignity without ceremony or pretension. As he advanced into the exposition and argument of his discourse, (and there were both in most of his sermons,) he became more emphatic, especially as brilliant though brief illustrations, ever and anon, gleamed upon his logic. By the time he had reached the peroration his utterance became rapid, his thoughts were incandescent, the music of his voice rung out in thrilling tones, and sometimes even quivered with trills of pathos. No imaginative excitement prevailed in the audience as under Maffitt's eloquence, no tumultuous wonder as under Bascom's, none of Cookman's impetuous passion, or Olin's overwhelming power, but a subduing, almost tranquil spell, of genial feeling, expressed often by tears or half-suppressed ejaculations; something of the kindly effect of Summerfield combined with a higher intellectual impression.

We cannot claim for Dr. Fisk genius, nor the very highest order of mind. Good vigour in all his faculties, and good balance of them all, were his chief intellectual characteristics. His literary acquisitions were not great. The American collegiate course in his day was stinted; after his graduation he was too busy to study much, and he was not a great reader. His resources were chiefly in himself—in his good sense, his quick sagacity, his generous sensibilities, and his healthy and fertile imagination. He possessed the latter power richly, though it never ran riot in his discourses. It was a powerful auxiliary to his logic—an exemplification of Dugald Stewart's remark on the intimate relation between the imagination and the reasoning faculty in a well-balanced mind. Its scintillations were the sparkles that flew about the anvil on which his logic plied its strokes.

His sermons, if examined in print, would pass for good but "second-rate" productions, that is to say, they would rank below those of Chalmers, Channing, Robert Hall, or Olin; but if heard from his own lips in the pulpit, the hearer—even the educated and critical hearer—inspired with the preacher's manner and sensibility,

would be disposed to assign them to the "first-rate" class. His style, not being formed from books, was the natural expression of his vigorous and nicely-balanced mind; it was therefore remarkable for its simplicity and terseness, its Saxon purity and energy. You cannot find a meretricious sentence in all his published writings.

He was not a metaphysician nor a dialectician, and yet by natural disposition he was a polemic. This was a marked propensity of his mind; it was never abused into gladiatorialship in the pulpit, but inclined him almost incessantly to theological discussion out of it. A jealous regard for the truth doubtless prompted this disposition; but we think it had a deeper foundation—that it was founded in his mental constitution. His polemical writings were not only in good temper, but examples of luminous and forcible argumentation. The sermon on Calvinism may be referred to as a specimen. That discourse, with his sermon and lectures on Universalism, his essays on the New-Haven Divinity, his discourse on the Law and the Gospel, his tract in reply to Pierrepont on the Atonement, &c., would form a volume which the Church might recognise as no ignoble memorial of both his intellectual and moral character. His travels in Europe, though containing some examples of elaborate reflection and picturesque description, was not a volume of superior claims—it had too much of the ordinary guide-book character.

That very significant and convenient word, *tact*, expresses a quality which Wilbur Fisk possessed in a rare degree. He was uncommonly sagacious in perceiving, and prompt in seizing, the practical advantages of his position, whatever it might be; hence his adroitness in controversy, the success of his platform addresses, his almost certain triumphs in conference debates, and the skill of his public practical schemes—excepting always those which were *financial*, in which respect, we think, he signally failed, a defect quite usual with men of genius, but not with men of his mental characteristics.

His moral character was perfect as that of any man whom it has been our happiness to know. His intimate friends will admit that there is hardly a possibility of speaking too favourably of him in this respect. After some years spent in personal relations with him, we are literally at a loss to mention one moral defect that marred the perfect beauty of his nature. We are aware that this is saying very much, that it is saying what cannot be said of one man perhaps in a million, but we deliberately say it of this saintly man. Serene, cheerful, utterly exempt from selfishness, pride, and vanity, tender yet manly in his sensibilities, confiding in his friendships, entertaining hopeful views of Divine Providence and the destiny of man, maintaining the purest and yet the most unelaborate piety—a piety that

appeared to believe and enjoy and do all things good, and yet to "be careful for nothing"—he seemed to combine the distinctive charms that endear to us the beautiful characters of Fenelon and Channing, Edwards and Fletcher of Madeley. His humility was profound, and surrounded him with an aureola of moral loveliness. It was not a burden of penance under which the soul heaved with self-cherished agony, still less was it a "voluntary humility"—an assumed, an affected self-abasement; but it seemed the spontaneous kindly and tender demeanour of his soul, it mingled with the cheerful play of his features, and gave a sweet suavity to his very tones. It was his rare moral character, more even than his intellectual eminence, that gave him such magic influence over other minds, and rendered him so successful in the government of literary institutions. All about him felt a sort of self-respect in respecting him; to offend him was a self-infliction which even the audacity of reckless youth could not brook.

Fisk lived for many years in the faith and exemplification of St. Paul's sublime doctrine of Christian perfection. He prized that great tenet as one of the most important distinctions of Christianity. His own experience respecting it was marked by signal circumstances, and from the day that he practically adopted it till he triumphed over death, its impress was radiant on his daily life. With John Wesley he deemed this important truth—promulgated, in any very express form, almost solely by Methodism in these days—to be one of the most solemn responsibilities of his Church, the most potent element in the experimental divinity of the Scriptures.* In his earlier religious history he had felt the influence of those temptations which have betrayed so many young men from our ministry into other communions, where better worldly auspices rather than better means of self-development or usefulness were to be found; but when he received the baptism of this great grace, his purified heart could not sufficiently utter its thankfulness that he had been

* Isaac Taylor, in his late work on Methodism, repels this doctrine as refuted by every man's consciousness. Knox, in a letter to Bishop Webb, says, "Their view of Christian perfection is, in my mind, so essentially right and important, that it is on this account particularly I value them above other denominations of that sort. I am aware that ignorant individuals expose what is in itself true by their unfounded pretensions and irrational descriptions; but with the sincerest disapproval of every such excess, I do esteem John Wesley's stand for holiness to be that which does immortal honour to his name." In John Wesley's views of Christian perfection are combined, in substance, all the sublime morality of the Greek fathers, the spirituality of the mystics, and the divine philosophy of our favourite Platonists. Macarius, Fenelon, Lucas, and all of their respective classes, have been consulted and digested by him, and his ideas are essentially theirs. *Thirty Years' Correspondence.* Letter XIX.

providentially kept within the pale of a Church which clearly taught this pre-eminent doctrine. This alone was a denominational distinction sufficiently important and sublime to be set off against any drawback that Methodism might present. In a letter to a brother clergyman, he expressed, with overflowing feelings, his renewed love of the Church. "I thank God," he said, "that I ever saw this day. I love our Church better than ever. How glad am I that I never left it." There are two periods at which a Methodist assuredly feels no regret for his connexion with the denomination—when he learns by experience what is the meaning of its instructions respecting Christian perfection, and when death dismisses him from its communion to the Church triumphant.

On the 22d of February, 1839, in the forty-eighth year of his age, Wilbur Fisk received that dismission. His chamber had been for days sanctified as it were by the glory of the Divine Presence, and his broken utterances were full of consolation, and triumph over death. "Glorious hope!" was the last and whispered expression of his religious feelings.

STEPHEN OLIN stands forth with commanding prominence and an imperial mien, among the princes of our Israel. A brief biographical and characteristic sketch of this truly great man was given in our October number; at the risk of repeating what was there said of him, and has within the last year been abundantly said elsewhere, we here introduce his name again. His omission from our present list would be unpardonable, for he was a shining light, a full orb—if not the most notable, yet the most intrinsically great man, take him "all in all," that American Methodism has produced. So manifest and commanding were his traits, that this pre-eminence can be awarded him without the slightest invidiousness.

His character—moral, social and intellectual—was, throughout, of the noblest style. In the first respect he was pre-eminent for the two chief virtues of true religion—charity, and humility. With thorough theological orthodoxy he combined a practical liberalism which we fear most orthodox polemics would pronounce dangerous. There was not an atom of bigotry in all the vast soul of this rare man. Meanwhile, it could be said of him as Rowland Hill said of Chalmers, "The most astonishing thing about him was his humility." He was the best example we have known of that childlike simplicity which Christ taught as essential to those who would enter the kingdom of heaven, and Bacon declared to be equally necessary to "those who would enter into the kingdom of knowledge." Like Fisk, he was a personal example of St. Paul's doctrine of "Christian

perfection" as expounded by Wesley. Respecting the Methodistic hypothesis of that doctrine he at first entertained doubts; but as he advanced in life, and especially under the chastening influence of affliction, it became developed in his own experience. "I sunk into it," he remarked to the writer, in substance. "My children, my wife, my health, my entire prospect on earth, all were gone—God only remained; I lost myself as it were in him, I was hid in him with Christ—and found, without any process of logic, but by an experimental demonstration, the 'perfect love that casteth out fear.'" He was never obtrusive in the avowal of this great truth, but ever ready to give, with all lowliness and meekness, a reason of the hope that was within him. The marvellous grace that imbued and, we were about to say, glorified his very greatness with unsurpassed humility, was owing, in a great measure, to his faith in this sublime idea of Christianity.

He had defects, unquestionably; but so far as they took a moral tendency, no effort of charity was requisite in order to attribute them to his continual physical infirmities. Some of our most interesting and precious personal recollections of him are connected with instances of such apparent defects. The virtues which accompanied them seemed rather to gain than lose by the contrast, as precious gems are beautified by their inferior settings.

His social character was beautiful. If he could not indulge the *persiflage*—the sheer inanities which inferior minds may deem the appropriate relaxation of social conversation—yet was he ever ready, for not merely the cheerful remark, but the exhilarating pleasantry: his familiar friends will never forget this charming trait. Nor were these buoyant intervals rare or brief. Frequently through a prolonged but always fitting conversation, would this play of sunshine illuminate his presence, and with it would intermix, congruously, often most felicitously, the radiant play of thought or the happy expression of Christian sensibility—never, however, the meaningless twaddle of weakness. A truer and more forbearing friend could not be found. His domestic affections were warm, and the circle of his family was a sanctuary full of hallowed sympathies and enjoyments.

It would require a more capable hand than ours to estimate his intellectual dimensions. His scholarship was, we think, more exact and thorough within his professional sphere, than varied or comprehensive beyond that limit. We speak of *scholarship* as distinguished from general information. At his graduation he was considered the "ripest scholar" who had been examined in his college. He was conservative in his views of classical education, and very decidedly

opposed to the "modernized" system of training attempted and abandoned at Harvard, and now experimenting at Brown University. A high and finished classical discipline was his ideal for the college over which he presided; and that institution has sent out, under his superintendence, as thorough students as have honoured the education of the land.

While he was a genuine scholar within his appropriate sphere, he possessed also a large range of general intelligence, though, as we have said, without that devotion to any favourite department of extra-professional knowledge, which often relieves and adorns the professional life of studious men by becoming a healthful and liberalizing counterpart to their stated routines of thought. We are not aware that he was addicted to the national literature of any one modern people, to the speculative philosophies which with so much fallacy have also developed so much mental vigour and splendour in the continental intellect of Europe, or to any one department of the elegant literature of our own language. We know not that he had more than a casual acquaintance with these, derived mostly from Reviews. With the current history of the world in politics, science, and especially religion, he had, however, more than the usual familiarity; a remarkable memory, tenacious of even statistics and names, doubtless gave him in this respect an advantage over most intellectual men.

The *original* powers of his mind were, however, his great distinction. And these, like his person, were all colossal—grasp, strength, with the dignity which usually attends it, a comprehensive faculty of generalization, which felt independent of details, but presented in overwhelming logic grand summaries of thought. This comprehensiveness, combined with energy of thought, was the chief mental characteristic of the man; under the inspiration of the pulpit it often and indeed usually became sublime, we were about to say godlike. We doubt whether any man of our generation has had more power in the pulpit than Stephen Olin; and this power was in spite of very marked oratorical defects. His manner was ungainly; his gestures quite against the elocutionary rules; his voice badly managed, and sometimes painful in its heaving utterances; but the elocutionist is not always the orator. While you saw that there was no trickery of art about Dr. Olin, you felt that a mighty, a resistless mind was struggling with yours. You were overwhelmed—your reason with argument, your heart with emotion.

When he began his discourse, your attention was immediately arrested by the dignity and sterling sense of his remarks. You perceived at once that something well worth your most careful attention

was coming. Paragraph after paragraph of massive thought was thrown off, each showing a gradually increasing glow of the sensibility as well as the mental force of the speaker. By the time he had fairly entered into the argument of the sermon, you were led captive by his power; but it would be difficult to say which most effectually subdued you, his mighty thoughts or his deep feeling. You seldom or never saw tears in his own eyes, but they flowed freely down the cheeks of his hearers. Ever and anon passages of overwhelming force were uttered, before which the whole assembly seemed to bow, not so much in admiration of the man, as in homage to the mighty truth. Such passages were usually not poetic, for he was remarkably chary of his imagery; but they were ponderous with thought—they were often stupendous conceptions, such as you would imagine a Sanhedrim of archangels might listen to uncovered of their golden crowns.

At suitable periods of the sermon, which usually occupied from an hour and a half to two hours, he would pause briefly to relieve his voice and his feelings. The mental tension of his audience could be perceived, at such times, by the general relaxation of posture, and the simultaneous, heaving respiration; but as soon as, with a peculiar, measured dignity, he resumed the lofty theme, all eyes were again fixed, all minds again absorbed.

Effective as was his preaching usually, it was not always so. His ill health sometimes spread a languor over his spirit which no resolution could throw off. We have recorded, on another occasion, an instance, which furnishes to our clerical readers too good a lesson to be omitted here. We spent a Sunday evening with him after he had failed, as he thought, in a sermon during the day. He referred to it with much good nature, and remarked that his history as a preacher had taught him to expect the blessing of God on even such efforts. He proceeded to relate an instance which occurred during his ministry in South Carolina. He preached at a camp-meeting where a Presbyterian clergyman, who was to address the next session of his synod in Charleston, heard him. The Presbyterian doctor repeated not only the text, but, substantially, the sermon before his clerical brethren, giving, however, full credit to its Methodist author. So remarkable a fact could not fail to excite great interest among the people of Charleston to hear the latter.

He at this time occupied the Methodist pulpit of that city, and the next Sunday evening his chapel was crowded with the elite of the community, including several clergymen. He preached long, and, as he thought, loudly and confusedly; in fine, he felt, at the close of the discourse, confounded with mortification. He sank, after the

benediction, into the pulpit, to conceal himself from view, till the assembly should be all gone. By-and-by he espied some eminent individuals apparently waiting in the aisle to salute him. His heart failed. Noticing a door adjacent to the pulpit he determined to escape by it. He knew not whither it led, but supposed it communicated with the next house, which had once been a parsonage, as he recollects having heard. He hastened to the door, got it open, and, stepping out, descended abruptly into a grave-yard, which extended beyond and behind the former parsonage. The night was very dark, and he stumbled about among the tombs for some time. He reached at last the wall which closed the cemetery in from the street, but found it insurmountable. Groping his way to the opposite side, he sought to reach a back street by penetrating through one of the gardens which belonged to a range of houses there. It was an awkward endeavour in the darkness, and among the graves; but at last he found a wicket-gate. He had no sooner passed through it than he was assailed by a house-dog. Having prevailed in this encounter, he pushed on and reached the street, with some very reasonable apprehensions that the neighbourhood would be alarmed by his adventures. He now threaded his way through an indirect route to his lodgings, passed unceremoniously to his chamber, and shut himself up for the night, but slept little or none, reflecting with deep chagrin on the strange conclusion of the day. On the morrow he hardly dared to venture out; but while yet in his study Mr. —, one of the first citizens in Charleston, and a leading officer in a sister denomination, called at the house; he was admitted to the preacher's study with reluctance; but what was the astonishment of the latter to hear him say that the sermon of the preceding evening had enabled him to step into the kingdom of God, after many years of disconsolate endeavours, during which he had been a member of the Church. The same day a lady of influential family came to report the same good tidings. Other similar examples occurred that morning; and this failure was one of the most useful sermons of his ministry.

His style was somewhat diffuse and always elaborate, too much so for elegance. Johnson used to insist that his own pompous Latinism was an effect of the magnitude of his thoughts; its fantastic collocation, even in the definitions of his dictionary, stand out, however, inexorably and grotesquely against the fond conceit; the critics pronounce his verbiage a result of his early study of Sir Thomas Browne. False, in part, as was the great author's apology, it was also, in part, true. He had a magnitude, and Roman-like sturdiness of thought, which demanded capacious expression, though the demand was exaggerated, and thus became a characteristic fault, as

well as a characteristic excellence. Dr. Olin's style was affected by a similar cause, but not to such a faulty extent. The defect was perceptible in his ordinary conversation, and quite so in his extemporaneous sermons. In some of his later writings, however, like Johnson in his *Lives of the Poets*, he seemed to escape the excesses while he retained the excellencies of his style.

Dr. Olin was gigantic in person. His chest would have befitted a Hercules; his head was one of those which suggest to us superhuman capacity, and by which the classic sculptors symbolized the majesty of their gods. Though of a very different craniological development, it could not have been less capacious than that of the noted American premier; and, crowning a much more lofty frame, must have presented, with vigorous health, a more commanding indication. His gigantic structure was, however, during most of his life, smitten through and through with disease and enervation. The colossal head seemed too heavy to be supported, and appeared to labour to poise itself. The eye, somewhat sunken in its large socket, presented a languid expression, though relieved by a sort of religious benignity which often beamed with feeling.

This great man must be added to the long and melancholy catalogue of self-martyred students. His infirmities commenced in his college life; they were exasperated by his labours as an instructor in a Southern climate; and were the burden of his later years, almost to the exclusion of any continuous labours. During these years his usefulness was confined mostly to occasional discourses, most of which have been published; to the quiet but inestimable moral power which the mere official presence of such a man cannot fail to exert over any responsibility to which he is related; and last, but not least, to the ministration of example under circumstances of suffering and personal religious development.

He was frankly independent in his opinions, and not without what would be called strong prejudices—no uncommon accompaniment of powerful minds. He was decidedly conservative on most subjects, though early inclined to political liberalism. On the rife question of slavery he shared not the strong moral sentiment of the North, yet he lamented the institution as calamitous. The Fugitive Slave Law he deplored as a necessary evil, and was favourable to its enforcement. He inclined to stringent institutions of government in both Church and State, but at the same time deemed our own Church polity susceptible of many liberal improvements, in order to adapt it to what he considered the demands of the times. He wished to see the period of our ministerial appointments prolonged. He was especially interested in the intellectual improvement of our

ministry, and was one of the warmest friends of theological education among us; before a theological school was begun in the Church he wrote home from London, where he witnessed the experiment among the Wesleyans, a public letter, urging the subject upon the attention of the Church, and enclosing a considerable donation towards it. He believed this, indeed, to be the capital want of Methodism in our day, and never disguised the conviction amidst any prejudice to the contrary. He entertained sublime views of our missionary resources, and longed and laboured to see its energies amply brought out and applied to this great work, especially in the foreign field. The evangelization of the world he deemed an achievement quite practicable at this day to Protestant Christendom. Some of his discourses on the subject were signal efforts of intellect and eloquence. One of the best papers which it has been our privilege to give in these columns from his pen was on missions.

On the night of the 15th of August, 1851, it was our mournful privilege to stand in a small and silent circle by the death-bed of this good and great man. The Herculean frame lay helpless and heaving in the last struggle. "I hope in Christ," (pointing with his finger upward;) "most certainly, in Christ alone. I believe I shall be saved, though as by fire," were among the last utterances of the dying sufferer. Early the next morning he was no more among men.

Five of the most notable men of our denominational pulpit have thus passed in review before us—two of foreign, three of native birth. Others might be selected from the dead, and there are among the living those who will take rank with such as we have recorded.

We have endeavoured to render each sketch suggestive of its appropriate lessons, and need not prolong our article by very minute comparative remarks. Olin was unquestionably the greatest, but Fisk the most perfect man in the series. The former had both the largest and strongest intellectual grasp, the latter more versatility and practical skill. Olin had the highest, the philosophical genius; and if his health had allowed him a productive life, he would have taken rank where by the title of his genius he really belonged—among the first men of his day: Fisk had talent and tact rather than genius; he was the practical though not the technical logician in both speculation and in life. Olin had very little of the detail of practical logic, but in him the higher logic, the faculty of generalization, was predominant; it gave grandeur to his habitual conceptions, though it could not take those minute cognizances of events or truths which afforded Fisk an habitual mastery over any position in which he found himself placed, and gave more perfect proportions to the

development of his character. Cookman had neither the philosophic comprehensiveness of the one nor the practical skill of the other, but more mental alertness and energy than either. Olin could have best planned the destinies of a state; Fisk could have planned best the movements of its army; Cookman could have best executed those movements. Cookman had much of Bascom's imagination. His nature was too hardy, too Saxon, to admit of any resemblance to Summerfield. His allegorical skill was all his own. Summerfield's position in the group hardly admits of comparison. He had none of Olin's intellectual breadth, little of Fisk's tactical skill, not much more of Cookman's energetic vivacity, or of Bascom's imagination. His distinction was almost entirely one of temperament, a temperament to which was subordinated, in the happiest manner possible, all his powers of intellect and of expression. His soul was not in his head, but in his heart, if we may so speak. Never was the power of a public speaker more pure, more anomalous. It was not the power of logic proceeding from the intellect, it was not poetic power proceeding from the imagination, nor did it flow from the passions; it was a moral magnetism, a gentle suasive effluence from the inmost life of the man. His biographer, though he claims for him justly a second-rate kind of "genius," declares the "predominating" qualities of his mind to have been "*good sense and good taste.*" Undoubtedly this was the case; but these qualities do not solve the problem of his power. There are thousands of men who have "*good sense and good taste,*" but who have no such power. It proceeded, we repeat, from the peculiar and sanctified temperament of the man, his "*intense animal feeling,*" as Montgomery somewhat equivocally calls it, and his "*good sense and good taste*" were but its regulators.

In dismissing these estimates we claim for them only the credit due to disinterested honesty. A better proof of their fidelity can hardly be given than the fact that they will be unsatisfactory to men of extreme prejudices for or against the characters sketched.

FOURTH SERIES, VOL. IV.—29

ART. VI.—M'COSH ON THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT.

The Method of the Divine Government, Physical and Moral. By Rev. JAMES M'COSH. New-York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 1851. Pp. 510, 8vo.

NEVER have we felt a more intense desire to get hold of any book, than that which stands at the head of the present article. Several causes conspired to work in us this vehement desire. In the first place, the subject of which it treats, though interesting to but few laymen, possesses for our minds the greatest of all conceivable charms. Besides the intrinsic grandeur of the subject,—involving, as it does, every great question pertaining to the nature and destiny of man,—the fact that many of the most vigorous years of our life have been earnestly devoted to the consideration of it, has given it an additional value in our eyes, as well as an increased power of fascination over our hearts. Secondly, from the reviews we had seen of the book, we expected to find in it the results of original, independent, profound thinking, and not the mere repetition of repetitions, as is too often the case with works on the divine government. Weary of reading books on such a subject, which, to borrow from old Burton, authors had made not otherwise than apothecaries make medicines—namely, by pouring them out of one bottle into another—we hoped to regale ourselves with something as fresh and racy, as it was just and profound. Coming, as it was said to do, from one who had equalled the giant intellects of the past,—a Butler, a Cudworth, and a King,—in sounding the depths, and solving the mysteries of the universe, we were prepared to hail the work with delight, and to revel in it as in a paradise of thought. In the third place, we had written a book on the same subject ourselves, (still in manuscript;) and hence the desire to compare our own views with those of an author who had shot up into so great and so sudden a reputation, may be more easily conceived than expressed. We made haste to get the book, we devoured it with avidity, and we formed our judgment of its merits. This judgment we now propose to lay before the reader.

We do not mean our judgment of its merits in all respects. The excellence and beauty of the style, though these are unquestionably very great, are scarcely worthy of serious consideration in a work of this nature. They form a relative, not an absolute, perfection; they may seduce into error, as well as illuminate and adorn the pathway to truth. Supposing the work to be sound, supposing it to present correct views of the divine government, still we can entertain

no doubt, that the secret of its success is to be found in the elevation and beauty of its style. For such is the littleness and weakness of the human mind, that it busies itself about almost anything rather than with the transcendent glories of the divine government. Indeed, it will hardly look into these at all, unless it be led on and beguiled by "the concord of sweet sounds," or drawn forward by the powerful fascination of poetical imagery. But serviceable as these things have no doubt been to the author, we shall pass them over in silence. The only image in the book which shall engage our attention, is the image which it presents of the divine government, and the glory of God therein reflected. Its great merit, if any it have, must here be found; and here accordingly we shall seek it.

The author proposes to set before us the divine government, not in detached parts and parcels merely, but as one entire, connected, and harmonious scheme. This is very well. Indeed, nothing short of this could meet the fundamental wants of the human mind. If we would understand any complex thing, we must examine, not only the parts of which it is composed, but also all the relations which they sustain to each other, as well as to the design of the whole. We may be perfectly acquainted, for example, with the materials, the form and structure, of every wheel and chain and spring of a watch; and yet remain wholly ignorant of the nature of a watch. To grasp this idea we must go farther, and determine how all the parts of a watch stand related to each other, and how they all jointly and harmoniously co-operate to accomplish its final result—the admeasurement of time. The same is true of every other complex thing or system, of every other work of skill. It is true of the earth, of the solar system, of the entire material globe, including all the stars of heaven. It is also true of the individual man, of society, and of the entire spiritual universe.

This idea, which we find in Butler, is very happily and variously illustrated by Mr. M'Cosh. He is about to apply it to the magnificent arrangements of the divine government. Tremendous task! Yet arduous as it is, he certainly possesses one qualification for its accomplishment; for he is deeply impressed with the sublime unity of the Cosmos, the beautiful harmony of the world, the divine concourse of all things in the one grand unutterable purpose of Almighty Love. But this impression, even when most deep and earnest, must first exist as a blind instinct, or as a dark feeling but half-illuminated, before it can unfold itself, like the leaves of a flower, to the sweet dawnings of the great outer universal day, which, as yet, has fallen but in broken and refracted streams of glory upon this lower world. We must first see through a glass darkly, before we can see face to

face; we must first walk by faith, before we can be admitted to the bright vision; and hence, we must first be haunted with the dim shadows of the mighty world, flitting on all sides around us, ere we can behold the infinite unclouded splendours of that image of himself, which was by God originally stamped upon the created universe. How far this sense, this instinct, this feeling, this faith,—call it what you please,—has unfolded itself in the mind of our author, and become a steady light to reflect an image of the divine glory, we shall now proceed to examine. We shall mark, if possible, the precise point of development it has reached, and determine how far, if at all, he has left other ethical writers and philosophers behind him. In one word, we shall endeavour to determine how far, and in what respects, he has cast the clear light of reason into the depths and mysteries of the world, beyond the points at which others have left us to walk by faith, and not by sight.

The author insists, that the most perfect unity and harmony pervade the entire world of God, and its government. If this be so, (and we most cheerfully concede it,) then just in proportion as any philosophy truly and adequately represents the world, as constituted and governed by God, will it also possess a corresponding unity and harmony in itself; and, on the other hand, just in proportion as it is disfigured by incongruities and contradictions will it be unfit to represent the divine constitution and government of the world. A philosophy of “the divine government” approaches to perfection, just in proportion as it exhibits the principles of the internal make and constitution of the world in their true lights and just proportions, and in relation to the grand end towards which they are, by their mutual interworking, continually conducting the stupendous scheme of all things. A philosophy which should set things before us truly, and in a clear light, would constitute the very perfection of human thought, the final result of human investigation, the glorious transfiguration of human knowledge. Let us now see whether Mr. McCosh has marched boldly, and steadily, and triumphantly along the line of such a philosophy, or whether he has not occasionally halted and hobbled by the way.

The first point to be settled, is the end for which the world was created. If we fix the end wrong, everything will be seen amiss, and nothing fully comprehended. To a mind possessed with the notion that a watch is designed to measure the temperature of the atmosphere, it would be utterly impossible to render its mechanism intelligible. In like manner, if we entertain a wrong view respecting the final cause or end of the world, all its arrangements must needs seem to be out of joint, and all our efforts to comprehend the wonderful

harmony pervading them, must prove utterly abortive. Now in regard to this first and all-important point, we are happy to be able to agree with our author. In this respect we do not entertain a doubt, that he stands upon higher and better ground than that occupied by most of those who have undertaken to grapple with the mysteries of the universe. Indeed, the attempts of Archbishop King, of Leibnitz, and of Edwards, to solve the stupendous problem of evil, were destined, we have long believed, to prove failures, from the fact that they had misconceived, or else occasionally lost sight of, the final cause or end of man's creation.

The final cause of man's creation may be viewed in relation to God, in relation to the universe, or in relation to man. Now it is in relation to man himself, that we consider this final cause or end of his creation, when we say it has been so often misconceived. According to Archbishop King, the happiness of man is the final cause or end of his creation. "Man was created," says he, "in order that he might be crowned with supremest joy and blessedness." If so, why is he not happy? Why this frightful flood of evils, which overflows all, and overwhelms so many in hopeless and eternal misery? Has God missed of his object? Has his eternal and most beneficent purpose been frustrated? These are questions, to which the philosophy of Archbishop King returns no satisfactory answer. It leaves us precisely where it found us, to walk by faith and not by sight.

He tells us, it is true, that such are the inexorable necessities arising from the nature of matter, that God could not make all men happy.* But this is not so clear. After all he has said in favour of this position, which is as old as philosophy itself, its truth seems more than questionable. The creation of beings possessed of bodily organs, who should be susceptible of pleasure, and yet forever free from pain, implies no contradiction; and consequently such beings might have been produced by the infinite wisdom and power of God, and placed above the reach of all pain and suffering. The old plea about the refractory nature of matter brings no light and satisfaction to our minds. It brought no light and satisfaction to such minds as Reid, and Stewart, and Butler, and Kant, and others almost without number; all of whom, though perfectly aware of that plea, have pronounced the great problem of evil to be still involved in unsearchable clouds and darkness.

Nor has Leibnitz met with better success. The argument of Bayle, against which he broke a lance, remained as firm and unshaken as if it had been touched by a child merely, and not assailed by a giant. If God were infinite in power and goodness, says Bayle,

* King's *Origin of Evil*; preface 4, 6.

he would be both able and willing to prevent sin,—then sin would have been prevented. Sin exists, however; and hence God must have been either unable or unwilling to prevent its existence. If unable, his power is limited; and if unwilling, his holiness is not infinite. To this argument, which has, in all ages, been the great stronghold of atheism, Leibnitz has not, we say, made a satisfactory reply.

He admits that God could very easily cause virtue to exist in the breast of a moral agent, considered as an individual; but if we take into consideration the whole universe, God could not prevent all sin, and cause virtue to reign everywhere, without doing more harm than good. Hence his very goodness determined him to permit the existence of sin. This is the doctrine which is repeatedly set forth in his great work, the *Essais de Theodicée*.

But how can this doctrine be made out? The contrary seems very clear. If God should make me perfectly holy, and consequently perfectly happy, this would clearly be for my good. If he should do the same thing for another individual, it would as clearly be for his good; and so on *ad infinitum*. Now, how such a proceeding could be for the good of each and every individual moral agent in the universe, and yet not for the good of the whole, is more than we are able to conceive. On the contrary, we must believe, that what is for the good of each and every part must be for the good of the whole. We say, then, that God does not permit sin because, on the whole, it is for the good of his creatures it should be permitted. Holiness is everywhere, and in all cases, better for them than sin.

The doctrine of Leibnitz subordinates holiness to happiness, the higher good to the lower. It represents God as setting a less value upon the holiness than upon the happiness of his creatures. He permits sin, according to Leibnitz, to raise its hideous head in his dominions, that he may bring good out of it. What good? Moral good? This, it is conceded, might be secured by the omnipotence of God. Why, then, permit the unholy thing in order to attain an end, which might be attained without it? Is it natural good? This must be the meaning; for the author could scarcely intend, that God does not shut all moral evil out of the world for fear of introducing a greater moral evil. No; he permits sin, because its prevention would not conduce to the highest good, or happiness, of his creatures. This, we repeat, is to subordinate holiness to happiness, the higher to the lower good, and to turn the moral world upside down.

There is a still more frightful subordination of virtue to pleasure, of holiness to happiness, in the scheme of President Edwards. According to his scheme God not only permits sin, he actually chooses sin, and brings it to pass, with a view to the good of his creatures!

What good is it, we ask, which, according to the philosophy of Edwards, God cannot produce by other means, that he must have recourse to the sins of his creatures in order to accomplish his purposes? We can conceive of no such good. It is certainly neither the holiness, nor the happiness, of the created universe; for these, we are assured by Edwards himself, God can cause to exist whenever and to whatever extent he pleases. What other good is there then, higher and greater, than the perfect holiness and happiness of each and every moral agent in the universe, which God has in view, and the pursuit of which is to justify the introduction of moral evil into the economy of the world? To our weak faculties, to our human modes of conception, the very existence of such a good seems an utter impossibility. If it exist at all, or can exist, we must believe it on the mere assertion of the philosopher in opposition to the dictates of our own reason; and if we believe the pursuit of this unimaginable good to be the motive which induces God to permit sin, or bring it to pass, we must again sacrifice the clearest convictions of our own minds to mere human authority. But were it not better to begin and end by simply reposing our faith in God, than to make so great a display of philosophy, and attempts at explanation, and then conclude by resting our belief on the authority of man?

The views of King, and Leibnitz, and Edwards all proceed on the greatest-happiness principle. They exalt happiness to the high position of the *end*, and sink holiness to the subordinate rank of *a means*. Nay, they place holiness side by side with sin, as a means of the highest good. Not so Mr. M'Cosh. In his opinion, as well as in our own, a likeness to God, who is "glorious in holiness," is the end of man's creation, and should be the aim of all his endeavours; while happiness occupies the subordinate rank of *a means*. Happiness is attached to virtue, in order that men may become good; virtue is not enjoined in order that men may be happy. This constitutes one difference between the philosophy of our author and that of most others who have undertaken to justify the ways of God to man. "So far as Dr. Brown," says he, "conceives that, in the infliction of suffering, God has reference to the encouragement of virtue and the discouragement of vice, his views are clear, and solid, and consistent. He has discovered that there is a greater evil than mere pain, and a greater good than mere pleasure; and that the pain which exists in the world, cannot be explained, except in its relation to the greater good and the greater evil. Instead of the "greatest-happiness" principle, he might have seen what we may call the "greatest-morality" principle; and the idea, if prosecuted, would have conducted him

to a firm resting-place, from which he might have contemplated the full character of God, and his dealings towards a world, which would have been seen by him as fallen. But when the grand reconciling truth was just dawning upon his mind, he turns to another truth which has but sufficient importance to distract his attention.*

The production of the greatest possible amount of holiness is, then, the first great end for which God created, and still governs, the world. Such is the position of the author, and in this position we heartily concur with him. But let us see how he prosecutes this idea, so as to find a firm resting-place. Let us see if he has really made such a use of this "grand reconciling truth," as to bring the phenomena of the moral world into an agreement with the perfections of God, or even to harmonize one portion of his system with another?

If God aims at the production of the greatest possible holiness, why does sin exist? If such be the purpose of the Almighty, why is not holiness everywhere seen? why is sin permitted to reign, and to mar the glory of the divine purpose? In regard to this question, at which so many centuries have laboured in vain, the author does not carry us one inch beyond the speculations of a Leibnitz, or an Edwards, or a King. Indeed, his views are more vague, more unsettled, more vacillating, and more contradictory, than are those of any of his distinguished predecessors. Here the "grand reconciling truth" is of no use to him. He finds no resting-place, but wanders up and down amid shadows as dark as night, and contradictions as clear as noon-day.

When he grapples with the difficulty, he gives us the solution of Archbishop King, which has been a thousand times repeated, that "a condition of things, in which such disobedience was impossible, may presuppose either that no freedom of the will has been given, or that it is being interfered with." P. 78. Having presented his views of the origin of evil, he concludes, that "there is nothing unreasonable in the idea that there may be a fallen world somewhere." He ceases to wonder, at least for the moment, that sin should exist; and finds that a fallen world is, after all, a thing which might be very reasonably expected to present itself somewhere in the dominions of God. But this removal of his wonder is not permanent. It seems to have been charmed away by the force of words, rather than solved by the application of principles. Hence it returns upon him in all its power, and we hear him declare: "Let the problem be: given a God of infinite power and wisdom, to determine the character of the world which he would fashion, and man's solution

* Book i, chap. ii, sec. 2.

would present a very different world from the actual one. True, the problem is confessedly of too high an order for human intellect to solve it correctly; *but every approximation which he makes, only impresses him the more with wonder, awe, and fear, when he compares the results at which he arrives with the actual results, as we must believe them*, of heavenly intelligence and love, in the existing world in which we are placed." P. 36. Thus he comes, along with Archbishop King, to a conclusion, which he declares so exactly corresponds with the actual condition of this world, that we should cease to wonder; and yet he as confidently asserts, that every result at which the human mind can arrive, when compared with the actual result, only impresses it the more with wonder, awe, and fear!

We have long been accustomed to suppose that the great difficulty pertaining to the moral government of the world, arises from the existence of sin rather than the existence of pain. Our author is on both sides of this question. In the first place, he is decidedly of the opinion that the great and almost only difficulty arises from the existence of sin. "There may be a difference of opinion," says he, "as to whether a satisfactory explanation can be given of the origin of evil, or whether there can be any other than the one already hinted at; but moral evil being supposed to exist, it is of the last importance to show that the other apparent evils flow from it. After the permission of sin, says Leibnitz, is justified, the other *evil in its train presents no difficulty*, and we are now entitled to resort to the evil of sin, to give a reason for the evil of pain. Moral evil being presupposed, it may now be shown that physical evil in no way reflects on the character of God." Pp. 80, 81. This is his opinion on one side.

Here it is on the other: "Two evils exist in the world; the one physical, and the other moral—the evil of pain and the evil of sin The existence of these two evils forms the grand mystery of the universe; nor have all the ingenious theories which have been constructed, been successful in removing the difficulties which press upon the subject. Of these two evils, physical evil is the one which seems to bear hardest against the divine government. Not that it is the worst of the two, but it is the one with which God has the most immediate concern. The blame of the moral evil may undoubtedly be cast on the individual who commits it. To deny this, were to deny the possibility of free-agency and responsibility on the part of the creature. It is surely possible for God to give free-agency to an intelligent creature, and such a free-agency as implies accountability; and the creature, when so endowed, cannot throw the blame of the sin he commits upon another. But the infliction

of pain proceeds directly from God ; and the blame of it, if blame there be, must lie upon him. He who would justify the ways of God to man, must be careful to defend the divine government at the point at which suffering is inflicted." P. 269. Now we are to believe, first, that the evil of sin is the great problem to be solved ; and if we can only account for the existence of this, the other evil will present "no difficulty." We are to believe, in the second place, that the difficulty arising from the existence of pain, is far greater than the other ! We are to believe, not only that the difficulty arising from the existence of sin has never been clearly or satisfactorily solved, that it has never ceased to baffle the human intellect, but also that it may be, and has been, brushed away by a few bold dashes of the author's pen ; while the "no difficulty" still remains the grand difficulty, toward which all who would justify the ways of God to man should direct their exertions ! Is it not beginning to become apparent, that if we would follow the author very closely, we must walk by faith, and not by sight ?

These are not all the inconsistencies into which the author falls, in relation to the subject of evil. The attempt of Dr. Thomas Brown to explain the existence of natural evil, by showing the good effects which result from opposing one evil to another, is clearly refuted by Mr. M'Cosh. Indeed, when the question is, Why does God permit any pain or natural evil to afflict mankind ? it is absurd to answer, that one evil is necessary to counteract another. Why is not all evil excluded ? If we answer this question by saying, that one evil is very useful to prevent the bad consequences of another, we certainly talk at random, and very wide of the mark. Mr. M'Cosh could see this in regard to natural evils, and he triumphantly explodes the attempts of Dr. Brown to explain or justify their existence. Yet this is precisely the course which he himself adopts to explain the existence of moral evils. Vanity and ambition, envy and evil-speaking, says he, are often attended with good consequences. Nay, in an evil world like this, all the malignant passions, all the evil principles of our nature, subserve wise and beneficent purposes.* All this may be very true ; but what does it signify, when it is admitted that "these passions would be unmixed evils in a world where sin was otherwise unknown ?"† If no sin existed, there would be no need of "principles that are evil" to counteract it. To this reasoning about moral evils, we may then apply his own language in regard to Dr. Brown's views of natural evils. "Acknowledging, as all must," says he, "that there are incidental advantages arising from the existence of suffering in the present dispensation of things,

° Book iii, chap. iii, sec. 3.

† Ibid.

there is the other problem starting to view, Why is there such a constitution of things? Why the need of one evil to counteract another? It is the existence of so many evils that is the grand mystery in the world; and it is not cleared up by showing that one evil is incidentally or intentionally the prevention of another." P. 39. It is a pity, that these very sensible and just remarks did not occur to the author, in relation to his own views of the existence of moral evils, as well as in relation to Dr. Brown's vindication of the permission of natural evils.

The truth is, that the philosophy of Mr. M'Cosh leaves him afloat upon a dark sea, over which he is driven and tossed about by various contending winds of doctrine. Now he sees an unsteady and flickering light in one direction, now in another; and hastily pursuing these, he follows no determinate course, but is seen veering in all directions. One wonders how it is possible that such a mind can, on such subjects, so often abandon itself to mere conjectures, when a few severe self-questionings might easily suffice to demonstrate that they partake more of the wildness and incoherency of dreams, than of the sublime unity and harmony of the actual world. Only listen to him for a moment. "It might be interesting to know," says he, "what are the means which God employs in the government of those worlds in which there is no taint of evil. Can we be wrong in concluding that the main instrument, whatever may be the subsidiary ones, is a grand internal principle by which the creature is swayed—being an imperative sense of duty, and the love of God reigning in the soul and subordinating all things to itself? This, we must believe, is the bond, stronger than the gravitation drawing the planets to the sun, which holds the pure intelligences in their spheres, and joins them to the grand centre of all wisdom and life." Now, the appalling fact set forth in the very next sentence, should have cured him of the pleasant dream.

"But whatever may be the means which God employs in the government of other intelligences," says he, "it is obvious, even at the first glance, and further inquiry deepens the conviction, that this is not the way in which he rules the world in which we dwell." Now if such be the very perfection of a moral government for other worlds, why has it not been also adopted for our world? Has God forsaken the inhabitants of the earth, or designedly adopted an imperfect mode of government for them? If so, the author should have essayed to give us, not "the method," but the *methods*, of the divine government. He should have told us, that there is a perfect and all-glorious moral government for other worlds, but an imperfect and inglorious government for this; indeed, this is precisely

the thing which he has told us in effect. In conclusion, if "we must believe" that God sways the pure intelligences of other worlds in the manner described by our author, why should not those pure intelligences also feel constrained to believe, that such is the method according to which the same wisdom and love governs our world? Such a conjecture would evidently be as valid as that of the author; and yet it would be most clearly a dream.

We are told in another place, as we have seen, that God does not thus absolutely sway us to obedience and love, because it would interfere with our free-agency. Pp. 77, 78. Why, then, should not the same mighty, irresistible swaying be excluded from other worlds as well as from this, because it would interfere with the free-agency of their moral and accountable inhabitants? We can see no unity of principle, no harmony, in the philosophy of Mr. McCosh; we trust that there is a greater unity, and a more glorious harmony, in the great world whose image he has undertaken to set before us.

In regard to that *questio vexatissima*—liberty and necessity—no two persons in the whole history of philosophy, are more clearly and unequivocally on the different sides of it, than is the author under consideration. He is as rigid a necessitarian as Hobbes, and as staunch a libertarian as Clarke. Edwards does not surpass him, in fixing every act of the will beneath the stern dominion of producing causes; Coleridge goes not before him, in denying the influence of motives, and asserting the self-determining power of the will. It may seem strange, that any author, and especially that one of so great a reputation, should be so clearly and so strongly on both sides of the question; but, strange as it may seem, the fact may be easily established by a reference to his writings.

First, he is a rigid necessitarian. "It is, we hold, with all philosophers who have deeply studied this subject, a fundamental principle of our very constitution, which leads us upon the occurrence of any given event, to say it has a cause. And this principle leads us upon the occurrence of a phenomenon to look for something producing it, whether the phenomenon be material or mental." This principle which leads us, on the appearance of any phenomenon, to look out for a *cause producing* it, he proceeds to apply to the thoughts and feelings, "the wishes and volitions," of the human mind. P. 281. The author's notion of causation is very different from that of Hume and Brown, which he expressly combats. By cause, he means that which operates to produce its effect. All the acts of the will, then, are produced by the operation of causes. "We are led by an intuition of our nature," says he, "to a belief in the invariable connexion between cause and effect; and we see numerous

proofs of this law of cause and effect reigning in the human mind as it does in the external world, and reigning in the will as it does in every other department of the mind." Pp. 286, 287. Here, as well as in various other places, we are plainly told that the same law which reigns in the material world, and constitutes the fixed mechanism of nature, also reigns in the human will, and produces all its volitions. There is nothing in Hobbes, nor Kames, nor Crombie, nor Collins, nor Spinoza, which more strongly asserts the most rigid scheme of necessity in regard to human volitions, than does the above language of our author. Accordingly we may, without the least injustice, rank him with the stern defenders of that iron scheme of destiny.

Secondly, he is a staunch libertarian. "True necessitarians," says he, "should learn in what way to hold and defend their doctrine. Let them disencumber themselves of all that doubtful argument derived from man being supposed to be swayed by the most powerful motive." P. 294. "Nor have necessitarians," says he, "even of the highest order, been sufficiently careful to guard the language employed by them. Afraid of making admissions to their opponents, we believe that none of them have fully developed the phenomena of human spontaneity. Even Edwards ridicules the idea of the faculty or power of will, or the soul, in the use of that power determining its own volitions. Now we hold it to be an incontrovertible fact, and one of great importance, that the true determining cause of every given volition, is not any mere anterior incitement, but the very soul itself, by its inherent power of will." Pp. 293, 294. Again, he does not take the assumption of Edwards, that motives sway the will. "The truth is," says he, "it is not the motive, properly speaking, that determines the working of the will; but it is the will that imparts the strength to the motive. As Coleridge says, 'It is the man that makes the motive, and not the motive the man.'" P. 280.

One more extract on this side of the question, and we are done:—

"We rejoice to recognise such a being in man. We trust that we are cherishing no presumptuous feeling, when we believe him to be as free as his Maker is free. We believe him, morally speaking, to be as independent of external control as his Creator must ever be; as that Creator was, when in a past eternity there was no external existence to control him."

Now, no advocate of the freedom of the human will, of its self-determining power, has ever gone beyond this, even in the moment of his greatest enthusiasm. Hence, we may safely rank Mr. M'Cosh among the warmest supporters of the freedom of the human will, and of its freedom in precisely that form which has always proved

the most obnoxious to other necessitarians. He fights under the banner of Hobbes, and Collins, and Edwards, as well as under that of Clarke, and Reid, and Coleridge.

Such inconsistencies seem the more incredible, because they proceed from one who aspires to exhibit, in his philosophy, a representation of the great harmonious system of the world itself. We naturally suppose that these things, which appear so repugnant to other philosophers, must be joined together and harmonized in his mind, by some secret link, of whose existence we have not been informed. We should certainly endeavour to search out and find this secret bond of union, if we were not happily relieved from the labour by the author himself. "We can produce the separate proofs of the two separate truths advocated by us," says he, in relation to the law of cause and effect, and the freedom of the will. "Should it be demanded of us to reconcile them, we answer, that we are not bound to offer a positive reconciliation of them. We point to the two objects; but we are not bound to show what is the link that connects them." Now, if the author himself is not bound to reconcile his own doctrines, we certainly may be excused from any such attempt. We are, indeed, glad that we are not bound to reconcile them; that we are not bound to show how the will can be "self-active," and yet have all its acts produced by the operation of causes; or how it can be under the same law which constitutes the mechanism of nature, and yet be as free as the unmoved Mover of the heavens and the earth, above and beyond whose almighty power there is, and can be, no controlling cause.

But, in our opinion, the author *is* bound to answer the demand for a reconciliation of his doctrines. If he had merely undertaken to give us "separate truths," in detached parcels, and not a harmonious system of truth, we might have been content with his performance as fulfilling his promise; but he led us to expect that we should see in his work, not only the various principles and laws of the divine government as they are in themselves, but also as they are in their relations to each other. Having invited us to behold the goodly spectacle of a harmonious system of truth, more beautiful in the mutual relations and adaptations of its various parts, than even in its separate features; we are not satisfied to be turned off with this huge compound of the mere fragments and disjointed elements of truth, as discordant as the tongues about the tower of Babel, and all over bristling with apparent contradictions.

In refusing to reconcile his doctrines, the author asks,—

"Is it required of us, in any other department of philosophy, to point out the bond which unites two truths, established on independent evidence, before

the mind gives its assent to them? We do not require the physical investigator to point out the connexion between mechanical and chemical combinations, before we believe in their existence; we only require him to furnish us with the separate evidence of the existence of each." P. 284.

This is all we require of the physical inquirer, provided he does not set out with the promise to show us the connexion, which he afterwards finds himself unable to point out. But this only by the way. The two cases are not parallel. There is no apparent contradiction between the existence of mechanical and chemical combinations; and hence each may be easily believed upon its separate evidence, though we see no bond of union connecting them. Not so with the doctrines of liberty and necessity, as maintained by our author. In the estimation of philosophers of all ages, and of all sects, they stand out in direct and irreconcilable opposition to each other. Indeed, the idea of liberty, as defined by him, is a direct and flat denial of his own doctrine of necessity; for it consists in the absence of motives, or causes, to sway the will.

The difference between the two cases may be exhibited in a single illustration. If a witness should tell us, for example, that he had seen elks in a forest of oak-trees or of elm-trees, we should certainly believe him, without requiring him to show the connexion between the presence of elks and the existence of either oak-trees or elm-trees; but if he should, in one part of his story, tell us, as a certain traveller is said to have done, that he had seen immense forests in which the trees were nowhere more than two feet apart, and, in another portion of his narrative, that he had seen elks running through those forests whose antlers measured twelve feet from point to point, we should certainly not be quite so ready to yield our assent to his testimony. And if we should ask him how it was possible for elks with such antlers to run through such forests, and receive the answer of the aforesaid traveller, that "that is no look-out of mine,—the elks must see to that themselves," we should still not be entirely satisfied of the truth of the narration.

We are aware that, in maintaining both the scheme of necessity and of liberty, while he refuses to reconcile them, Mr. M'Cosh merely follows the fashion which seems to be set by the Calvinistic writers of the present day. This mode of dealing with this very intricate subject has, of late, frequently fallen under our observation. We shall, therefore, bestow rather more attention upon it than it would otherwise deserve.

"It is absurd," says Mr. M'Cosh, "to represent the one doctrine as setting aside the other." Here we have the assertion of the author for it, that it is absurd to represent liberty as setting aside

necessity, or necessity as setting aside liberty. Yet this absurdity, according to the author's own showing, has been commonly committed by both necessitarians and libertarians. P. 285, note. He, however, escapes this absurdity, at least in his own estimation. It were well, indeed, if he had done so in reality; for, whatever may be thought of others, it were certainly a very striking absurdity, in one who maintains both doctrines, to make the one exclude the other. Yet this has been done by Mr. M'Cosh. He not only plants himself on the doctrine of liberty, and makes it exclude that of necessity; but he also plants himself on the doctrine of necessity, and makes it exclude that of liberty. Both of these positions may be clearly established.

First, he plants himself on the doctrine of liberty, and excludes that of necessity. In his zeal on the libertarian side of the question, he denies that the will is swayed by the most powerful motive. The doctrine of Edwards, and other necessitarians, on this subject, he expressly repudiates, on the ground that they do injustice to the spontaneity of the human will. Now what does Edwards mean by the most powerful motive? As quoted by Mr. M'Cosh himself, Edwards says: "When I speak of the strongest motive, I have respect to the strength of the whole that operates to produce a particular act of volition, whether that be the strength of one thing alone, or of many together." P. 279. By the term the *strongest* motive, then, Edwards means, as he here informs us, to designate the cause, or causes, which produce a particular act of volition. To deny his doctrine, then, that the will is swayed by motives, as Mr. M'Cosh does, is to deny that the acts of the will are produced by causes. But this is precisely to deny Mr. M'Cosh's own doctrine of necessity. Everywhere, in the writings of Edwards, the words *motive* and *cause* are used as convertible terms; and hence to deny that motives operate to produce volitions, is to deny that causes operate to produce them. Hence, it is clear that Mr. M'Cosh, from the overflowing abundance of his zeal in favour of the self-determining power of the soul, has rejected and denied the scheme of necessity.

In the second place he plants himself on the scheme of necessity, and excludes the freedom of the human will. If every act of the will has a producing cause, it is certainly very difficult to conceive how it can be free. Accordingly, Hobbes found the freedom of man, not in the will or mind itself, but in the external sphere of the body. No matter how we come by our volition, says he, an external act is free provided it flow from our will. This definition of liberty, as consisting in a power or opportunity to do a thing, *if we will*, without any regard to how we came by our will or volition, was, as is

well known, afterwards adopted by Locke and Edwards. Leibnitz, in his *Nouveaux Essais*, has clearly shown that this definition allows us no freedom of the will at all, but merely "elbow-room." This idea of liberty, it is hardly necessary to add, is perfectly consistent with the most absolute scheme of fate that can possibly be conceived. "No matter how we came by our volitions," it says, we are free, provided nothing hinders our volition from producing its external effect, though our volition should be produced by the strongest motive of Edwards and Hobbes, or by the producing cause of Mr. McCosh, or by the direct efficiency of the Almighty, according to the scheme of the younger Edwards; yet are we free, provided our bodies are free to follow their impulses. This, we repeat, is not the freedom of the mind, but of the body. Its most perfect type is to be found where Hobbes finds it,—not in the world of mind, but that of matter,—in the stream of a river, which, says he, is free to flow down its channel, though impelled by gravity, but not free to flow across its banks!

Now notwithstanding Mr. McCosh's zeal for the inherent self-determining power of the will, yet when he comes to view the subject from the platform of necessity, he too finds the freedom of the will in the absence of external restraints on the body. He says,—

"If it be alleged that the circumstance that volitions have a cause renders the agent no longer responsible for them, we forthwith demand the proofs. If it be replied that the conscience says so, then we meet the assertion with a direct contradiction. The conscience clearly announces the responsibility of intelligent and voluntary agents, but it attaches no such condition to responsibility. No doubt it says, *that if actions do not proceed from the will*, but from something else—from *mere physical or external restraint*—then the agent is not responsible for them; *but if the deeds proceed from the will*, then it at once attaches a responsibility to them. Place before the mind a murder committed through pure physical compulsion, brought to bear on the arm that inflicts the blow, and the conscience says, *Here no guilt is attachable*. But let this same murder be done with the thorough consent of the will, the conscience stops not to inquire whether this consent has been caused or no."—P. 287.

Here the question started was, whether we can be accountable for our volitions, for the acts of our wills, if they are caused; and it is shifted—how silently and how completely!—from an accountability for the acts of the will themselves, to an accountability for the external acts or bodily motions, flowing from these internal acts or volitions. Thus, he finds freedom and the basis of responsibility not in the will itself, but in the external sphere of the body.

Again he says,—

"If any man asserts, that, in order to responsibility, the will must be free—that is, *free from physical restraint*, free to act as it pleases—we at once and heartily agree with him; and we maintain that in this sense the will is free—as free as it is possible for any man to conceive it to be."

Thus, viewing the subject from the platform of necessity, he entirely shuts out and excludes the freedom of the will itself, and substitutes in its place that false notion of liberty which was so long ago set up by Hobbes, and so triumphantly demolished by Leibnitz. Hence we find him guilty of three things:—1. Of holding and maintaining both liberty and necessity; 2. Of making liberty exclude necessity; and, 3. Of making necessity exclude liberty.

We shall now take leave of Mr. M'Cosh. We might point out other inconsistencies in his work, almost without number; but such a task would be more tedious than profitable. Having exposed the great central contradictions of his work, which are fraught with so many minor inconsistencies, we feel no desire to weary ourselves, or to wear out the patience of the reader, by descending to a critical examination of the vast multitude of particulars in which he is at war with himself.

We do not deny that the book possesses merit. It gives us many "separate truths," as well as many separate errors; and these truths are sometimes presented in impressive and beautiful lights. But a system of truth it does not give us. The author is indeed a good writer, rather than a great thinker. He most lamentably fails to give us anything approximating to the coherency and beauty of a system. His view, or, rather, his manifold views, of the divine government, are about as fit to represent the order and harmony of the moral world, as framed and ruled by God, as are the wild babblings of madmen to represent the sweet strains of the angelic hosts.

One reason of this discord is, that the author has, in various directions, dared to depart from the old landmarks of Calvinism, while he has resolutely held on to them in others. He has sought for truth, not merely in the writers of his own school, but in the great world of letters and of things; and hence the many cross lights which have disturbed his vision, and prevented him from taking a consistently Calvinistic view of the universe. In his opinion, the "intellectual and spiritual clearness" of President Edwards, in questions pertaining to the divine government, approaches "nearer the angelic than has been the attainment of any in these latter days." Be this as it may, it is certain that, in all matters pertaining to the system of Calvinism, no man ever had so profound an insight as President Edwards. He understood, in every particular, not only what was necessary to lay and secure its foundations, but also to build it up into one coherent and harmonious scheme of doctrine; and in our opinion, Mr. M'Cosh has in no one instance departed from Edwards without introducing an element of discord into the bosom of Calvinism. Without intending it, he has indeed

aimed many lusty blows at his system. The foreign and heterogeneous elements which he has thus introduced are, we have no doubt, in most instances true; and they are, for that very reason, the seeds of dissolution which must ultimately work the utter ruin and overthrow of the entire fabric of Calvinism. The Calvinists of the present day, if they did but know it, instead of bestowing such indiscriminate and unbounded praise upon those who may undertake to defend their cause, have some reason to exclaim, "Save us from our friends!"

ART. VII.—SHORT REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF BOOKS.

(1.) "*A New Harmony and Exposition of the Gospels*, by JAMES STRONG, A. M." (New-York: Carlton & Phillips, 1852; 8vo., pp. 569.) In point of external finish—paper, printing, binding, and graphic illustration—this is by far the finest book that has yet been issued from the Methodist Book Concern. And the gem is worth the setting. The book is a noble example of the application of genuine learning, unwearied industry, and critical sagacity to that highest of all objects to which the wit of man can apply itself—the illustration of the Christian Scriptures. In the brief notice we can now afford to give, it is impossible for us to characterize this great book as it deserves: a fuller notice will be given in our next number, and, in the mean time, we can do little more than state the contents and scope of the work.

The basis of the entire book is a new *Harmony* of the four Gospels. In this part of the work, Mr. Strong accords, in the main, with Robinson, so far as the arrangement of events is concerned: but in this, as in everything else, he is clearly a man *nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri*; and while he has consulted all the harmonizers, he has slavishly followed none. A marked and novel peculiarity of this part of the work is the arrangement of the Harmony upon the page,—Mr. Strong's method completely combining all the advantages of the methods exemplified in Newcome and Townsend. The difficulties of such a combination are very great, and Mr. Strong has shown great tact and skill in getting over them.

The next feature of the work is the *Exposition*, which consists of a free version directly from the Greek text. There is much novelty also in the execution of this part. Many *paraphrases* of the sacred text have been attempted; but this is *not* a paraphrase: few words more than those of the text itself are employed, and the style is straight-forward and modern, and, on that very account, all the more striking, even to the casual reader. By this ingenious, but difficult mode of procedure, Mr. Strong has succeeded in producing what he sought, namely, "an exegetical manual, which, while adapted to ordinary readers, should yet not be unworthy the perusal of persons of higher attainments." It is a commentary, without the complexities, involutions, and digressions, which make most commentaries so difficult of perusal.

Besides the Harmony and Exposition, we have, still upon the face of the page, a small, but compact, body of *Notes*, containing such needful illustrations and explanations as could not find place in the body of the Exposition. The topics requiring fuller consideration are treated in two Appendixes, which treat of the general chronology of the life of Christ, and give also a minute investigation of the topography of ancient Jerusalem. Each of these is a treatise in itself. The third Appendix gives a general Index and Analysis of the Gospel History, which is, in fact, as our author expresses it, "a commentary in miniature."

The Illustrations, nineteen in number, are partly lithographs, tinted in the finest style of the art, partly steel, and partly wood engravings, all executed in the very best manner.

The book, as a whole, is an honour, not merely to our denominational literature, but to the Biblical literature of the age. And, what is of more importance, it will form, both for critical students and for common readers, an invaluable help to a better understanding of the sacred Scriptures. We need not bespeak for it a wide circulation: that it will be sure to obtain on the strength of its merits alone.

(2.) KIRWAN'S name is a terror, if not to the Pope, at least to Archbishop Hughes; and his new volume, entitled "*Romanism at Home; Letters to the Hon. R. B. Taney*," (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1852; 12mo., pp. 272,) will not at all tend to quiet the nerves of either Pope or Archbishop. His former "Letters" were confined mainly to the unscriptural *doctrines* of Popery; the present volume treats, in the same thorough and trenchant style, of its "external arrangements, its government, its despotism, its legends, its relics, and its influence on the moral, social, and political interests of the world." In order to do justice to this aspect of the subject, Kirwan visited Rome, and saw for himself much of what he describes in this volume. It is a terrible picture, but no less true than terrible. Our young ministers should read this book as an introduction to their *study* of Romanism,—a study which every American minister will find necessary within the next twenty years.

(3.) IN the present number of this Journal (pp. 450-456) DR. OLIN'S style of preaching is characterized at some length, and brief allusion made to the forthcoming edition of his works. We take great pleasure in welcoming the first two volumes under the title, "*The Works of Stephen Olin, D. D., LL. D.*, late President of the Wesleyan University." (New-York: Harper & Brothers; 2 vols., 12mo., pp. 422, 475.) The first volume is wholly made up of Sermons and Sketches of Sermons, and affords ample proof of the massive intellectual power of the author, notwithstanding the fact that but one of the sermons in the volume was prepared for publication by himself. The first sermon here given happens to be the first that we ever heard him preach—at Wilkesbarre, Pa., during the session of the Oneida Conference of 1843. The text is John xiv, 1, "Let not your heart be troubled: ye believe in God, believe also in me;" and the scope of the discourse is, that faith in God, with-

out faith in Christ, is adapted to awaken, not to calm our fears—to trouble the heart, not to comfort it. The impression of the spoken discourse can never be effaced from our minds: its clear, logical force; its affluence of thought; its overwhelming earnestness; and the enormous power of its delivery, all combined to make it the most impressive sermon we have ever heard from mortal lips. And we find all the substance of the discourse reproduced here; indeed, in this, as in other instances in the collection, we are surprised to find that Dr. Olin's manuscripts were left in so perfect a condition. And—as we must sum up in a sentence all we have now to say with regard to this volume—it is our judgment that no sermons printed since Robert Hall's, can compare with these in fulness, breadth, comprehensiveness, and in force of style. The *second* volume is devoted to the discussion of topics connected with Christian Education, and also to Missionary and other Addresses. It contains seven lectures on the Theory and Practice of Scholastic Life; four Baccalaureate Discourses; and thirteen Addresses and Essays. In finish of style, as well as in interest and novelty of topics, this volume surpasses the other; and we should gladly see it placed in the hands of every college student in the land. It should, perhaps, be printed separately for this purpose. We must now leave this great work—advising all our readers to buy it and read it; and hoping soon to return to it in an extended article, of which the lamented author will form the subject.

(4.) "*A Manual of Grecian Antiquities*, by CHARLES ANTHON, LL. D." (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1852; 12mo, pp. 437.) This volume is of the same size and plan with the "*Manual of Roman Antiquities*" by the same author, recently published. It gives, in a brief and compact introduction, geographical and historical outlines of ancient Hellas; and then treats of the antiquities under the four heads of the Heroic Age, Sparta, Crete, and Athens. A vast body of information is condensed into this volume, which is certainly the best school-manual upon the subject.

(5.) THE practical writings of JOHN ANGELL JAMES bid fair to rival in quantity, if not in excellence, those of Richard Baxter. The last is now before us in the shape of "*Pastoral Addresses, chiefly on the Subject of Christian Duty*." (New-York: Carter & Brothers, 1852; pp. 408.) The book is made up mostly, we should judge, of week-night lectures to the congregation, and is marked by the earnestness of feeling and diffuseness of style that characterize Mr. James's writings.

(6.) "*The Economy of Methodism illustrated and defended, in a Series of Papers*, by T. E. BOND, Sen., M. D." (New-York: Carlton & Phillips, 1852; 8vo, pp. 391.) This work is valuable not merely in the polemical aspect indicated by its title, but also as a contribution to the history—or rather to the useful materials for the history—of the Methodist Episcopal Church. It contains, I. Dr. Bond's "*Appeal to the Methodists, in opposition to the changes*

proposed in their Church government," published originally in 1827, and which has been for many years out of print; II. His "Narrative and Defence of the Proceedings of the Methodist Episcopal Church in Baltimore City Station;" and, III, a number of miscellaneous articles, chiefly from the pages of the "Itinerant," relating to the controversy on lay delegation and kindred topics. The Appendix touches briefly upon the recent movement in Philadelphia in favour of lay delegation. The book, with the whole subject, will call for a full review hereafter.

(7.) THE second volume of "*The Life and Works of Robert Burns*, edited by Robert Chambers," (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1852; 12mo, pp. 317,) continues the biography down to 1788. On the plan of the book, and its excellent execution, we have spoken in another place.

(8.) "*Songs in the House of my Pilgrimage*" (New-York: Carter & Brothers, 1852; pp. 315) is a book of poetical pieces, one for every day in the year, selected with a design to present daily to the Christian's mind some precious promise of the word of God to comfort the afflicted and encourage the trembling soul. It is a good design, and is well executed.

(9.) MR. JACOB ABBOTT is the benefactor *par excellence* of the children of this generation. He has just commenced the issue (or the reissue) of a series entitled "*Marco Paul's Adventures in the Pursuit of Knowledge*," which will be as popular, no doubt, as the Franconia stories. Two books of the series have already appeared, "*Marco in New-York*" and "*Marco on the Erie Canal*," (Harper & Brothers: 1852,) both of which blend instruction with amusement in that skilful way in which no writer for children has excelled Mr. Abbott. Two drawbacks, however—sad ones too—attend all his otherwise faultless writings for children: one is, that he is often careless enough to use New-England words and phrases without any indication to the youthful reader that they are provincialisms; and the other is, that the books are printed in the miserable Websterian orthography instead of English.

(10.) "*An Exposition of some of the Laws of the Latin Grammar*, by GESSNER HARRISON, M. D., Professor of Ancient Languages in the University of Virginia." (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1852; 12mo, pp. 290.) "This is not a mere school-book, but a substantial and most acceptable contribution to philological science—adapted, at the same time, for use in college classes. The work is made up mainly of Dr. Harrison's lectures to his own classes in the university, and aims "to set forth a rational arrangement and explanation of some of the more prominent phenomena in the inflections and syntax of the Latin language." It is, in fact, a commentary upon the Latin grammar, exhibiting the results of the later philological inquiries—many of which are beyond the reach of most teachers, as well as pupils, in this country—in a perspicuous and satisfactory form. The book abounds in acute distinctions

also, of Dr. Garrison's own. We should be glad to give a minute account of the work did our limits allow; but we must content ourselves with urging all teachers of the Latin language to get and study it for themselves, and with expressing the hope that the work will speedily find its way into the higher classes of all our American colleges.

(11.) ONE of the most successful of the many useful compilations which the late Rev. DANIEL SMITH has presented to the public is "*Gems of Female Biography.*" (New-York: Lane & Scott; 18mo., pp. 430.)

(12.) "*Novelties of the New World*" (Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 1852; pp. 324) is a pleasant book for youth, made up of the most remarkable adventures and discoveries of the first explorers of North America. It is uniform with "*Plymouth and the Pilgrims*," by the same author.

(13.) It is said that the manuscripts of PRESIDENT EDWARDS, if all published, would be more voluminous than the works of any of the copious writers of the seventeenth century, with the possible exception, perhaps, of Baxter, of eighty-volume memory. His unpublished MSS. were committed, some three years ago, to the Rev. Tryon Edwards, who found among them a series of Lectures delivered by Edwards in 1738, to the people of his charge in Northampton, written out in full, apparently with a design for publication. They are now issued under the title "*Charity and its Fruits; or, Christian Love as manifested in the Heart and Life.*" (New-York: Carter & Brothers, 1852; pp. 530,) forming a complete exposition of 1 Cor. xiii.

(14.) "*The Church-Member's Manual*, by WILLIAM CROWELL," (Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 1852; 12mo., pp. 272,) is an enlarged reprint of a work with the same title, published some years ago. It gives a perspicuous account of the doctrines, discipline, and usages of the Baptist Church.

(15.) ROMANISM has, if possible, more of the persecuting spirit now than ever. Multiplied illustrations of this spirit are afforded in a "*Memoir of the Rev. W. H. HEWITSON*, by the Rev. JOHN BAILLIE." (New-York: Carter & Brothers; 12mo., pp. 374.) Mr. Hewitson was a youthful minister of the Free Church of Scotland, who went to Madeira for the recovery of his health, and there laboured, with great zeal and prudence, in teaching the simple gospel of the Son of God. The malignity of the Roman Catholic Bishop of Madeira and his satellites against Dr. Kalley, is a well-known story; and Mr. Hewitson was baited and persecuted in the same way. He subsequently laboured as a missionary in Trinidad, and afterward entered upon regular pastoral work in Scotland. Throughout his brief career (he died 1850, aged thirty-eight) he lived in holy communion with God, and toiled for his Master with consuming energy. The book is a precious record of Christian love, zeal, faith, and triumph.

(16.) "Bronchitis, and Kindred Diseases," by W. W. HALL, M. D.," (New-York: J. S. Redfield; 12mo., pp. 350,) is a very sensible statement of the causes of the ailments named in its title. It is intended for ordinary readers—not to enable them to cure themselves, but to aid them in securing such habits as will prevent disease. Its general circulation would be a national benefit.

(17.) ONE of the most interesting and instructive of the many volumes to which the disappearance of Sir John Franklin has given rise, is the "Arctic Searching Expedition," by SIR JOHN RICHARDSON." (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1852; 12mo., pp. 516.) In the spring of 1848 Sir John was assigned to take the command of a searching party, to go by boats and overland to Fort Confidence, to winter there, and then to trace the coast between the Mackenzie and Coppermine rivers, and the shores of Victoria and Wolaston Lands. The expedition discharged its duty—without discovering any traces of the missing voyagers—and Sir John returned in the autumn of 1850. The record of an expedition so full of toils, perils, and novelties, could not but be attractive; and Sir John tells his story simply and well. The appendixes give much new information as to the geography, climate, &c., of the hyperborean regions of North America. A map is necessary to the completeness of the work.

(18.) "The Principles of Courtesy," by G. W. HERVEY," (New-York: Harper & Brothers; 12mo., pp. 300,) is an attempt to set forth the elements of the duty of *Christian* politeness:—or, rather, to set forth the laws of courtesy, without inculcating pernicious opinions, or appealing to unworthy motives,—errors into which writers on etiquette commonly fall. It treats, first, of the spirit of courtesy; secondly, of the forms of courtesy in religious society; and, thirdly, of the forms of courtesy in secular society—a bad division, as all secular society ought to be Christian, and will be, before the millennium comes.

(19.) "Living or Dead," by Rev. J. C. RYLE," (New-York: Carter and Brothers; 18mo., pp. 360,) is a series of home-truths, practically put to the hearts and consciences of Christians and those who should be Christians. The writer has an admirable hortatory style, vivified throughout by a profoundly earnest spirit.

(20.) "The History of Palestine, from the Patriarchal Age to the Present Time," by JOHN KITTO, D. D." (Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 1852; 12mo., pp. 426.) This is not to be regarded as an abridgment of Dr. Kitto's larger work, *The Pictorial History of Palestine*; it is designed, and has been written, expressly for use as a text-book in schools, and as a manual of the subject on which it treats. In a copious introduction, of 125 pages, we have the historical and physical geography of Palestine, with an account of the customs and usages of the Jews. The history proper is then exhibited in eight chapters, bringing it down to the restoration of Syria to the dominion of the Porte.

The book has over 200 illustrative wood-cuts. We know no single volume so well deserving the name of a *manual* of the history and geography as this—with the single and almost fatal drawback, that it has *no Index*.

(21.) PUTNAM'S "Semi-monthly Library for Travellers and the Fireside" continues to appear with praiseworthy punctuality. Among the recent issues are, "Claret and Olives; from the Garonne to the Rhone, by ANGUS B. REACH;" a "Journey to Iceland, and Travels in Sweden and Norway, translated by CHARLOTTE FENIMORE COOPER;" "Up the Rhine, by THOMAS HOOD," 2 vols. Mr. Putnam has also commenced a new series of books in Popular and Practical Science, in a form similar to that of the semi-monthly Library, of which we have received "The Solar System, by J. R. HIND,"—a descriptive treatise upon the Sun, Moon, and Planets, including an account of all the recent discoveries. It is really marvellous that books of such value can be got up in such a style for twenty-five cents a volume.

(22.) AMONG the new volumes of Bohn's Libraries are "Humboldt's *Cosmos*, Vol. IV., translated by E. C. OTTE and Dr. PAUL, with an Index;" "Sir Joshua Reynolds' *Literary Works*, with *Memoir of the Author*, by H. WILLIAM BEECHEY, Vol. II.;" "Cicero's *Orations*, literally translated by C. D. YONGE, M. A., Vol. III.;" "Sir Thomas Browne's *Works*, edited by S. WILKIN, F. L. S., Vol. III.;" "Oersted's *Soul in Nature, and other Works*, translated by the MISSES HORNER;" "The *Chess Tournament*, edited by H. STAUNTON, Esq.;" "Rome in the Nineteenth Century, fifth edition, 2 vols.;" "Neander's *Church History*, Vol. VII., with Index." An abundant supply of these valuable series is always kept on hand by Bangs Brother, & Co., Park-Row, New-York.

(23.) "Miscellany; consisting of Essays, Biographical Sketches, and Notes of Travel, by the Rev. T. A. MORRIS, D. D., one of the Bishops of the Methodist Episcopal Church." (Cincinnati: Swormstedt & Power, 1852; 12mo., pp. 390.) This volume consists of three parts,—Part I. Essays; Part II. Biographical Sketches; Part III. Notes of Travel. Most of the papers here presented have appeared at different times in various periodicals; and Bishop Morris has done an acceptable service to the Church, and especially to its youth, in gathering these "words of wisdom" into a less perishable form than that in which they were originally sent forth. They are marked throughout by the sobriety of judgment, clearness of thought, and chaste expression which characterize all the writings of the author.

(24.) "New Rhetorical Reader and Elocutionist, by WILLIAM H. GILDER, A. M." (New-York: J. C. Riker; 12mo., pp. 336.) This is, in our judgment, the best book of its class that has yet appeared in this country. The Introduction sets forth the essential principles of elocution with great brevity, yet amply enough for purposes of practical instruction. Then follows a judi-

cious selection of passages in prose and verse, the staple of which consists of extracts from the standard writers of the language, while a new feature is introduced in the shape of excerpts from writers less known, but yet, in the main, deserving of a place in such collections. We are glad to see among them the names of Olin, Fisk, Emory, Winans, Cookman, and a number more of the best writers and speakers in our own Church. We commend the work to teachers, believing that they have only to examine it carefully to be convinced of its eminent adaptation for use in American schools.

(25.) SEVERAL lives of Wesley have appeared in Germany, but the first, to our knowledge, written in the German language on our own soil, is "*Das Leben und Wirken des Johannes Wesley und Seiner Haupt-Mitarbeiter, bearbeitet nach den besten englischen Quellen, von WILHELM NAST.*" (Cincinnati: Swormstedt & Power, 1852; 12mo., pp. 300.) The work is not designed as a complete history of Methodism, nor as a full biography of Wesley, but rather as a sketch of the historical development of Methodism. The "sources" spoken of in the title-page are mainly Watson's "Life of Wesley," Jackson's "Centenary of Methodism," and Larabee's "Wesley and his Coadjutors;" the substance of which books—so far at least as might be of special interest to German readers—is translated and condensed into the volume before us. We trust it will obtain a wide circulation among the German people, not only in this country, but also on the other side of the water.

(26.) THE "*Pictorial Field-Book of the Revolution*, by B. J. LOSSING" (New-York: Harper & Brothers) is rapidly approaching completion—the twenty-fourth number having made its appearance. Our readers who wish at once to gratify the tastes, improve the minds, and cherish the patriotic feeling of their children, should put this book, by all means, into their hands. When the work is completed, we hope to give an estimate of it more in accordance with its merits than its fragmentary mode of publication has heretofore allowed us to offer.

(27.) WE have received a copy of the seventh edition of "*A Practical Manual of Elocution: embracing Voice and Gesture*, by MERRITT CALDWELL, A.M." (Portland: Sanborn & Carter, 1852; 12mo., pp. 357.) The value of this work as a text-book for school and college use, is now not a matter of question; it has been proved by years of experience. No book on the subject, issued either before or since the present work, approaches it, in our judgment, in a clear and practical exposition of the theory and practice of elocution. We renew our hearty recommendation of the book, not only to teachers, but also to ministers and students of theology.

(28.) SCHMITZ's "*Elementary Latin Grammar and Exercises*" (Philadelphia: Blanchard & Lea; 18mo., pp. 246) is an abridgment of the larger grammar by the same author, and is intended for the use of beginners. The book is clear and systematic, but has few of the *helps* to memory needed by young pupils.

(29.) HUDSON's edition of "*The Works of Shakspeare*" (Boston: James Munroe & Co.) is going on to completion: we have received the second, third, and fourth volumes since our notice of the first. We are prepared to renew our declaration of confidence in Mr. Hudson's capacity to produce an edition that will be the best in all respects for general use. The notes and prefaces in these three volumes bear ample testimony to his taste and judgment, while the text is one on which all readers may rely as approaching quite as near to accuracy as that of any extant edition. And in the mechanical qualities of type, paper, size, and form of volumes, this edition will have nothing to be desired in point of neatness and convenience.

(30.) MAYHEW's "*London Labour and the London Poor*" (New-York: Harper & Brothers) has reached the eighteenth number, and continues the searching inquiry into the condition of the working classes of London, which Mr. Mayhew has been so long and so strenuously pursuing. No one could imagine, without reading this book, how much interest may be thrown by a man of genius about a subject which, in other hands, would offer nothing but material for the dullest and the driest statistics.

(31.) "*The Way to do Good*, by JACOB ABBOTT," (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 1852; 12mo, pp. 402,) is the third and last of the "*Young Christian*" series, of which we have before spoken twice. Mr. Abbott's graphic pen, which charms all youthful readers in the simple beauty of his stories and histories, is equally at home in writing of practical religion. The present well-known volume sets forth with ample power of expression and illustration the excellence, the beauty, and the bliss of a life of Christian usefulness.

(32.) "*Meyer's Universum*," (New-York: H. J. Meyer,) consists of a series of views of the most remarkable places and objects of all countries. The work has been established in Germany for many years, and has had a very wide European circulation. Mr. Meyer has now commenced an American edition in monthly parts, each containing four steel engravings, with description and historical text by European and American writers, under the editorship of Mr. C. A. Dana. It will be sold at the very low price of twenty-five cents a number.

(33.) ACCURATE information with regard to the Holy Land, is now more accessible than ever before, and new stores are constantly accumulating from the researches of careful travellers. The latest information will be found embodied in "*The Land of Promise*, by JOHN KITTO, LL. D.," (New-York: Lane & Scott; 12mo, pp. 334,) which gives a topographical description of the principal places in Palestine, and of the country eastward of the Jordan. Every place of interest and importance is described as it *now* appears; and the attempt is made to combine the accuracy of scientific description with the vivacity of a book of travel. It is illustrated by a physical map of Palestine, and by numerous woodcuts.

(34.) "The Howadji in Syria, by GEORGE WILLIAM CURTIS," (New-York: Harper & Brothers; 12mo, pp. 304,) is, like the "Nile Notes" of the same author, a series of *poetical* pictures, rather than a book of travel. Its dreamy, exaggerated, and voluptuous style, harmonizes well with the Eastern life which it depicts. But its sweets are too sweet, and cloy from their rich abundance.

(35.) "Revival Miscellanies, containing eleven Revival Sermons, &c., selected from the works of the Rev. JAMES CAUGHEY, by Rev. R. W. Allen and Rev. D. Wise." (Boston: J. P. Magee; 12mo., pp. 442.) The sermons in this volume are earnest and faithful exhortations; but have no other merit. Appended to these are a number of loose essays, fragments of letters, &c. The work may have currency, and be useful for a time, especially in quarters where Mr. Caughey (who is styled in the title-page "The Eminently Successful Revivalist") is personally known.

(36.) THE fourth volume of Mr. Putnam's Home Cyclopedias is the "Hand-Book of the Useful Arts, by T. ANTISELL," M. D. (New-York: G. P. Putnam, 1852; 12mo, pp. 690.) The work includes Agriculture, Architecture, Domestic Economy, Civil Engineering, Machinery, Manufactures, Photogenic, and Telegraphic Art, and affords in a clear and comprehensive form for popular reference, a dictionary of all terms used in the application of science to the useful arts. It also gives summary statements of all the most valuable European and American patents of recent times. The work is admirably printed, and is illustrated by a number of very fine woodcuts. The volumes of the series can be had separately, but none of our readers who may purchase the "Home Cyclopedias" as a whole, will see occasion to regret it.

(37.) THE "Family and School Monitor, and Educational Catechism," (New-York: G. Savage; 18mo., pp. 176,) gives a large amount of valuable instruction in the form of question and answer.

(38.) "The Chain of Sacred Wonders, by S. A. LATTA, M. D.," (Cincinnati: 8vo.,) is still published in quarterly numbers, as we learn from the first number for 1852, now before us. No number for 1851 except the first reached this office. In the present number the sketches are carried down to the "Meeting of Moses and Jethro, the priest of Midian."

(39.) THE "Report of the Pennsylvania Hospital for the Insane," for 1851, shows that the institution is in most excellent order, under the admirable management of Dr. Kirkbride.

(40.) "God in History, by JOHN CUMMING, D. D.," (New-York: Lane & Scott; 12mo, pp. 129,) embodies a number of facts illustrative of the presence and providence of God in the affairs of men. It is written in the flowing style characteristic of Dr. Cumming.

(41.) Of the following pamphlets, essays, sermons, &c., we regret that we are unable to give anything more than the titles:—

Address delivered by the Hon. Daniel Webster in Faneuil Hall, May 22, 1852, at the request of the City Council of Boston.

Catalogue of the Officers and Students of the New-York Conference Seminary, Charlottesville, Schoharie County, N. Y., during the first term, 1851-52.

Thoughts on Entire Sanctification, by Rev. H. MATTISON.

A Discourse on the Horrors of the Liquor Traffic, both Wholesale and Retail, delivered in Wesley Chapel, Indianapolis, Sept. 14, 1851, by Rev. B. F. Crary, A. M.

Obituary Addresses delivered on the Occasion of the Death of Augustus Neander, by the following eminent Men of Berlin: Neander's Decease, by S. RAUH, Licentiate of the University; a Discourse delivered in his Dying Chamber, by DR. FREDERICK STRAUSS; a Discourse delivered at his Grave, by DR. F. W. KRUMMACHER; a Discourse delivered on the Day of his Burial, July 17, 1850, in the Hall of the Berlin University, by DR. CARL IMMANUEL NITZSCH. Translated from the German, by the Rev. H. M. HARMAN, A. M. To which is prefixed a Sketch of the Life of Neander, by the Translator.

Freedom of Thought, the True Mean.—An Address delivered before the Philomathean Society of Troy Conference Academy, West Poultney, Vt., on the Evening of July 15, 1851, by JAMES STRONG, A. M., formerly Teacher of Languages in that Institution.

Catalogue of the Officers and Students of the North-Western Virginia Academy, Clarksburg, Va., for the Academic Year 1851-2.

Report of the Superintendent of the Township of Waterford, in the County of Camden, N. J.

Catalogue of the Officers and Students of Providence Conference Seminary, East Greenwich, R. I., for the Academic Year 1851-2.

Constitution and Rules of the Waterford Township Association of Teachers. Instituted, August, 1851.

Catalogue and Circular of the Officers and Students of the Wesleyan Female Institute, Staunton, Va., 1851-2.

Adaptation of Religion to Female Character.—A Discourse to Young Ladies, delivered in the First Presbyterian Church, Richmond, Va., Feb. 29, 1852, by Rev. T. V. MOORE.

Warning Words to Young Men.—A Discourse delivered in the First Presbyterian Church, Richmond, Va., Feb. 29, 1852, by Rev. T. V. MOORE.

A New Theory of the Apocalypse, as Corroborated by Daniel's Numbers, by Rev. S. S. RALSTON.

Thirty-First Annual Report of the Board of Direction of the Mercantile Library Association, of the City of New-York.

Third Annual Report of the American and Foreign Christian Union, presented at their Anniversary, held on Tuesday, May 11, 1852, in the Broadway Tabernacle, New-York.

ART. VIII.—LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

Theological.

EUROPEAN.

We have received a copy of one of those elaborate works in special departments of Church History which Germany alone produces, entitled, "Die Bussordnungen der abendländischen Kirche, von Dr. F. W. H. WASSEESCHLEBEN, Prof. d. Rechte a. d. Univ. Halle." (Halle, 1851; 8vo., 726 pp.) After an historical Introduction, showing a most thorough survey of the whole subject in its original sources, all the Penitentials and Canons relating to penance in the British, Irish, Anglo-Saxon, Frankish, and Spanish Churches, are given at length. It is a repertory, in fact, of penitential law—not in abstracts, but in a reprint of the original documents themselves.

The new "Polyglotte Bibel zum praktischen Handgebrauch" (Bielefeld, Velhagen und Klasing) is carried on in the last number up to Jeremiah. It contains the Hebrew, Septuagint, Vulgate, and Luther's version in parallel columns, and will be, when completed, one of the cheapest and most convenient Polyglotte extant.

THE *Journal des Débats* announces a discovery which, for the present at least, seems to set a long-agitated literary question at rest. As many of our readers well know, the authorship of the famous work commonly ascribed to Thomas à Kempis, "*De Imitatione Christi*," has been disputed for nearly four centuries. A small library has been written on the theme,—especially by French and Netherland antiquaries,—and the tendency of opinion in France, at least, has been to give the merit of this celebrated production to John Gerson, Chancellor of the University of Paris, who died in 1429. Kempis was an excellent copyist; his copy of the Bible—the labour of fifteen years—was thought a masterpiece of calligraphic art; and it has been inferred by M. Barbier and M. Leroy that he was merely employed in transcribing the work of Gerson. This inference has been drawn mainly from the name and date of an ancient manuscript of the "*De Imitatione*" preserved in the library at Valenciennes. But, as we learn from the *Débat*, M. Malou, bishop of Bruges, has found a manuscript in the library at

Brussels which bears the name of Thomas à Kempis, ten years older in date than the one at Valenciennes,—and M. Muller, Bishop of Munster, has discovered several old MS. copies, one of which is of the same date as the Brussels MS., and also bears the name of Kempis. "Thus," says our contemporary, "the pious reclus of the fifteenth century, Master Thomas of Mount St. Agnes and canon of Utrecht, called Thomas à Kempis from the name of Kempen, the place of his birth, is now re-established as the true author of this celebrated and inimitable work." With this decision Belgian antiquaries will, of course, be satisfied. The controversy was one of dates and names; and the attempt to encumber it, as M. Barbier did, with comparisons of style and thought was of little use. Almost every writer has his one best book.—*Athenaeum*.

We have received the sixth volume of Neander's *Allgemeine Geschichte der Christlichen Religion und Kirche*. (Hamburg, Perthes, 1852; 8vo., 805 pp.) This volume, which constitutes the eleventh part of the whole History, is edited from Neander's posthumous papers by R. F. T. Schneider, a pupil and friend of the lamented author. It embraces the sixth period of the History, viz., from the time of Boniface VIII. up to the Council of Constance, and so embraces a time of deep interest to the Church, covering the preliminary and preparatory steps to the great Reformation, the movements of Wyclif in England, and of Huss and his followers in Bohemia. The work, of course, will be found very different in finish and accuracy from the volumes prepared for the press by Neander's own hand; but the editor appears to have performed his difficult task intelligently and conscientiously.

We have received, but have not had time to examine, two new works on Job, viz., *Philologisch-historischer Kommentar zum Buche Hiob*, von Dr. E. J. MAGNUS, Breslau (Halle, 1851; 8vo., 448 pp.); and *Das Buch Hiob, verdeutscht und erläutert* von Lic. KONSTANTIN SCHOTTMANN. (Ber-

lin, 8vo., 507 pp.) The latter has a copious Introduction of 150 pages.

We have also received *Der Prophet Hosea, erklärt und übersetzt von Dr. AUGUST SIMON*, Licent. d. Theol. in Königsberg. (Hamburg, 1851; 8vo., 330 pp.)

The second volume of *Theologie*, von L. J. RUCKERT, Professor in Jena, (Leipzig, 1851; 8vo., 610 pp.) contains the historical part—the life and work of Christ, and the Christian life.

The first series of Kitto's *Journal of Sacred Literature*, 7 vols. 8vo., can now be had at the reasonable price of 31s. 6d., bound in cloth, bringing the price to about \$9 here.

The apocryphal Acts of the Apostles have been collected into a volume by Professor Tischendorf, under the title, *Acta Apostolorum Apocrypha, ex triginta antiquis codicibus vel nunc primum eruit vel secundum atque emendatus editit*. C. TISCHENDORF, (pp. lxxx and 276, Lips., 1851.) "In this volume Professor T. has edited thirteen works professedly containing accounts of the actions of certain of the apostles. Seven of them have never before been printed; the rest appear now, with the benefit of a new revision of the text from MS. authorities."—*Journal of Sacred Literature*.

The second volume of Dr. Candlish's "*Contributions towards an Exposition of the Book of Genesis*" (Edinburgh, 1852) extends from Gen. xvii to xxviii. This work, of which the first volume appeared a number of years ago, is not a commentary upon the language of Genesis, verse by verse, nor yet a series of expository lectures, but an attempt to "unfold those views of the divine government and of the history of man, which the general strain of the narrative, in its obvious interpretation, suggests."

The *Congregational Lectures* have now reached fifteen volumes, and it is proposed by Messrs. Jackson and Walford, London, to republish them in neat octavo volumes, four at a time, the subscription for which shall be twelve shillings sterling. For the information of our readers we give a list of the whole series, as originally issued:

I. Christian Ethics; or, Moral Philosophy on the Principles of Divine Revelation. By Ralph Wardlaw, D. D.:—II. The Causes of the Corruption of Christianity. By Robert Vaughan, D. D.:—III. The Christian Atonement: its Basis, Nature, and Bear-

ings; or, The Principle of Substitution Illustrated, as applied in the Redemption of Man. With Notes and Illustrations. By the Rev. Joseph Gilbert:—IV. Divine Inspiration; or, The Supernatural Influence exerted in the Communication of Divine Truth, and its Special Bearing on the Composition of the Sacred Scriptures. With Notes and Illustrations. By Ebenezer Henderson, D. D.:—V. Holy Scripture Verified; or, The Divine Authority of the Bible Confirmed by an appeal to facts of Science, History, and Human Consciousness. By George Redford, D. D., LL. D.:—VI. On the Relation between the Holy Scriptures and some parts of Geological Science. By John Pye Smith, D. D., F. R. S., F. G. S.:—VII. The Connexion and Harmony of the Old and New Testaments; being an Inquiry into the Relation, Literary and Doctrinal, in which these two parts of the Sacred Volume stand to each other. By William Lindsay Alexander, D. D.:—VIII. The Theology of the early Christian Church, Exhibited in Quotations from the writers of the First Three Centuries. By James Bennett, D. D.:—IX. The Existence of Evil Spirits Proved, and their Agency, particularly in relation to the Human Race, Explained and Illustrated. By the Rev. Walter Scott, President and Theological Tutor of Airedale College, Bradford, Yorkshire:—X. The Sacraments: an Inquiry into the Nature of the Symbolic Institutions of the Christian Religion, usually called the Sacraments. By Robert Halley, D. D. Part I, Baptism:—XI. The Doctrine of Original Sin; or, The Native State and Character of Man Unfolded. By the Rev. George Payne, LL. D.:—XII. The Revealed Doctrine of Rewards and Punishments. By Richard Winter Hamilton, D. D., LL. D.:—XIII. The Ecclesiastical Polity of the New Testament Unfolded, and its Points of Coincidence or Antagonism with Prevailing Systems Indicated. By the Rev. S. Davidson, D. D., LL. D.:—XIV. The Work of the Spirit. By William Hendry Stowell, D. D.:—XV. The Sacraments: An Inquiry into the Nature of Symbolic Institutions of the Christian Religion. By Robt. Halley, D. D. Part II, The Lord's Supper.

A CHEAP and uniform edition of the principal works of the late Rev. E. Bickersteth is announced by Seeleys, London. It will be comprised in sixteen volumes fcp. 8vo., and sold at \$2. Four volumes will be issued every six months. The works to be embraced in the series are the following:—

Christian Truth; a Family Guide to the Chief Truths of the Gospel:—The Christian Student; Designed to assist Christians in general in acquiring Religious Knowledge:—A Scripture Help; Designed to assist in reading the Bible Profitably:—A Treatise on the Lord's Supper. In two parts:—A Treatise on Prayer; Designed to promote the Spirit of Devotion:—The Chief Concerns of Man for Time and for Eternity:—Family Expositions of the Epistles of St. John and St. Jude:—The Christian Hearer; a Treatise on Hearing the Word:—Family Prayers. A complete course for Eight Weeks; with Additional Prayers, suited to Various Occasions:—The Signs of the Times in the East; a Warning to the West:—The Promised Glory of the Church of Christ:—The Restoration of the Jews to their Own Land; in connexion with their Future Conversion and the Final Blessedness of our Earth:—A Practical Guide to the Prophecies:—A Treatise on Baptism; Designed as a help to the due improvement of that Holy Sacrament:—The Divine Warning to the Church, at this time, of our Enemies, Dangers and Duties, and as to our Future Prospects.

In answer to numerous questions, we state again that Clark's "Foreign Theological Library" is still publishing,—four volumes a year, subscription price one guinea per annum, amounting, in New-York, to seven dollars. Subscriptions are received by Mr. John Wiley or by Mr. G. P. Putnam, Park Place, New-York. The volumes already published (omitting Neander's Church History, which is copyrighted in this country) are Hengstenberg on the Psalms, 3 vols.:—Hagenbach's History of Doctrines, 2 vols.:—Giese's Ecclesiastical History, 2 vols.:—Olshausen on Gospels and Acts, 4 vols.:—on Romans; on Corinthians; on Galatians, Ephesians, Colossians, and Thessalonians; on Philippians, Titus, and First Timothy:—Havernick's Introduction to the Pentateuch:—Hengstenberg on the Apocalypse, vol. i.

MESSRS. BAGSTERS (London) have lately published a new work designed to aid those who wish to acquire, by private study, a sufficient knowledge of Greek to read the New Testament in the original, under the title of the "*Analytical Lexicon to the Greek New Testament.*" In this work every word in the New Testament is grammatically explained and referred to its root. It is in one volume 4to., uniform with the Hebrew

Analytical Lexicon, and sold at twenty-five shillings sterling.

"*Babylon and Jerusalem*" (18mo., 116 pp.) is a letter, addressed to Ida, Countess of Hahn Hahn, whom our readers will remember as a novel-writer of repute in Germany—and as a lady of more notoriety than good women generally desire. After a life of worldliness, when her novels began to pall upon the popular taste, and she found herself upon the dreary side of forty, destitute of *excitements* and of support, she turned Catholic. The first fruit of her conversion was a book entitled, "From Babylon to Jerusalem,"—and the little work before us is a reply to it. Keen, sharp, almost Pascal-like in its irony, it is yet everywhere respectful and even indulgent. The translator attributes it to Dr. Nitzsch, of Berlin.

Or the new edition of Dr. John Owen's works (publishing by Johnstone and Hunter, Edinburgh, in 16 vols. £3 3s.), volumes i, ii, v, vi, viii, ix, x, xiii, xiv, and xv, have already appeared. The six volumes [vols. iii, iv, vii, xi, xii, and xvi] in progress complete the Miscellaneous Works, and will be delivered in the course of 1852 and 1853.

The same publishers announce Owen's "Exposition of the Epistle to the Hebrews," and "Theologoumena," &c. To appear in 8 vols., demi 8vo., price to subscribers £2 2s., payable 1st January, 1853, and 1st January, 1854—the volumes to be issued in the course of 1853 and 1854.

The materials for the early Ecclesiastical History of England are abundant, but few of them have been presented to the English reader. It is proposed to publish by subscription all the extant writings from Bede, inclusive, down to the date of Foxe's *Acts and Monuments*, on the plan of publication pursued by the Parker and other societies—three volumes of 400 pages each to be furnished annually, at the rate of £1 (stg.) a year. The series will embrace the following authors, with others: viz., 1. Gildas; 2. Nennius; 3. Bede: Ecclesiastical History and Minor Historical Works; 4. Asser; 5. Ingulf; 6. Florene of Worcester; 7. Eadmer; 8. Simeon of Durham; 9. William of Malmesbury; 10. Ordericus Vitalis; 11. Henry of Huntingdon; 12. Richard of Hexham; 13. John of Hexham; 14. Richard of Devizes; 15. Benedict of Peterborough; 16. Brompton; 17. Gervase of Canterbury; 18. Hoveden; 19. Ralph de Diceto; 20. Gi-

raldus Cambrensis; 21. Roger of Wendover; 22. Matthew Paris; 23. Hemingford; 24. Avesbury; 25. Higden; 26. Matthew of Westminster; 27. Thomas Walsingham.

To which must be added the Saxon Chronicle, and portions of various other documents, bearing upon the History. Subscriptions should be addressed to Messrs. Seeleys, 54 Fleet-street, London.

We continue our summaries of the contents of the leading European Journals of Theology:—

THE *Theologische Studien und Kritiken* for April, 1852, is thus analyzed in the British Quarterly. The number opens with a long and learned dissertation, by Bleek, on the age and authorship of the latter half of the book of *Zechariah*, chapters ix to xiv. The controversy has employed the pens of De Wette and Hävernick, Hengstenberg and Umbreit, and the prophecies in question have been attributed by some to *Zechariah*, by others to some prophet or prophets who wrote previous to the time of the exile. Dr. Bleek advocates the latter view. The second paper is an essay, by Luthardt of Erlangen, on the reciprocal relation of "faith" and the "word of God," as exhibited in connexion in John vi. 29. It contains some acute and suggestive remarks, though the positions advanced appear here and there open to question.—Next we have a brief article from Umbreit, on the change of the name *Soul* to *Paul*; and next *A Word from France*. M. Sardinoux, professor of theology at Montauban, has translated into French Dr. Ullmann's work on the Nature of Christianity, and the latter returns the courtesy by here rendering into German the substance of M. Sardinoux's introduction. The French professor points out the inadequacy of the many contrivances whereby his countrymen have sought for the last half-century to strain social renovation. The French people resemble some luckless alchemist, ever sanguine though ever disappointed. About them lies in heaps their costly and useless apparatus—the implements of the never-realized projection, most of them in fragments, all in disorder. The laborious enthusiasts are scorched by their own furnace, scarred by the explosion of their choicest preparations. What can M. Sardinoux say? He reiterates the truth that the gospel only can bring healing. He speaks earnestly, though in general terms. Napoleon has fixed, for a time at least, that balance which used to waver with every mind, and determined it after the old and barbarous fashion of the Gallic conquerors of Rome—by throwing the sword into the scale. M. Sardinoux observes that Christianity had in the cradle to contend with two enemies, the Jewish and the Pagan error; that Paul was her champion against the

first, John against the second. These two serpents would seem to have been rather driven away than strangled by the infant Hercules. The former revived in the pageant of the mass and the power of the hierarchy; the latter lives again in the infidelity of the time. The Gnostic follies of the second century, with their mythology of abstraction, their pseudo-intellectualism, and their immoral tendencies, have all been paralleled or outdone by the socialist theories and sceptical dogmatism of the nineteenth. M. Sardinoux thinks that we must exhibit Christianity in the spirit of John to counteract this evil, as Luther maintained it after the type of Paul to destroy the other. There is some truth in this; but, as for France, she has more to dread, we think, from popery than from scepticism, and lacks a Paul even more than a John. Popery is the royal mistress now of the continental despots, the intriguing courtesan who guides in secret the politics of tyranny. All those in France who have any of the old Roman spirit in them, will see in Jesuitism the Scjanus of the modern Tiberius who occupies the throne of France, who lives environed by his legions, prescribes to a senate of automata, and whose only faith is universal suspicion, his sole instrument universal terror.—The *Systematic Theology* of Martensen, a Danish professor, is reviewed at great length, and very favourably, by Schöberlein. Dr. Martensen is already known to us by an able little volume on Master Eckart. In that work, modestly entitled, "A Historic Study," Martensen takes a more favourable view of the opinions of this mystic than that entertained by Dr. Schmidt in a paper which appeared some years ago in the *Studien und Kritiken*. From what we have read of Eckart, we are inclined to think that he should not be classed, as Martensen would place him, with Tauler. Allowance should be made for the apparently pantheistic expressions of a poetical philosophy or religionism. But the matter and manner of Eckart are scientific and metaphysical to a remarkable degree for the class to which he belonged. Unlike such men as Xenophanes, Novalis, or our own Sir Thomas Browne, who wrote poetical rhapsodies on philosophical questions, Eckart is argumentative and self-possessed, and there is not so large a deduction to be made in his case from the fervour of the fancy of occasional expressions. In his theology, which would appear to be in many respects a work of much value for Germany, Dr. Martensen has marked out a path for himself, somewhat similar to that of Tweten, as a corrector of the prominent defects of Schleiermacher's system. He handles religion more as a question of truth, and less as one of individual experience. While his system has inevitably a speculative character, he is careful to part off the respective domains

of theology and philosophy. In his view of evil he approaches too nearly to the doctrine of Schelling, though his estimate of sin as a whole appears to us more adequate than that of Schleiermacher. His theology is strongly imbued with what may be termed the Trinitarian type, which has of late found much favour in Germany among men of very opposite opinions. All is arranged according to a supposed three-fold development of the Divine Nature, and on the subject of the "Immanent," as distinct from the revealed, Trinity, Martensen loses himself, like many before him, in a maze of words.—A posthumous work of Vinet's, entitled *Pastoral Theology, or, The Theory of the Evangelical Ministry*, is reviewed by Dr. Kienlen. From the brief outline given, it would appear to be all that might be expected from the reputation of this first of modern French theologians. The book ought not to remain long without finding an English translator.—Kling reviews the *fourth Evangelical Church-day*, held at Elberfeld in Sept., 1851. The number closes with an article on the programme of the *Hague Union for the Defence of the Christian Religion* for 1851.

Kitto's Journal of Sacred Literature, for April:—I. Romanism as it is: II. Gregory of Nazianzum: III. The Rephaim: IV. Alford's Greek Testament: V. On the Nature of a Miracle: VI. Recent Travels in Palestine: VII. Elijah's Coming: VIII. The Last Blessings of Jacob: IX. The Epistle to Diognetus: X. Israel after the Flesh: XI. Remarks on 1 Chron. vi, 16-38, and Rev. xxii, 8, 9.

North British Review, for May:—I. Prospects of British Statesmanship and Policy: II. Phrenology—its Place and Relations: III. Village Life in England: IV. Romanism and European Civilization: V. Life and Chemistry: VI. King Alfred: VII. Binocular Vision and the Stereoscope: VIII. Memoirs of Dr. Chalmers.

Prospective Review, for May:—I. Life and Letters of Niebuhr: II. English Liturgies, Ancient and Reformed: III. German Letters on English Education: IV. Memoirs of Margaret Fuller Ossoli: V. The Reform Act of 1832: VI. The Soul in Nature.

Theological Critic, for April:—I. Greg's Creed of Christendom: II. Remarks on Henderson's Translation of Isaiah: III. Gottschalk and the Predestinarian Controversy of the Ninth Century: IV. Romans ix, x, xi: V. The Evidence of the Genuineness of the Gospels: VI. Newman's Lectures, addressed to the Brothers

of the Oratory: VII. The Cycles of Egyptian Chronology: VIII. 1 Tim. iv, 7-10.

Eclectic Review, for April:—I. India and our Supply of Cotton: II. Works of J. Fenimore Cooper: III. Wilkinson on the Connexion of the Human Body with Man: IV. Merivale's Imperial Rome: V. Patent Law Amendment: VI. Longfellow's Golden Legend: VII. Science and Religion: VIII. Roe buck's History of the Reform Ministry. *May*:—I. History of Maynooth College: II. Davidson's Introduction to the New Testament: III. Lord Holland's History of the Whig Party: IV. Representative Men: V. Narrative of the Voyage of H. M. S. Rattlesnake: VI. Howitt's Literature and Romance of Northern Europe: VII. The Life of Lord Jeffrey. *June*:—I. Life and Letters of Niebuhr: II. Miss Kavanagh's Women of Christianity: III. Memoirs of Margaret Fuller: IV. Dr. Hooker's Rhododendrons: V. Local History and Public Libraries: VI. Bancroft's History of the American Revolution: VII. The Visible Heavens: VIII. Deans and Chapters.

Christian Remembrancer, for April:—I. Tartary and Thibet—Budhism: II. Caswall's America: III. Perrone on the Immaculate Conception: IV. Margaret Fuller Ossoli: V. Paley's Supplices of *Aschylus*.

Our English brethren are taking a hint from American publishers. A new "Foreign Evangelical Review" is announced, to be published quarterly, and to consist chiefly of articles from the Reviews and Magazines of the United States. It will contain 224 pages, and be sold at about fifty cents a number.

AMONG the books in theology and kindred subjects recently announced on the continent of Europe are the following:

Synopsis evangeliorum Matthei, Marci, Luce cum locis qui supersunt parallelis litterarum et traditionum evangelicarum Ireneo antiquiorum. Ad Griesbachii ordinem concinnavit, prolegomena, selectam scripturæ varietatem, notas, indices adjectit Rud. Anger, Phil. et Theol. Dr., utriusque in acad. Lips. Professor, &c. Lipsiae, 1852. 314 pp., 4to.

Lehrbuch d. Kirchengeschichte zunächst für höhere Lehranstalten. Von Hrn. Kurtz, Dr. der Theol. und ord. Prof. an der Univ. Dorpat, u. s. w. Mitau, 1852. 244 pp., 8vo.

Die Waldenser im Mittelalter. Zwei historische Untersuchungen von A. With.

Dieckhoff, Lic. und Privatdoc. der Theol. z. Göttingen. Göttingen, 1851. 420 pp., 8vo.

Specimen e litteris orientalibus, exhibens Librum Geneseos, secundum arabicam pentateuchi samaritani versionem, ab *Abu-Sa'ido* conscriptam, quod — ex tribus codicibus edidit *Abrah. Kuenen*, Theol. Dr. Lugd. Bat., 1851. 189 pp., 8vo.

Ueber Micha den Morasthiten und seine prophetische Schrift. Ein monographischer Beitrag zur Geschichte des alttestamentlichen Schriftthums und zur Auslegung des Buches Micha. Von Dr. C. P. Cuspari, Lic. u. Lect. der Theol. an der norwegischen Universität. Christiania, 1851. 180 pp., 8vo.

Geschichte des Priszillianismus. Ein Versuch von Joh. Matth. Mandernach, Priester der Diöcese Trier. Trier, 1851. 112 pp., 8vo.

Beiträge zur Erklärung des alten Testaments. Drei Abhandlungen. Von Dr. Laur. Reinke, Prof. 1. Die Schwierigkeiten und Widersprüche mancher Zahlangaben in den Büchern des alten Testaments und deren Entstehung und Lösung. 2. Ueber das Recht der Israeliten an Canaan und über die Ursache seiner Eroberung und der Vertilgung seiner Einwohner durch die Israeliten, und die verschiedenen Erklärungsversuche darüber. 3. Ueber das Geblüde Jephata's Richt. xi, 30-40. Münster, 1851. 532 pp., 8vo.

Commentarius perpetuus in prioris Pauli ad Corinthios epistola caput quintum decimum. Cum epistola ad *Winerum*, theologum Lipsiensem, auctore *Wess. Alb. van Hengel*. Roterodami, 1851. 271 pp., 8vo.

Versuch einer vollständigen Einleitung in die Offenbarung des Johannes, und die apokalyptische Litteratur überhaupt. Von Dr. Fr. Lücke. 2. verm. u. verb. Auflage. 2. Lief. die Einleitung in die Johanneische Apokalypse, enthaltend 1. Abthlg. Bonn, 1851. 343-566 pp., 8vo.

De evangeliorum apocryphorum origine et usu. Disquisitio hist. critica, quam præmio aureo dignam censuit societas Hagana pro defendenda religione christiana. Auctore Dr. C. Tischendorf, Prof. Hage Comitum. (Lugduni Batav., 1851. 231 pp., 8vo.

AMONG the works in Theology and kindred subjects recently announced in Great Britain, are the following:—

Dissertation on the Origin and Connexion of the Gospels of Matthew, Mark, and Luke. With a Synopsis of the Parallel Passages

in Greek and English; and Critical Notes. By James Smith, Esq., of Jordanhill, F.R.S., &c., author of the 'Voyage and Shipwreck of St. Paul,' &c.:—A History of the Christian Church; for the use of Students in Theology, and general readers. Part I.—To the Reformation. By Rev. James C. Robertson, M.A. 2 vols., 8vo.:—A Memoir of the Rev. W. B. Johnson, Missionary of the Church Missionary Society at Regent's Town, Sierra Leone. Compiled from his own Journals and Correspondence. In one volume, fcp. 8vo.:—Nuns and Nunneries. Sketches, compiled entirely from Romish Authorities. In foolscap 8vo.:—Hippolytus and his age; or, Doctrine and Practice of the Church of Rome under Commodus and Alexander Severus. By C. C. J. Bunsen, D.C.L. 3 vols., post 8vo.:—A Handbook of Hebrew Antiquities. For the Use of Schools and Young Persons. By the Rev. Henry Brown, M.A., Prebendary of Chichester; edited by the Rev. T. K. Arnold, M.A., Rector of Lyndon, and late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. 12mo.:—Eight Essays on Various Subjects. By the Rev. S. R. Maitland, D.D., F.R.S., and F.S.A. Small 8vo.:—Ervin; or, Miscellaneous Essays on the Nature, History, and Destiny of Man. Second edition:—The Life of Cardinal Wolsey. By George Cavendish, his Gentleman Usher. New edition, reprinted from Dr. Wordsworth's Ecclesiastical Biography, with the addition of numerous Historical and Biographical Notes. 4to.:—Letters on the Church of Rome, addressed to the Rev. Emmanuel Farant, D.D., and L. L. D., Chaplain to the King of Sardinia, and Italian Missionary to England. By the Hon. and Rev. Baptist W. Noel, M.A. Fcp. 8vo.:—Lectures delivered before the Young Men's Christian Association, at Exeter Hall, during 1851-52. Fcp. 8vo.:—Rationale Apocalypticum; or, a Systematic Exposition of the Revelation: with Historical Proofs and Illustrations. To which is appended an Analysis of the principal Modern Commentaries from Mede downwards, including a Practical Examination of Mr. Elliot's "Hore Apocalypticæ." By the Rev. Alfred Jenour. 2 vols., 8vo.:—The Eclipse of Faith; or, a Visit to a Religious Sceptic. Post 8vo.:—Count Arensberg; or, the Days of Martin Luther. By the Rev. Joseph Sortain, B.A. Trinity College, Dublin. 2 vols., post 8vo.:—Progress of the Reformation in Ireland. A Series of Letters Written from the West of Ireland to a Friend in England, in September, 1851.

By the Earl of Roden. Second edition. Fcap. 8vo.:—The Resurrection of Life: an Exposition of 1 Cor. xv, with a Discourse

on our Lord's Resurrection, by John Brown, D. D. 8vo.:—The Triple Crown; or, the Power, Course, and Doom of the Papacy.

AMERICAN.

We are glad to see it announced that a new and complete edition of the works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, edited by Prof. Shedd, of the University of Vermont, is in the press of Harper and Brothers. It is to be issued in six or eight handsomely printed volumes.

The *Thirty-third Annual Report of the Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church* (1852) is a well-filled document of 232 pages. It is by far the most thorough and complete Report that has yet been issued, thanks to the energy and skill of the corresponding Secretary, Dr. Durbin. Illustrations, in the form of maps and plates, are not wanting; and the statistical tables at the end are very full. We should be glad to give an abstract of this excellent Report, did our limits allow; but we must content ourselves with expressing the hope that it will be scattered broadcast among the Churches, and do its work in stirring up the people to new zeal in the great cause of Christian Missions.

THE first number of the "*Presbyterian Quarterly Review*" gives promise of a valuable journal. It contains seven articles:—I. "Our Church and Our Review," defining the position of both, and showing in the wants of the one the call for the other: II. "The Mission of the Presbyterian Church," which, according to the writer, may be summed in four principles: 1. Religious Liberty in contrast with ecclesiastical power; 2. A living Calvinism in contrast with a rigid dogmatic system, enforced in the *ipissimum verba* of the formularies; 3. A cooperative Christianity, in contrast with an exclusive ecclesiasticism; and 4. the aggressive, in contrast with the exclusively conservative type of Christianity. Art. III. is an Introduction to the Book of Daniel; IV. is an explanation and brief vindication of Geology; Art. V. (the ablest in the number) is an examination of the doctrine of "Development" as taught by Newman and Möhler, in its application to Romanism; Art. VI. is an earnest address to the Laymen of the Presbyterian Church on their relations to the Church and to the Ministry; and Art. VII. contains notices of books. We welcome

this Review into the ranks of quarterly journalism, and wish it all possible success.

We continue our summaries of the contents of the American Theological Journals:—

Evangelical Review, (Gettysburg, Pa.) for April:—I. Martin Luther, in Pictorial Representations, &c.: II. Theories of Inspiration: III. The Influence of Physical Temperament on the Expression of Religious Feeling: IV. The Necessity and Authority of Apostolic Tradition: V. The Importance of Properly Developing the Resources of the Lutheran Church in America: VI. Works of Melanchthon: VII. Journal of a Voyage by Rev. Dr. Muhlenberg.

Brownson's Quarterly Review, (Boston,) for April:—I. The Existence of God: II. The Two Worlds, Catholic and Gentile: III. Austria and Hungary: IV. Paganism in Education: V. Reason and Revelation: VI. Protestantism and Government.

Christian Examiner, (Boston,) for April: I. The Andover and Princeton Theologies: II. Murray's and Latham's English Grammars: III. Conditions of Social Progress: IV. The New Exodus: V. The Procession of the Holy Ghost: VI. Juvenile Depravity and Reformatory Schools: VII. The Rev. William Ware: VIII. Life and Letters of Niebuhr.

Bibliotheca Sacra, (Andover,) for April:—I. India as a Field of Inquiry and Evangelical Labour: II. The Grotian Theory of the Atonement, from the German: III. Life of Zuingli, continued: IV. Writings of Richard Baxter: V. Observations on Matthew xxiv, 29-31, and the Parallel Passages in Mark and Luke, with Remarks on the Double Sense of Scripture: VI. The Practical Element in Christianity: VII. Remarks on the Idea of Religion from the German.

Biblical Repertory, (Princeton,) for April:—I. Works of John Owen, D. D.: II. Early Christianity in the British Isles: III. National Literature, the Exponent of National Character: IV. The Prophet Obadiah, Expounded by Charles Paul Caspary: V. The Jews at X'ac-fung-foo: VI. Lectures on the

Evidences of Christianity: VII. Bristed's Five Years in an English University: VIII. Parrhesia, or Christian and Ministerial Freedom of Speech.

Christian Review, (New-York,) for April:—I. Life and Writings of Andrew Fuller: II. The Method of the Divine Government: III. Recent German Works on Latin Grammar: IV. The Doctrine of the Holy Spirit's Presence in the World, Examined: V. Administrations of Washington and Adams: VI. Customs, Manners, and Religion of Nicaragua, in Central America: VII. Moses Stuart: VIII. Baptism for the Dead.

Church Review, (New-Haven,) for April:—I. Modern Theories of Social Progress: II. Western Church Missions: III. Syriac Biblical Literature: IV. Letter on the Confirmation of Converts from Rome: V. Type of Church Life: VI. The Church and the Times: VII. Stephen's Lectures on the History of France: VIII. American Ecclesiastical History—Humphrey's History of the Propagation Society, &c.

Quarterly Review of the Methodist E. Church, South, (Richmond,) for April:—I. Remarks, Exegetical and Doctrinal, on Gal. iii, 6-21: II. Power of the Soul over the Body: III. Life and Correspondence of Thomas Arnold, D.D.: IV. Hannah More: V. Relation of the Church to Missions: VI. The Divine Government: VII. Sketches and Skeletons.

Mercersburg Review, (Mercersburg, Pa.,) for April: I. Protestantism and Romanism: II. Philosophy of Persecution: III. The Synergistic Laws of Spiritual Life in Man IV. The Heidelberg Catechism: V. Latin Pronunciation: VI. Systematic Benevolence: VII. A Word of Explanation.

Southern Presbyterian Review, (Columbia, S.C.,) for April:—I. The Harmony of Revelation and Natural Science—The Final Conflagration: II. Pronunciation of Greek: III. The Character of Moses: IV. Remarks upon the Will, with some Strictures upon the Opinions of M'Cosh: V. Analogy of the Southern Language of Europe with the Latin: VI. The Unity of the Human Race.

Theological and Literary Journal, (New-York,) for April:—I. Genesis and the Theological Theory of the Age of the Earth: II. The Sabbath and its Modern Assailants: III. Progress of the Nineteenth Century: IV. Metaphysical and Gospel Truth and Error: V. The Figurative Character of the Sacred Writings.

Universalist Quarterly, (Boston,) for April:—I. Progress, as exhibited in the Government of Ancient Greece: II. Importance of Universalism in Religious Culture: III. Cranmer and the Anglican Church: IV. The Soul in the Future State: V. Tyre, Commerce, and Prophecy: VI. Justification by Faith, and Justification by Works: VII. Washington; or, Greatness.

Classical and Miscellaneous.

EUROPEAN.

THE Messrs. Grimm have recently announced their German Dictionary; and the favour with which it has been received may be gathered from the fact of its sale to the 20th of April having exceeded 7000 copies; the first part, consisting of 120 pages, contains about half of letter A, printed in royal 8vo., double columns.

The Leipsic Catalogue of publications for the half-year ending Michaelmas last (fair of St. Michael) comprehended 3860 titles, and 1168 in preparation; that of the Easter book-fair of the last six months, publications 4527, representing the issues of 903 publishers,—one contributing 113, and another 95.

AMONG the works in Philology and general Literature recently announced on the continent of Europe are the following:—

Gesammelte Abhandlungen aus dem klassischen Alterthume. Von C. W. Götting, Prof. zu Jena. 1 Bd. Halle, 1851. 405 pp.

Die vier Elemente der Baukunst. Ein Beitrag zur vergleichenden Baukunde, von Gottfr. Semper, ehemal. Director der Bau-schule zu Dresden. Braunschweig, 1851. 108 pp., 8vo.

Thorvaldsen's Leben nach den eigenhändigen Aufzeichnungen, nachgelassenen Papieren und dem Briefwechsel des Künstlers. Von Just. Mt. Thiele. Deutsch unter Mitwirkung des Vf. von Hor. Helms. 1. Bd. Mit d. Portrait Thorvaldsen's na. n Eckersberg. Leipzig, 1852. 351 pp., 8vo.

Geschichte der Erziehung, des Unterrichts und der Bildung bei den Griechen, Etruskern und Römern. Aus den Quellen

dargestellt von Dr. J. H. Krause. Halle, 1831. 453 pp. 8vo.

De l'éducation. Système théorique et pratique d'émulation et de discipline, &c., par M. Depau, chef d'institution. Paris, 1832. 8vo.

Mythologie der Skandinavier und Deutschen mit Bezugstellen aus deutschen und nordischen Dichtern. Von A. J. Weidenbach. Frankfurt a.M., 1831. 456 pp. 8vo.

AMONG the new works recently announced in Great Britain are the following:

Lient. Sherard Osborn's *Stray Leaves* from an Arctic Journal. Post 8vo.:—Mr. Samuel Laing's Notes on the Political and Social State of Denmark and the Duchies of Holstein and Sleswick. 8vo.:—China during the War and since the Peace. By Sir John F. Davis, Bart., late Her Majesty's Plenipotentiary in China. 2 vols., post 8vo., with Maps and Wood Engravings:—The Life of the Rev. W. Kirby: Chiefly from his Journals and Letters. By the Rev. John Freeman, M. A. 8vo. With Portrait and View of Barham Parsonage:—Dr. Roger's Thesaurus of English Words and Phrases classified and arranged to facilitate the Expression of Ideas and assist in Literary Composition:—Memoirs of the Whig Party during my time. By Henry Richard Lord Holland. Edited by his son, Henry Edward Lord Holland. Vol. I. Post 8vo.:—The Life of Marie de Medicis, Queen of France, Consort of Henry IV. By Miss Pardoe, author of "The City of the Sultan," &c. 3 vols., 8vo.:—Thirty-five Years in the East. Adventures, Discoveries, Experiments, and Historical Sketches, relating to the Punjab and Cashmere. By John Martin Konigberger, late Physician to the Court of Lahore. 2 vols., 8vo.:—Niebuhr's Lectures on Ancient History: Comprising the History of the Asiatic Nations, the Egyptians, Greeks, Carthaginians, and Macedonians. Translated from the German by Dr. L. Schmitz. 3 vols., 8vo.:—On the Methods of Observation and Reasoning in Politics. By G. Cornewall Lewis, M. P. 2 vols., 8vo.:—Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy in England. By W. Whewell, D. D., Master of Trinity College, Cambridge:—Leaves from the Note Book of a Naturalist. By W. J. Broderip, F. R. S. Reprinted from *Fraser's Magazine*:—Meliiora; or, Better Times to Come. Edited by Viscount Ingestre, and containing Papers by Rev. T. Beames, Hon. F. Byng, W. Beck-

ett Denison, Rev. C. Girdlestone, Viscount Goderich, Montague Gore, Dr. Guy, Rev. Dr. Hook, H. Mayhew, Rev. C. G. Nicolay, Hon. and Rev. S. G. Osborne, Rev. J. B. Owen, Martin F. Tupper:—The Six Colonies of New-Zealand. By W. Fox:—Handbook of the Religion and Mythology of the Greeks: with a Short Account of the Religious System of the Romans. From the German of Professor Stoll, by the Rev. R. B. Paul, and edited by the Rev. T. K. Arnold, M. A.:—Political Elements; or, The Principles of Modern Legislation. By Joseph Mosely, B. C. L.:—African Wanderings; or, an Expedition from Sennaar to Taka, Basa, and Beni-Amer; with a particular glance at the Races of Bellad-Sudan. By F. Werne, author of "Expedition in search of Sources of the White Nile." Translated from the German by J. R. Johnston. 16mo.:—Varieties of Mankind; or, an Account of the Distinctive Characters of the principal Races of Men. By W. B. Carpenter, M. D., F. R. S., F. G. S., Examiner in Physiology in the University of London. With numerous Engravings on Wood. Being Dr. Carpenter's Article on the Varieties of Mankind, reprinted, with Alterations and Additions, from "Todd's Cyclopaedia of Anatomy and Physiology":—Notes on Public Subjects, made during a tour in the United States and Canada. By Hugh Seymour Tremenheere, Esq., author of "The Political Experience of the Ancients." Post 8vo.:—Lives of the Earls of Essex, 1450 to 1646. I. The Earl Marshal of Ireland.—2. The Favourite.—3. The General of the Parliament. Founded upon Letters and Documents chiefly unpublished. By the Hon. Capt. Devereux, R.N. 2 vols.:—My Home in Tasmania, during a residence of nine years. By Mrs. Charles Meredith, author of "Notes and Sketches of New South Wales." With Illustrations. Post 8vo.

We continue our summaries of the principal Reviews of Great Britain:—

Quarterly Review, for April:—I. Sir Roger De Coverley: II. Horace Walpole's Garland: III. Diary of General Patrick Gordon: IV. Recent Epics: V. Comparative Anatomy: VI. Bohemian Embassy to England, &c., 1466: VII. Cannon, Musket, and Rifle: VIII. California *versus* Free Trade: IX. George III.—Grenville and Rockingham Papers—Lord Mahon's History, Vol. V. and VI.: X. Lamartine's History of the Restoration: XI. Lord John Russell and the Earl of Derby.

Edinburgh Review, for April:—I. Tronson du Coudray; Nouvelles Causes Célèbres: II. National Education: III. The Temporal Power of the Pope, Farini: IV. Athenian Architecture—Penrose: V. Industrial Investments: VI. J. Knox's Liturgy: VII. Mallet du Pan: VIII. Roe buck's History of the Whigs: IX. Squier's Nicaragua: X. Lord Derby's Ministry and Protection.

Dublin Review, for April:—I. Philosophic Researches on Christianity: II. Scipio de Ricci: III. The Leeds Experiment in Anglicanism: IV. Scandinavian Literature—The Royal Mirror: V. Are Heroes always Heroic: VI. Mignet's Mary Stuart: VII. Worsaae's Account of the Danes and Norwegians in England, Scotland, and Ireland: VIII. Dr. Newman's Lectures on the Present Position of Catholicism in England: IX. Lady Theologians.

English Review, for April:—I. Alison's Marlborough: II. Modern Latin Versifica-

tion: III. Dr. Newman and Protestant Prejudice: IV. Archer Gourney's Poems: V. National Defences—Colonel Chesney: VI. Price on the Anglo-Catholic Theory: VII. Works of Eliot Warburton.

Irish Quarterly Review, for March:—I. History of the Streets of Dublin: II. D'Israeli's Biography of Bentinck—Free Trade and no Trade: III. Mitford's Literary Recollections: IV. Maturin: V. Sam Slick's American Humour: VI. Irish Church History.

Westminster Review, for April:—I. The Government of India: II. Physical Puritanism: III. Europe—its Condition and Prospects: IV. A Theory of Population, deduced from the General Law of Animal Fertility: V. Shelley and the Letters of Poets: VI. The Commerce of Literature: VII. Lord Palmerston and his Policy: VIII. Early Quakers and Quakerism: IX, X., XI., XII. Contemporary Literature of England, America, Germany, and France.

A NEW MONTHLY.

THE subscribers will issue in July the first number of a new monthly publication, to be entitled *THE NATIONAL MAGAZINE, devoted to Literature, Art, Religion, and General Intelligence*. Its denomination as "National" is not designed to limit it to native productions or national topics, but to express its adaptation to the national tastes and to a national circulation. It will consist largely of choice selections from the current periodical literature of the parent country and of continental Europe; but it shall be characteristically American in its sentiments, and will abundantly represent our indigenous literature.

Assuming that a "progressive" spirit, practical predilections, and the religious sentiment, are characteristics of the American mind, and that these are not incapable of union with the best aesthetic tastes, it will be the aim of this periodical to combine, with such articles as the popular mind usually relishes with most avidity, an elevated literary tone, a critical appreciation of art, the discussion of great practical questions, and a just recognition of religion—religion without dogmatism and without sectarianism. Nothing shall appear in it which can directly or indirectly offend the general Christian sentiment, or render it unwelcome to the purest religious family. On the contrary, it will endeavour to enhance its literary and other attractions by a pervading religious spirit. It is, in fine, the design of the publishers to make it acceptable alike to the lovers of elegant but healthful literature, to the domestic circle, and to the literary man in his study.

It will be embellished with numerous engravings—most of them illustrative of real scenes or facts.

Besides an abundant miscellany of Essays, Sketches, Translations, Poetry, &c., original and selected, it will comprise departments of Literary News, Art Intelligence, Book Notices, Religious Information, and General News, prepared thoroughly by skilful hands.

The public may rely with certainty on the regular and permanent issue of the "National Magazine," as the fullest provisions for editing and publishing it have been made, based upon a capital entirely competent to the design.

It will be published at the commencement of each month, and contain ninety-six pages per number, making two volumes per annum, of nearly six hundred pages each. It will be the largest monthly of its price in the United States.

A liberal discount will be made to wholesale purchasers. To clergymen and others who act as agents in procuring subscribers, a commission of 20 per cent. will be allowed, or a sixth copy of the work for five subscribers.

Terms \$2 00 per annum, in advance. Single numbers, 18 $\frac{3}{4}$ cents.

CARLTON & PHILLIPS.

The first number is in press, and will be out shortly. Its contents are—

Periodical Literature. Editorial.
Sketch of Stephen Olin. (Engraving.)
Sketch of Dr. Lyman Beecher. (Engraving.)
Milton. (Five engravings.)
Greek Schools of Philosophy. (Two engs.)
The Jews' Walling-Place at Jerusalem. (Engraving.)
Poem—The Child in Heaven.
Sketch of Sterling—Religion of Carlyle.
Poem—An old Idea newly Clad.
Be not too Fastidious.
The Armenian Church and Mount Ararat.
Autobiography of a Shilling.
Romantic Fables and Popular Superstitions.
Grundtvig and his Song of Praise.
Peter Cariwright—A Character.
The Beacon-Fire of the Tyrol.—Founded upon fact.
Bob Multiform—The "Ne'er do Well."
Zezides; or, Devil Worshippers.
Cap of Liberty.

Thomas Moore—His Character as an Author.
Poem—Be Strong: A Word to the Fearful of Heart.
The Schoolmaster in Georgia.
History of the Pearl.
Marriage Ceremonies.
Hartley Coleridge.
Dust Showers and Red Rain.
Control of Temper.
Monomaniacs—Ludicrous Examples.
Synchronistics—The year 1618.
The Daughter's Marriage.
Lieutenant Holman, the Blind Traveller.
Herschell, Rosse, and the Telescope.
Mrs. Frye.
Murillo—Extraordinary Tuition Scene. (Eng.)
Art Intelligence.
Literary Record.
Religious Summary.
Scientific Items.
Editorial Notes.